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2Innovation districts are a relatively new strategy in urban economic  
development. They have been fast gaining attention and popularity, due in 
part to energetic third-party promotion and the apparent successes of two 
early adopters: Barcelona and Boston. As additional cities establish and  
promote innovation districts, it benefits policymakers to possess  
information regarding their characteristics and suitability as an economic 
development approach.
We conduct in-depth case studies of four innovation districts in the United 
States—located in Boston, Detroit, Saint Louis, and San Diego—that present 
contrasting settings, policies, and outcomes. The empirical information is 
drawn primarily from interviews with the innovation district creators and 
implementers and the entrepreneurs embedded within them. We assess the 
expectations, design, implementation, and operation of these innovation 
districts, with reference to stated and normative policy goals along with  
theories of regional economic development. Our purpose is to provide 
scholars and policymakers with guidance as to how, and how well,  
innovation districts may achieve the aim of urban economic development  
to generate economic dynamism and prosperity.
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CHAPTER 1: INVESTIGATING 
INNOVATION DISTRICTS 
8This study investigates the urban economic development strategy of  
innovation districts. As the phenomenon of innovation districts currently  
is flourishing and expanding across the nation, it commands rigorous  
attention from those interested in understanding economic development  
in the United States. Researching the design, opportunities, and pitfalls 
associated with the economic development strategy will be valuable to 
policymakers. By studying innovation districts, we aim to provide practical 
guidance to governments, nonprofit organizations, and other interested 
actors as they consider devoting substantial effort and resources toward 
improving their local and regional economies.
Because innovation districts are relatively new, this research does not claim 
to provide definitive empirical knowledge or results. Moreover, it is too 
early in the application of innovation districts to conduct widespread  
empirical evaluation. Instead, our approach focuses on examining four 
cases of innovation districts that present contrasting settings and policies. 
We assess the economic development efforts as they have progressed so far 
by drawing on existing theories of regional economic development and by 
relating the design and implementation of innovation district actions to 
stated and normative goals. In conducting this research relatively early in 
terms of innovation district applications, we anticipate the information to 
be opportune for the consideration of local economic development policy-
makers and stakeholders.
The structure of this report is as follows. The remainder of this chapter is 
devoted to explaining the idea of innovation districts and outlining the 
aims of the study. The second chapter describes the research methods,  
both the selection of the comparative cases and the way in which  
information was obtained and compared for each case study. Chapters 
Three, Four, Five, and Six present detailed presentations and analyses of 
four innovation districts. Chapter Seven focuses on findings and implica-
tions that derive from comparing across the cases. Chapter Eight concludes 
with recommendations for economic developers and policymakers.
1   INTRODUCTION
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9Innovation districts have been gaining attention during the past several 
years as a new strategy in American urban economic development.  
In a policy arena that has a history of crazes and follow-the-leader  
strategies, innovation districts may well be the next fad: cities across the 
United States are designating areas and enacting economic development 
policies under the rubric of innovation districts. Locations nationwide are 
claiming the establishment of innovation districts, from Buffalo to  
Chattanooga to Albuquerque to Seattle. In addition to the typical desire  
of city leaders to keep pace with the trend-setters, the proliferation of  
innovation districts has been buoyed by the enthusiastic promotion of 
Bruce Katz of the Brookings Institution along with several of his colleagues 
(e.g., Katz and Bradley 2013; Katz 2014b; 2015; Katz et al. 2015; Vey et al. 
2018; Wagner et al. 2019).
The initial inspiration for innovation districts in the United States  
traces from the 22@ district of Barcelona, Spain (Katz and Bradley 2013).  
A former industrial area within the Poblenou neighborhood, the location 
had already experienced publicly-led redevelopment in the lead-up to the 
1992 Summer Olympic Games that included the removal of obsolete  
infrastructure and abandoned factory buildings and the erection of  
landmark residential structures. In 2000, the city endowed a private legal 
entity, 22@BCN, with specific financing and investment authority and the 
charge to administer (and publicize) the transformation of approximately 
115 city blocks into a center for innovative economic activity in five  
industrial sectors: media, information communications technology,  
medical technology, energy, and design. Ten universities and nine  
research and design centers are located within the industrial district.  
The area has drawn numerous start-up firms and witnessed major  
growth in employment in the ensuing couple of decades (Barnett et al. 
2014; March and Ribera-Fumaz 2016).
The evident success of Barcelona’s 22@ district has drawn the attention  
of economic developers and policymakers in the United States. Yet as  
interest in innovation districts has expanded, so has the meaning of the 
term broadened. Despite (or perhaps partly because of) their recent  
popularity, innovation districts are not well-defined as a concept or a policy 
approach. Instead, innovation districts have been identified in the United 
States primarily in an inductive manner—by recognizing a number of  
familiar features—as well as through self-declaration by those promoting 
the strategy locally. Katz and Bradley describe innovation districts by  
reference to their goals and supporting features in this way (2013, p.114): 
“innovation districts cluster and connect leading-edge anchor institutions 
and cutting-edge innovative firms with supporting and spin-off companies, 
2   WHAT ARE INNOVATION DISTRICTS?
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business incubators, mixed-use housing, office and retail, and twenty-first-
century amenities and transport.” Without explicitly defining the setting, 
characteristics specified by Katz and Bradley such as spatial proximity, 
modern transportation, and mixed-use development suggest an urban  
environment. Katz and Wagner do add the descriptor “urban” in a
subsequent report (2014a). Lawrence et al. (2019, p.2) similarly define  
innovation districts by their aims, as geographic areas “intended to attract 
and support creative and entrepreneurial people, institutions, and  
businesses”, also describing them as a component of regional innovation
ecosystems, a concept explored below. Innovation, itself a complex and  
potentially contested concept, is referenced recursively in Katz’s  
descriptions, and locally authored explanations of particular innovation 
districts typically do little to identify the boundaries of what is being  
classified as innovation. From the perspective of policy design, action 
agents are crucially ambiguous in Katz’s and his coauthors’ descriptions.1 
Are private firms and anchor institutions responsible for the development 
of innovation districts?2 What is the role of the public sector? Whereas  
Lawrence et al. (2019) explain that innovation districts tend to distribute 
control among multiple types of entities, the lack of detail in their  
discussion implies substantial variation in composition and administrative 
structures. Can innovation districts arise from market forces, in which  
case perhaps they are unsuitable as a target for purposive public direction 
(Feldman and Francis 2004)?
To conduct this study, it is important for us to define innovation districts  
in a manner that permits the selection of useful cases for detailed  
examination and supports comparisons both among these cases and with 
other relevant examples. A practical definition must set boundaries on the
concept, which, in contrast to inductive descriptions or policymaker  
assertions, serve to include and also to exclude certain examples and  
possibilities. We define innovation districts to be spatially delineated urban 
areas in which firms connect with each other and with anchor institutions 
to foster innovation and entrepreneurship, with active support from  
policies and programs, effective infrastructure, attractive amenities, and 
conducively structured economic and social spaces.3 Physical demarcation 
restricts innovation districts to a particular urban space, either fixed  
initially or after the fact with some degree of intentionality. This supports 
the establishment or development of a particular identity for the district 
and carries implications (considered below) for garnering benefits from 
agglomeration and the concentration of political and policy attention.  
This component of our definition does not disqualify districts that  
undergo changes to their geographies, but is meant to exclude amorphous 
or fluidly-defined places (e.g., Silicon Valley in California).
The definition requires innovation districts, unsurprisingly, to focus on 
spurring or attracting innovation in entrepreneurial ventures and possibly 
in established firms as well. Anchor institutions serve to draw attention  
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1 Katz et al. depict the involvement of 
some of the major organizations and 
actors without identifying particular
roles or assigning responsibility for  
outcomes. For example, in condensing 
the observations of innovation district
leaders, Katz and Wagner refer to the 
Triple Helix of industry, research  
universities, and government interacting 
in a structured manner being critical to 
the success of innovation districts but 
avoid digging into the specifics of such
interactions or the allocation of duties 
(2014a, pp. 14-15).
2 Anchor institutions are sizable,  
immobile organizations, often non- 
profits, that have vested interests in their
surrounding local and regional  
economies (Initiative for a Competitive 
Inner City and Staples Foundation for
Learning 2010; Birch et al. 2013).
3 We wish to distinguish innovation  
districts from two similarly-titled  
international concepts. (1) African  
innovation districts, also termed  
innovation hubs, are national programs 
aimed at jump-starting technology- 
intensive industry activity by establishing  
co-working spaces and business  
incubator and accelerator facilities.  
These efforts are normally sited in a 
primate capital city and many involve 
partnerships with international firms.  
(2) Urban innovation, sometimes labeled 
urban entrepreneurialism, refers to local 
development approaches that initiate 
rather than manage economic growth 
and that borrow approaches from the 
private sector such as risk-taking,  
innovation (in policy), and self- 
promotion. Urban innovation is a  
mode or framework for local economic  
development rather than a specific 
strategy.
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and supply locally-committed assets and resources, with engagement  
approaches that tend to reflect local character and community goals.  
Unversities are the most common type of anchor institution, but other 
knowledge producers, such as laboratories or research institutes, or cultural 
or civic institutions may also anchor innovation districts. There must be 
active policy or programmatic support, though the timing, design,  
implementation agents, scope, and robustness of action may vary  
tremendously. Local government may provide enabling infrastructure,  
redevelopment funding, or supportive land use and zoning regulations.
Public or quasi-public agencies, anchor institutions, or other non-profit 
organizations may establish or ratify the physical boundaries of the district, 
supply marketing or promote visibility such as via signage to set the district 
apart from surrounding areas, or oversee the administration of the  
innovation district as an organizational entity. Any or all of these kinds  
of organizations may be involved in education and workforce training  
programs that impart knowledge and skills vital to innovation or  
entrepreneurship, such as STEM (science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics) fields and business management.
Like the descriptions proffered by Katz and others, our definition maintains 
the breadth of the innovation concept. Innovation is the application of new 
ideas and technology to generate economically valuable production: this is 
the key to producing the economic growth and dynamism that is the stated 
rationale for many innovation districts.4 Innovation may also encompass 
cultural and artistic novelty, the driver of creativity-based urban develop-
ment strategies. Or innovation may be confined to creations that are novel 
within a particular industry (for example, analytical methods and  
instruments within the financial sector). According to our non-scientific 
canvass of readily available material, innovation district organizations and 
promotional materials normally do not specify publicly their  
conceptualization of innovation.
This practical definition encompasses most, though not all, of the  
innovation districts examined by Katz and his co-authors, and many  
of the most prominent innovation districts in the United States. It excludes 
locations that operate without active policies or programs, including those 
in which cities or other organizations have sought to brand existing  
collections of innovative activities as “innovation districts” without  
engaging in additional actions to generate or attract innovation or  
entrepreneurship (e.g., Kendall Square in Cambridge, Massachusetts).  
The definition also omits non-urban sites, such as the Research Triangle 
Park in North Carolina despite its recent redevelopment efforts to increase 
density and broaden its mix of land uses (Katz and Wagner 2014a; Bracken 
2015).
CHAPTER 1: INVESTIGATING INNOVATION DISTRICTS
4 Our terminology follows the standard 
distinction between invention, which 
refers solely to discovery, and innovation, 
which encompasses commercialization 
(Schumpeter 1939; Arora et al. 2016).
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What are innovation districts likely to achieve, and by what means? These 
questions are crucial for local elected leaders and policymakers who  
aspire to do more than blindly follow a popular policy trend. Evaluating the 
suitability of the strategy in a particular location, and tailoring the approach 
for local goals and circumstances, requires understanding how innovation 
districts operate to encourage and support innovation, entrepreneurship, 
and economic development. We identify and explain three primary  
rationales for innovation districts as an urban economic development  
strategy. Although these justifications are separate in terms of their  
theoretical explanations, they are not exclusive and ought to be able to  
operate in tandem.
3   JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INNOVATION DISTRICTS
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3.1. The spatial economy: agglomeration, entrepreneurial ecosystems,  
      and labor
Innovative enterprises benefit from locating in proximity to other  
innovative agents. A main reason is the capability to access and absorb  
useful knowledge produced externally to the firm. At least as far back as  
the late 19th century, the agglomeration advantage of knowledge spillovers 
has been accepted as a leading explanation for the spatial assemblage of 
innovative activity (Marshall [1890] 1910). Specialized knowledge diffuses 
among entities engaged in similar activities, knowledge that spills across 
organizations focusing on different problems and issues leads to original 
insights, and interaction and rivalry among competitors fuels the drive to 
innovate (these non-market influences often are termed Marshall- 
Arrow-Romer, Jacobs, and Porter externalities, respectively) (Arrow 1962; 
Jacobs 1969; Romer 1986; Porter 1990; Audretsch 2003).
The extent to which proximity is a necessary condition for knowledge spill-
overs to occur depends on the types of knowledge producers and recipients. 
Although there is no general consensus in the literature, a number of  
studies find that knowledge spillovers from major anchor institutions such 
as universities and research centers may spread over substantial regional 
(metropolitan-scale) distances, whereas firm-to-firm knowledge spill-
overs often seem to diminish much more rapidly with distance (Funke and 
Niebuhr 2005; Goldstein and Drucker 2006; Fu 2007; Sonmez 2015;  
Drucker 2016). As might be expected, innovation-intensive industries tend 
to be more dependent on nearby knowledge spillovers than are industries 
that rely less on innovation (Audretsch and Feldman 1996a; Drucker 2012).
In addition to knowledge spillovers, spatial propinquity among innovative 
actors facilitates face-to-face contacts and chance meetings that help to 
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establish professional and interpersonal networks (Storper and Venables 
2004; Autant-Bernard et al. 2007; Christopherson et al. 2008). Informal and 
cross-sector networks, also known as “weak ties”, are particularly difficult 
to form and maintain across distances (Granovetter 1973).5 Yet it is such 
connections that are especially valuable in generating imaginative ideas 
(Sonmez 2015).
Innovation activity, and thus the spillover and networking benefits that 
accrue from spatial concentration, may decline as firms mature or industry 
life cycles progress, raising the issue of whether innovation and entrepre-
neurship lead to substantial economic growth in the same location  
(Audretsch and Feldman 1996b). Rapid transportation and sophisticated
telecommunication, enhanced firm and employee mobility, greater division 
of the product life cycle across firms or among sites of multi-establishment 
firms, and hindrances to scaling production in urban locations all are  
factors that may limit the ultimate impact of innovation districts on the  
politically critical metrics of jobs and income (Potter and Watts 2011; 
Shearmur and Bonnet 2011; Duranton and Kerr 2015). Moreover, if firm 
profits can be improved by relocating activity to less costly or more  
attractive locations once innovation intensity declines and proximity 
advantages diminish, then it may be the economically troubled, lagging, 
lessdesirable cities and regions that are least likely to reap the long-term 
benefits from creating active and successful innovation districts.
The entrepreneurial (or innovation) ecosystem concept broadens consid-
eration from knowledge spillovers to a wider set of advantages conferred 
upon entrepreneurs and innovators by the full set of actors, assets, and 
activities that constitute their surrounding environment. The elements of
entrepreneurial ecosystems include knowledge producing organizations, 
human capital and workforce characteristics, financial capital, government 
regulations and supports, business services, interfirm networks, and local 
business climate and culture.6 The quality and particular features of these 
ecosystem components affect the likelihood of individuals choosing to 
become entrepreneurs, the type of businesses that entrepreneurs establish, 
and the probability of entrepreneurial success, and thus help to determine 
local competitiveness. Enhanced competitiveness, in turn, may support and 
augment the contributing elements of the ecosystem, generating a virtuous 
economic development cycle (Audretsch and Pena-Legazkue 2012).
Entrepreneurial ecosystems are sturdier and more economically  
advantageous if they incorporate a variety of types of firms and  
organizations: not only start-ups but also established companies, not only 
small and vigorous ventures but also large and prudent firms (Isenberg 
2014; Lawrence et al. 2019). Each type is capable of contributing something 
different to the mixture, from dynamism and inventiveness to stability and 
resourcefulness. Innovation outcomes tend to benefit from the coexistence 
CHAPTER 1: INVESTIGATING INNOVATION DISTRICTS
5 “Strong ties”, in contrast, are formal 
within-network connections.
6 The entrepreneurial ecosystem concept 
is akin to the regional innovation systems 
idea in common usage in Europe.
Regional innovation systems consist of 
elements that influence innovation  
activity at the regional scale, namely the
economic actors and institutions,  
regulatory environment, supportive  
programs and policies, and social  
attitudes and relationships concerning 
innovation (Cooke 2002; Moulaert and 
Sekia 2003).
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of entrepreneurial endeavors with older and larger firms (Cohen and  
Klepper 1992; Martin and Scott 2000; Feldman et al. 2002, Ch. 4; Agrawal 
et al. 2012). Companies with established products often pursue more  
incremental time- and cost-saving innovations, whereas start-ups are more 
likely to seek and find entirely new technological and market niches.  
In addition, the greater resources of large firms enable them to invest in 
projects that require lumpy investments or pose greater risk, in return for 
potentially large returns across long time horizons.
The measure of an entrepreneurial ecosystem’s strength is not the quantity 
or density of its entrepreneurs (Isenberg 2014). Indeed, all else being equal, 
additional entrepreneurs implies more business attempts of marginal  
quality or potential (Shane 2009). More reasonable gauges of ecosystem 
quality are whether the system is self-sustaining over time and its degree  
of vibrancy, as ongoing activity and flux represent opportunities for entre-
preneurs (Isenberg 2011; Stangler and Bell-Masterson 2015).
Labor is decreasingly contained within traditional firm boundaries.  
Employee mobility and flexible cooperative endeavors boost knowledge 
diffusion; these mechanisms are especially important in innovation- 
intensive industries (Saxenian 1994; Ter Wal and Boschma 2008;  
Serafinelli 2015; Sonmez 2017). In contrast to what was the norm for most 
of the twentieth century, many employees no longer expect to perform 
tasks on fixed schedules and in fixed locations. Workers engaging in  
innovation activities increasingly provide labor through the “gig” or  
“platform” economy, wherein tasks are accomplished through contractual 
arrangements outside of conventional employment (Davis 2016; Kenney 
and Zysman 2016). These arrangements are enabled and supported by 
modern information and communication technologies that permit work, 
including collaborative activities, to occur nearly anywhere and at any time. 
For some employees, this means engaging in work, or feeling pressure to 
work, everywhere and all the time (Mazmanian et al. 2013; Putnam et al. 
2014; Kubicek et al. 2017).
As labor is performed in conjunction with other daily activities, built envi-
ronments that support this overlapping and blending of life components are 
in demand. Employees and employers increasingly seek locations that offer 
convenient transportation infrastructure and speedy telecommunications; 
that host a variety of spaces suited for work, household chores, recreation, 
and socialization in close proximity; that offer alternative designs and types 
of workspace that are flexible and scalable; or that support in other ways the 
complex and frequently unpredictable calendars that accompany the mod-
ern economy. Designs that attempt to stimulate innovation are premised on 
the understanding that innovation is collaborative, technology-intensive, 
and inter-sectoral. Therefore, design, both physical and programmatic, 
prioritizes open and convergent environments that encourage face-to-face 
interactions in order to foster ideation and product commercialization.  
CHAPTER 1: INVESTIGATING INNOVATION DISTRICTS
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The design of the district, in addition to the scale, is catalytic in ensuring 
this level of engagement and connectivity.
Innovation districts fit well with current understandings of the spatial  
geography of innovation, agglomeration, and labor. To the extent that  
innovation districts succeed in clustering entrepreneurial and innovative 
firms with each other and with knowledge-producing institutions they 
ought to yield increased quantity or quality of innovation outputs.  
Although their footprints vary in size, innovation districts aim to operate 
on a neighborhood scale that is walkable or permits efficient transportation 
options and, in conjunction with a varied mix of land uses and activities, 
offers the amalgamated “live-work-play” environment that matches the life-
styles of the innovation workforce. This scale is consistent with maximizing 
knowledge spillovers and supporting chance encounters, informal  
interactions, and networks. The programmatic design of innovation  
districts is double-layed, providing direct supports (e.g., incubators,  
anchor institutions, Wi-Fi connectivity) and fostering the networking  
opportunities critical for forming and strengthening both strong and  
weak ties. Industry-specific activities cultivate strong ties, whereas the  
weak ties essential for diffusing information, contacts, and business leads 
are kindled by diverse programmed events, from hack-a-thons and entre-
preneur round tables to yoga and craft beer tastings. Innovation districts 
that bring together and build linkages among a variety of types of actors 
and institutions are more likely to generate a robust and enduring  
entrepreneurial ecosystem.
On the other hand, taking advantage of the knowledge produced in univer-
sities and research institutions may not require gathering potential  
recipients into their immediate vicinity. Locations across the city and  
region and even extending to neighboring metropolitan regions may be 
close enough for this particular purpose. Innovation district actors and 
networks can act to extend connections to institutions and assets located 
outside the district proper.
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3.2. Placemaking
Regions compete with each other for firms, talent, and private investment, 
both within nations and against international locations as well. Cities often 
adopt placemaking strategies that involve developing and publicizing one 
or more smaller locations as subsets of the larger urban area in order to 
appeal to particular targets.7 
As part of this approach, innovation districts present a combination of  
features that may be highly attractive to innovative enterprises and  
associated actors. Moreover, local governments and politicians can  
emphasize the salient features of these particular locations in order to  
7 The current application of “place- 
making” to mean the intentional design 
and advertising of attractive and dis- 
tinguishing aspects of locations evolved 
from an earlier, narrower use of the 
term, primarily by landscape architects 
and urban designers, referring to the 
provision of public spaces (Schindler 
2017).
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cultivate a deliberate impression of the wider region, including its  
governance, institutions, and business culture.
Focusing on external promotion, innovation districts contribute  
opportunities to shape the outward-facing image or brand of a city or  
urban area (Clark et al. 2016; Saffron 2016). Firms that have the where-
withal to select initial sites or change their locations are responsive to the 
location preferences of their most highly valued (and difficult to replace) 
employees and executives. Relatively young, highly educated workers— 
and especially the millennial generation—are perceived to be among those 
most attracted to the dense, vibrant, mixed-use urban environments offered 
by innovation districts. Without delving into the many scholarly debates 
about the accuracy, utility, and social implications of creative class theory 
and its associated prescriptions for talent recruitment, inescapably it is true 
that numerous policymakers have adopted the imperative to make the city, 
or at least selected portions of it, attractive to the most talented and  
innovative members of society (Storper and Scott 2009; Perry 2010).
Innovation districts also constitute a device for redefining or remaking 
the image of a community from the perspective of current city residents 
and existing institutions. In some cases, innovation districts may supplant 
underutilized or derelict areas in a wholesale fashion; in other locations, 
ongoing and gradual investments in infrastructure, changes in residential 
and business populations, and intentional marketing efforts shift existing 
perceptions toward a new image of a neighborhood. Whether placemaking 
efforts accomplish their aims depends on the mix of building types created 
or preserved, the quality of the surrounding environment, the perceived 
distinctiveness and authenticity of the outcome, and the resulting area’s 
attractiveness to the target audiences (Lawrence et al. 2019; Wagner 2019). 
As is also true for other types of placemaking efforts8, shaping the public 
impression of a locality through developing an innovation district can be 
directed by a collaborative and inclusive public process, can impose in top-
down fashion a vision designed by political and business elites, or can fall 
anywhere in between these extremes.
CHAPTER 1: INVESTIGATING INNOVATION DISTRICTS
8 Arts and cultural development and 
redevelopment strategies currently are 
popular (Grodach and Loukaitou-Sideris 
2007; Sparks et al. 2012).
3.3. Urban revitalization
Although related to and indeed dependent upon the spatial economic  
geography and placemaking justifications described above, urban  
revitalization designates an additional rationale for innovation districts 
as an economic development strategy. Both economically booming and 
struggling cities are looking toward innovation districts as a mechanism 
for boosting the fiscal circumstances of local government (Wagner et al. 
2019). Yet the ultimate impacts of a successful innovation district, as well 
as the implementation mechanisms likely to achieve such outcomes, may 
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be much different if it is sited in a location suffering substantial economic 
distress than in an area with growing population, activity, and demand for 
real estate. As a tool for revitalizing stagnant or declining areas, innovation 
districts ought to be evaluated not only on their prospects for supporting 
innovation and generating associated economic activity, but also regarding 
the variety and persistence of economic opportunities created, how well 
they integrate existing populations with such new opportunities, and how 
the innovation district once established will fit with its broader social and 
physical surroundings.
Katz and Wagner (2014a) delineate innovation districts in areas under- 
going rapid development or that enjoy strong localized demand separately 
from those in cities seeking to harness innovation districts to redevelop 
underutilized locations.9 (They list Boston, Brooklyn, and Seattle among 
several other examples of the latter type.) Although Katz and Wagner do 
not detail the urban features or policies that distinguish the two kinds of 
innovation districts, they do note that redevelopment-focused innovation 
districts normally are sited in former industrial or warehousing districts 
that are not far from city centers and mass transportation facilities. Such 
locations possess some of the desirable characteristics that contribute to  
innovation districts but have yet to be repurposed via market forces or 
other government initiatives from lower-density land uses experiencing 
diminishing demand.
As with other strategies for urban revitalization, the specter of innovation 
districts as imposing a particular redesign on a location raises issues of 
inclusion and social equity (Flint 2016; Wagner et al. 2019). Processes that 
determine a community’s future without involving current residents may  
be deficient in terms of fairness and adherence to democratic values; 
dominant visions of a future innovation district that do not demonstrate 
a feasible place for varied populations including current residents imply 
gentrification, displacement, and exclusion (Stehlin 2016; Lawrence et al. 
2019). This is one aspect of the general problem in planning and urban 
development to find the appropriate balance of the new with the old, to 
accommodate the existing while enabling the incoming—a challenge that 
ultimately must defy any single comprehensive solution (Rittel and Webber 
1973).
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9 The first type encompasses those 
innovation districts identified by Katz 
and his co-authors that our working 
definition excludes for not having active 
support from the public sector or anchor 
institutions.
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Are innovation districts something new in economic development? We 
contend that they are, but not because any of the individual components 
that comprise innovation districts are novel ideas or approaches. All sorts 
of neighborhood, community, and economic development strategies start 
with designating and promoting a particular area; there are a wide variety 
of policies employed to foster innovation and entrepreneurship, often at a 
region-wide scale; and numerous rationales justify the provision of efficient 
infrastructure, attractive amenities, and dense mixed-use neighborhoods. 
What distinguishes innovation districts from prior strategies is that they 
unite these features and approaches in a single location. Katz and Bradley 
declare innovation districts “a classic case of the whole being greater than 
the sum of its parts (2013, p. 115). It is the assembly of the assorted  
elements, and the emphasis on combining them to construct an  
environment that maximizes the potential for successful innovation and 
entrepreneurship, that make innovation districts a new approach in urban 
economic development.
To illustrate their distinctiveness, it is helpful to contrast innovation  
districts with economic development strategies that evidence similarities. 
Research and science parks, for instance, aim to supply a desirable location 
for research-intensive firms or the research function of multi-site firms, 
often near to one or more knowledge-generating institutions such as a uni-
versity or a public laboratory. Co-location with other firms  
establishes the potential for agglomeration benefits as described above,  
and parks’ affiliations with research organizations can produce direct  
advantages such as preferred access to personnel and specialized equip-
ment. To maximize spillover opportunities and the value of institutional 
relationships, many research parks are geared toward specific industries or 
sectors (Technology Partnership Practice 2007). Innovation districts are 
similar in aspiring to generate agglomeration advantages through  
proximity, and may provide preferential or exclusive access to the resources 
of associated institutions. Most innovation districts are intended to attract 
a broad range of kinds and sizes of innovative and entrepreneurial firms, 
often across different economic sectors, and in so doing construct a vibrant 
community that supports the Jacobs type of externalities as well as  
Marshall-Arrow-Romer and Porter externalities. Yet there are research 
parks that are open to innovative firms broadly defined, and there are  
innovation districts planned for particular industries or types of firms, so 
this distinction is not complete. Clearer differences between the two  
strategies become evident in considering physical characteristics and the 
mix of uses. Research parks provide bucolic and soothing settings,  
separated from bustle and commotion in support of clarity of thought for 
researchers and innovators. Suburban or exurban locations and attendant 
4   WHAT MAKES INNOVATION DISTRICTS DIFFERENT?
CHAPTER 1: INVESTIGATING INNOVATION DISTRICTS
19
building styles and layouts often are a part of this approach10, but more 
important is the uniformity of uses, focusing on traditional work spaces 
situated in park-like campuses and offering only minimal commercial
or other uses as conveniences so as to minimize distractions (Mozingo 
2011). Innovation districts adopt the opposite approach, touting the “live-
work-play” fusion of life components and the active energy or “buzz” they 
fashion, particularly promoting this aspect toward the more youthful  
generations of workers and entrepreneurs (Wagner et al. 2019). Indeed, 
some research parks are attempting to remake themselves into more  
urbanized, mixed-use environments to entice the millennial workforce 
(e.g., Research Triangle Park in North Carolina; see Katz and Wagner 
2014a; Bracken 2015).
As another example, incubators are organizations or programs that  
provide services and assistance to fledgling businesses to nurture them 
toward self-sufficiency (Tornatzky et al. 1996; Qian et al. 2011). An incu-
bator may provide a building or a portion of a building to congregate early 
ventures physically, or may operate “virtually”. Research parks often contain 
one or more incubators; incubators may form a part of the programming of 
innovation districts as well, since the function of incubators is to encourage 
and sustain innovative activity. On their own, however, incubators do not 
encompass a physical area offering uses and amenities beyond entre- 
preneurial space and associated support services.
Innovation districts are distinct from but can overlap with several other 
approaches to urban development. Mixed-use development has seen a  
resurgence in popularity in the United States since the early 1990s, due to 
the realization of benefits such as shorter commutes, efficient infrastructure 
provision, and distinctive neighborhood character. Municipal and coun-
ty planning departments can encourage mixed-use development through 
mixed zoning, negotiated density bonuses, and planned urban develop-
ments, among other tools (University of Delaware Institute for Public  
Administration 2018). Mixed-use development is one of the characteristics 
(or, from the perspective of planners, one of the tools) that can supply the 
mix of spaces, amenities, and opportunities to make innovation districts 
attractive. Transit-oriented development focuses on creating compact  
communities centered around mass transportation and pedestrians, 
 offering one approach for achieving the land use, density, and amenity 
aspects of innovation districts. Placemaking, discussed above, can feed into 
the marketing strategies of an innovation district, or the innovation district 
may serve as one element of a wider placemaking effort; the same is true of 
the relationship of innovation districts to other types of cultural  
development strategies.
Cluster policy may also correlate with innovation district strategies.  
Cluster-led economic development organizes the activities of a municipality 
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10 Locations on the periphery of urban 
areas and building styles that separate 
enterprises and distribute space at
relatively low densities are more common 
in the United States than in Europe or 
Asia and are more common in research 
parks founded in the 1980s or earlier.
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or region in economic development around a set of interrelated industries 
or firms, with potential agglomeration benefits as a key justification (Perry 
2010). An innovation district focused on select industries, or designed to 
accommodate certain types of innovative activities, fits well with the cluster 
development framework.
Innovation districts often are confused with or not clearly separated from 
these and other economic and urban development strategies. In some 
instances this occurs due to the lack of definitional clarity, but it also arises 
from the breadth of scope of innovation districts. The conceptual  
distinctiveness of innovation districts is not found in the elements that 
comprise the strategy, but in their confluence as a multi-faceted yet  
cohesive approach to urban economic development.
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We intend this study to result in an improved understanding of the strategy 
of innovation districts and its potential application in urban economic  
development. The spread of innovation districts across the country  
indicates the practical value of deliberately considering their design,  
features, and potential achievements. Scholars of urban policy may find 
innovation districts especially intriguing as they present a convergence of 
ideas gathered and validated across several theoretical and policy domains. 
Furthermore, because the strategy builds on broader social, economic, 
and cultural trends, its implementation and consequences help to illumi-
nate the continuing evolution of location decisions from both the firm and 
employee perspectives. Across all of these arenas, we hope that our findings 
provide guidance useful to policymaking and prove informative to those 
interested in better understanding the processes of economic development.
It is too soon to be able to evaluate the ultimate successes or failures of  
innovation districts in generating innovation, entrepreneurship, and  
economic development. Of course, this is a characteristic drawback of  
empirical evaluation research—by the time outcomes are apparent and 
measurable, the policies that generated those outcomes often are  
entrenched: in plans, in budgets, and in the physical and social features  
of communities. To the extent that the economic development field is 
propelled by the actions of competitors and tempted by the latest fashions, 
innovation districts may be well-rooted in the economic development 
policies of cities nationwide before we can ascertain their effectiveness in 
a comprehensive manner. By conducting this study now, in an admittedly 
constrained manner, we aim to get in front of (or at least alongside) the 
incipient trend, and in so doing deliver opportune information for the  
consideration of local and regional economic development stakeholders 
and decision-makers.
5   WHY STUDY INNOVATION DISTRICTS?
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Bruce Katz of the Brookings Institution has been encouraging innovation 
districts as applied to urban economic development in the United States 
for a number of years.11 His monograph co-authored with Jennifer Bradley 
(2013) explores the ways in which cities and regions have been approaching 
the severe economic challenges exacerbated by the lack of federal leader-
ship and funding in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007 through 
2009. Katz and Bradley devote one chapter to the emerging approach of 
innovation districts, presenting Boston, Detroit, and the Research Triangle 
region of North Carolina as illustrative examples.12 Reports issued in the 
following two years focus solely on innovation districts. The first updates 
the description, categorizes the locations and assets of various innovation 
districts, and curates strategy suggestions culled from interactions with 
practitioners (Katz and Wagner 2014a); the second, published one year  
later, extends the list of categories of innovation districts and describes 
related issues such as the involvement of intermediary organizations and 
concerns over inclusivity (Katz et al. 2015). Intermixed with the major 
publications, a number of issue briefs and articles issued by the Brookings 
Institution describe individual cities’ innovation district policies and the 
strategy’s potential to further particular economic development goals such 
as advancing interregional competitiveness and curbing “brain drain”  
(Katz 2014b; 2014a; Katz and Wagner 2014b; Katz 2015; 2016).
The Urban Land Institute authored a report that extrapolates from the ex-
periences of the I.D.E.A. (Innovation + Design + Education + Arts) district 
in San Diego (examined in detail in Chapter 4 of this report) to proffer pol-
icy guidelines (Clark et al. 2016). Reed examines four innovation districts, 
identifying advantages and challenges from the perspective of real estate 
development and management (2016).13 Flint cautions against cities adopt-
ing an innovation district strategy without critically examining its suitabil-
ity for local circumstances (2016). The Brookings Institution produced an 
“audit guide” for assessing a local innovation ecosystem in order to locate 
or direct policies for an innovation district, drawing most heavily on exam-
ples in Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh (Vey et al. 2018). Most 
recently, RTI International published an overview of innovation districts 
aimed toward policymakers and practitioners (Lawrence et al. 2019), and 
the Global Institute on Innovation Districts, a new organization that boasts 
Bruce Katz as a founding partner, issued an update on innovation district 
strategies and implementation (Wagner et al. 2019). All of these texts are 
composed primarily in a journalistic manner, emphasizing descriptive 
examples and general policy recommendations, in order to be accessible 
and possibly inspiring to local decision-makers and members of the general 
public. This is a constructive way to approach a legitimate audience, yet it 
does leave open the opportunity for more rigorous research.
11 Katz has accompanied his writing with 
considerable consulting to municipalities 
and regional organizations.
12 The Research Triangle Park in North 
Carolina does not meet our working  
definition of innovation districts; see 
What Are Innovation Districts? and What 
Makes Innovation District Different? 
above.
13 Only one of Reed’s cases qualifies as 
an innovation district according to the 
working definition we apply—the Cortex 
Innovation Community of St. Louis, the 
subject of Chapter 3.
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In the scholarly arena, all of the very limited quantity of research examining 
innovation districts pertains to the 22@ district in Barcelona, presumably 
because its relative maturity affords perspective and permits some degree 
of empirical assessment. One article appraises the effect of the innovation 
district on the internationalization of business, highlighting the conflict 
between attracting multinational firms and supporting the growth of local 
ventures (Leon 2008). A few works explore the association of the Barcelona 
innovation district with other development and planning frameworks such 
as social inclusivity, global competition, and low carbon economies  
(Battaglia and Tremblay 2011; Charnock and Ribera-Fumaz 2011; March 
and Ribera-Fumaz 2016). We find no academic study that assesses an  
individual innovation district outside of 22@ in Barcelona or that compares 
multiple innovation districts systematically.
The chief conclusion of this section is that the literature on innovation 
districts is sparse. Of course, many newspaper articles and items in other 
media relate the progress of individual innovation districts and occasion-
ally critique those efforts. Aside from such reporting, there are the earnest 
efforts of Bruce Katz, his colleagues at the Brookings Institution, and a few 
other authors and organizations to describe, categorize, and promote  
innovation district strategies in the United States, but there has been no 
serious attempt at systematic or rigorous comparative evaluation. As far  
as we are aware, this study is the first.
CHAPTER 1: INVESTIGATING INNOVATION DISTRICTS
The goal of this research is to better understand the settings, influences, 
design, and implementation of industrial districts in the United States, 
primarily through the close examination of four selected cases, and in so 
doing provide useful guidance to local policymakers currently implement-
ing or considering engaging in an innovation district strategy. We focus our 
investigation around four interrelated questions:
7  RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.  What are the goals of innovation districts from the perspective of their  
     creators, implementers, and stakeholders?
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Obtaining a detailed accounting of the intended outcomes of innovation 
districts as a local or regional economic development strategy enables us to 
compare the different examples according to their own rationales. More-
over, elucidating the intentions of individual districts provides a basis upon 
which to judge the potential effects of the districts’ policies and actions.
2.  Which industries or economic activities are considered innovative or  
     otherwise are targeted by innovation district policies and actions?
The economic targets of innovation districts provide a point of comparison 
across cases that remains authentic to the internal justification as a localized 
strategy. The scope of the economic development effort also impacts the 
resources required and influences the potential for economic success.
3.  How do differences in the constitution, design, administration, setting,  
     and resources of innovation districts affect their operations and likelihoods  
     of achieving positive outcomes?
We link the details of the innovation districts and their implementation to 
their consequences to the extent possible at the current stage of develop-
ment of each innovation district.
4.  What observations from the efforts of the innovation districts studied can  
      inform comparable economic development efforts underway or being  
     planned elsewhere?
With this study we anticipate providing constructive feedback to those 
engaged in the innovation districts examined, but even more so we aim to 
instruct and assist economic development policymakers seeking to  
implement the strategy in other locations.
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This chapter explains the way in which we conducted this study. We  
describe the methods, including the study design, the selection of four 
comparative cases, and the collection and analysis of information.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the urban economic development strategy of 
innovation districts is not ripe yet for a thorough and comprehensive  
empirical evaluation. The prototype that inspired many of innovation 
districts in the United States, the 22@ district of Barcelona, was established 
officially in 2000. Although some efforts can trace antecedents sub- 
stantially further back, formal innovation district policies have been in 
place in American cities only since 2010.
This study is primarily exploratory in nature, but does also involve aspects 
of explanatory research. It is exploratory in that we seek to discover and 
refine the description of the characteristics, settings, and procedures of 
innovation districts that are key to their operation and that generate the 
potential for them to achieving their aims. We do this through investigat-
ing selected individual cases closely and by drawing contrasts among these 
cases. Even though the study is not comprehensive regarding innovation 
districts in the United States, we selected the cases so as to supply as broad 
a foundation as possible for learning about the policy strategy in  
general terms. The research is explanatory in that we assess the likelihoods 
of innovation district policies accomplishing distinct outcomes by engaging 
the rationales for urban economic development described in the previous 
chapter, in essence testing the substance of each case separately against the 
prescriptions of established and hypothesized theories (Yin 1994).
1   OVERVIEW
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Four case studies of innovation districts form the empirical basis of this 
study. To address the research questions thoroughly, it is necessary to delve 
deeply into the particulars of innovation districts, examining not only the 
public-facing messages and promotional efforts but also their histories; 
their economic, financial, political, and social underpinnings; and their 
evolutionary development. The comparative case study approach  
is well-suited to conducting in-depth investigations, and provides an  
appropriate foundation for reliable judgments concerning the internal  
attributes and logic of the chosen examples. Although the particular  
number of cases is a function of the resources available for the study, the 
four cases exhibit a wide range of features and settings that are instructive 
for innovation district efforts throughout the country.
2   COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY DESIGN
To the extent possible, we selected cases to maximize variation along  
several relevant dimensions:  the geographic location, the predominant 
regional economic structure and trajectory, the organizational ownership 
of the innovation district initiative, and the degree of anchor institution 
engagement and leadership. 
The four innovation districts range in size from 94 acres in San Diego to 
2,750 acres (more than four square miles) in Detroit. All are sited within a 
few miles of the central business district, or, in the case of Detroit, encom-
pass the central business district. The innovation district effort in Boston 
was initiated and managed by the city’s Office of the Mayor, in St. Louis by a 
consortium of anchor institutions, in Detroit by the non-profit com- 
munity with substantial anchor institution involvement, and in San Diego 
by private sector interests. Boston and San Diego are coastal cities with long 
histories of innovation-led development that in recent years have  
experienced strong economic growth, tight real estate markets, and soaring 
costs of living. Their innovation districts, at least initially, targeted start-
up and small entrepreneurial ventures. Detroit and St. Louis, on the other 
hand, represent the Rust Belt of the Midwest; both region’s economies 
were dominated traditionally by large original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) and have experienced central city employment and population 
decline through the last three decades. The innovation districts in these two 
cities are aimed at established as well as start-up businesses.
3   SELECTION OF CASES
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These features of the four cases are summarized in Table 2-1. Further detail 
regarding each case is explored in the chapters that follow; here we  
emphasize their apparent differences. Together, the four cases offer  
comparisons and contrasts that are meaningful with respect to the  
assortment of circumstances in which innovation districts are being  
considered, designed, and implemented nationwide.
Table 2-1. Elements of Case Studies Innovation Districts.
CITY: BOSTON DETROIT ST. LOUIS SAN DIEGO
Seaport (Boston  
Innovation District)
Detroit Innovation 
District
Cortex Innovation  
Community
I.D.E.A. (Innovation +  
Design + Education + Arts)
2010 2014 2002; 2010 * 2011
1,000 acres in South 
Waterfront
2,750 acres in Down-
town, Midtown, and 
New Center
187 acres in Midtown 93 acres in East Village
Focus on start-ups Mix of established firms 
and start-ups
Mix of established firms 
and start-ups
Focus on start-ups
Public (city) Non-profit community 
and anchor institutions
Anchor institutions Private sector
name:
designation:
physical  
delineation:
innovation and entre-
preneurship emphasis:
initiative  
leadership:
regional economy:
industrial strength: Innovation Traditional  
manufacturing
Traditional  
manufacturing
Innovation
entrepreneurial mix: mix of large and small 
entrepreneurial firms
large firm dominance large firm dominance small entrepreneurial 
focus
trajectory: boom decline decline boom
land prices and  
living costs:
high low low high
* Founded in 2002 as Cortex, the technology district was reimagined as an innovation district and renamed the Cortex Innovation Community in 2010.
We collected information for each case study through a review of primary 
and secondary documents and by conducting a series of interviews. We 
toured each innovation district and its environs. We constructed parcel in-
ventories for the two smaller innovation districts, those in St. Louis and San 
Diego. In a couple of cases, members of the research team attended local 
meetings or events related to the development of the district. 
The sources of relevant documents vary by case. For each, we researched 
news items and other media publications, along with reports authored by 
4   DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS METHODS
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Table 2-2. Case Study Interviews.
CITY: BOSTON DETROIT ST. LOUIS SAN DIEGO
24 33 38 24
August, 2016 –  
May, 2017
March, 2015 –  
August, 2017
June – August, 2016 April, 2016
Respondents:
Time period:
organizations involved with the innovation districts and archival references 
as available. These provide background, context, and sometimes specify 
sequences of historical events. Except for Detroit, none of the innovation 
districts have formally prepared plans, though we did obtain access to a 
number of relevant ordinances, earlier or related plans, and internal con-
ceptual and policy documents.1
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with local actors and stake-
holders:  those involved in planning and implementing the innovation  
district, economic development officials, local planning experts, and  
residents and business owners involved with the activities of and/or located 
near to the district. We identified initial subjects from the document  
review and by perusing websites and publications promoting the  
innovation districts. We solicited suggestions for further interview subjects 
from the interviewees. Almost all of the interviews occurred in person; a 
handful took place by telephone. In Boston, St. Louis, and San Diego, most 
of the interviews occurred during one or two site visits. In Detroit, the  
interviews were distributed across a longer time period and some  
respondents were interviewed multiple times. (Additional information 
regarding the interview methods for the Detroit case is included in Chapter 
4.) We conducted the majority of interviews singly, but also hosted a few 
multiple-respondent interviews and one focus group. 
We requested clarifications or additional documents from some interview 
respondents who agreed to follow-up contacts. In addition, in the St. Louis 
and San Diego cases, several months after the interviews occurred we sent a 
concise compilation of preliminary high-level findings to each respondent, 
and solicited corrections or additional comments. 
Table 2-2 documents the number of respondents for each case study and 
the approximate time frame during which the interviews transpired. Note 
that because the identities of all respondents are confidential, interviews 
and focus groups are referenced as personal communications or interviews.  
The interview guide, recruitment script, and the study information sheet 
that was provided to each respondent are included as Appendices 1-3. 
(These documents differed slightly and immaterially across the cases).
1 There are separate plans for the four 
neighborhoods that comprise the Boston 
innovation district area, but no con- 
solidated master plan for the entire 
district. 
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This chapter describes the regional setting, background, origin, and  
development path of St. Louis’s innovation district, the Cortex Innovation 
Community. Special attention is paid to the particular actions and  
circumstances that played a central role in positioning the innovation  
district to prosper and achieve its current situation. The final section  
considers concerns that are likely to arise with the continued growth and 
development of the innovation district in the near future.
1   OVERVIEW
2   REGIONAL BACKGROUND AND SETTING
The trajectory of development that occurred in St. Louis is more akin to 
Detroit than the other two case study cities of Boston and San Diego.  
The peak municipal population of the City of St. Louis was achieved as of 
the 1950 Census. Although the metropolitan area’s total residential  
population has continued to expand, the city comprises a shrinking share  
of the region (Figure 3-1). This trend follows the steady decline of manu- 
facturing as a share of employment and the suburbanization of residences 
and jobs witnessed in most sizeable cities in the American Midwest and 
Northeast throughout the second half of the twentieth century, but these 
changes were especially pronounced in certain cities such as Buffalo,  
Cleveland, Detroit, and St. Louis. The St. Louis region of today is de- 
centralized, jurisdictionally fragmented, and racially and economically  
segregated more so than most other major American urban areas  
(personal communications).
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Figure 3-1. St. Louis city and metropolitan population. 
Note: This figure consistently uses the recent United States Office of  
Management and Budget (2013) definition of the St. Louis metropolitan 
area: the City of St. Louis in Missouri; Franklin, Jefferson, Lincoln, St. 
Charles, St. Louis, and Warren counties in Missouri; and Bond, Calhoun, 
Clinton, Jersey, Macoupin, Madison, Monroe, and St. Clair counties in 
Illinois.
Source: United States Census Bureau (1900-2010).
St. Louis used to be considered a corporate city, with professional  
occupations dominating the workforce and hosting headquarters and/or 
major research and development operations for large manufacturers such  
as Anheuser Busch, Boeing, Mallinckrodt, McDonnell-Douglas, Pfizer,  
and Ralston Purina among others (Motoyama and Knowlton 2017). Along 
with the general decline of manufacturing employment, corporate mergers 
and acquisitions took a heavy toll. By 2016, only nine companies on the 
Fortune 500 list were headquartered in St. Louis, down from 23 in 1980, 
with consolidations continuing (Feldman 2016). For example, in 2017, 
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the aerospace giant Boeing relocated its defense unit to Washington, D.C., 
and brokerage firm Scottrade shed more than half of its 1,800 St. Louis jobs 
after being acquired by Ameritrade (Weisgerber 2016; Benjamin 2018).
One of St. Louis’s traditional industry strengths is the biological and life 
sciences, headlined by international companies including Monsanto, Pfizer, 
Sanofi, and Sigma-Aldrich.1 This economic concentration has not been 
immune to the pattern of corporate contraction and restructuring.  
For example, Pfizer eliminated most of its 1,000 positions in St. Louis after 
acquiring fellow pharmaceutical company Wyeth in 2009, releasing  
a sizable share of the area’s highly skilled life science employees into a labor 
market unable to absorb most of them (Volkmann 2009; personal  
communication). Mallinckrodt, KV Pharmaceuticals, Monsanto, Sigma- 
Aldrich, and even Annheuser Busch (which conducts research into yeast 
fermentation processes) have laid off large numbers of workers with  
biological expertise over the past two decades (personal communication). 
The legacies of St. Louis’s rich corporate history include wealthy elite  
families (famous names include Busch, Danforth, McDonnell, and  
Pulitzer), world-class cultural and recreational institutions (such as the 
Missouri Botanical Garden; see below), and a pervasive corporate ethos. 
Until relatively recently, St. Louis would not have been considered to  
possess much of an entrepreneurial culture (personal communications). 
This characterization appears to be in the process of changing, with the 
establishment of multiple formal and informal networking and mentoring 
programs; St. Louis corporations increasingly supporting entrepreneurship 
and innovation as part of a growth-oriented local business culture, in- 
cluding seeking local purchasing arrangements; and a general recognition 
and banding together of the business community around entrepreneurship 
as the economic path forward (Motoyama and Knowlton 2017).
St. Louis enjoys a reputation as an easy city in which to do business and 
in which to live (personal communications). Partially arising as another 
outcome of its corporate history, the characterization also is boosted by its 
Midwestern location. Distant from the coasts, St. Louis offers affordable 
housing, high quality amenities, and far less congestion than many other 
U.S. cities.
1 MilliporeSigma is the current name 
of the life science branch of Merck 
following its purchase of Sigma-Aldrich 
in 2015.
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The waning of St. Louis’ traditional economic strengths eventually incited 
reactions from the region’s economic and civic leadership. As in many other 
Rust Belt cities, including Detroit, such responses and engagement did not 
arise quickly, with business and political leaders perhaps slow to recognize 
the shifting economic landscape, maybe loath to accept the changes as more 
than temporary, possibly needing a crisis to galvanize action (per- 
sonal communications). Certainly what to do about the challenges facing 
the region was not obvious. Nevertheless, a variety of efforts, both public 
and private, ultimately were initiated, including visioning exercises,  
commissioned studies, development plans, and fundraising for specific 
projects.
In 1997, for instance, several prominent civic and business leaders  
sponsored a research report that was published in serial form in the St.  
Louis Post-Dispatch newspaper. Collectively called the Peirce Report after 
Neal Peirce, one of the prominent authors, the research examined the  
economic challenges and analyzed the future prospects of the St. Louis 
region (Winter 2006). This public inspection buoyed the activities of an 
eight-year initiative begun in 1996, called St. Louis 2004, that aimed to  
generate or enhance a wide variety of approaches to reposition the future  
of the region, ranging from economic development to recreational  
opportunities, from neighborhood and housing redevelopment to access  
to medical care. (The initiative was named and timed for the 100th  
anniversary of the St. Louis World’s Fair in 1904). Although not focused 
directly on entrepreneurship or innovation, these activities represent  
concerted efforts to steer the public debate about the future of the region, 
and they also mark an active attempt to coalesce elite actors and  
organizations behind regional economic development.
Efforts to develop an entrepreneurial ecosystem in the region also trace 
back to the late 1990s and early 2000s (Harrington 2016). The Center for 
Emerging Technologies (CET) began in 1998 as one of a statewide 
collection of business incubators started by the University of Missouri  
system with support from the State of Missouri Department of Economic 
Development. CET was chartered as a nonprofit organization, operated 
by the University of Missouri-St. Louis, and directed by a board that also 
included representatives from Washington University and St. Louis  
University. The incubator provided space and business support for fledgling 
bioscience firms, including but not limited to ventures started by the faculty 
and alumni of the three universities involved, giving them the oppor- 
tunity to thrive and grow locally rather than move elsewhere (Mellitz 2009; 
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personal communications). The location of CET in a renovated warehouse 
building between St. Louis University and the medical campus of  
Washington University fit with an earlier idea to redevelop this location  
as a “technopolis”, a haven for technology-intensive innovation (Melcer 
2002; personal communication).2 Extracting some of its formerly internal  
activities, the Regional Chamber and Growth Association spun out  
Innovate St. Louis as a non-profit organization devoted to operating  
educational and networking programs for local entrepreneurs.3 The  
Coalition for Plant and Life Sciences formed in 2001 to advocate for  
bioscience activity regionwide, with a particular focus on promoting  
entrepreneurial activity in the sector. The coalition was spearheaded by  
Dr. William H. Danforth, an academic cardiologist and the grandson of the 
founder of Ralston Purina who was the Chancellor of Washington  
University from 1971 through 1995 (Washington University n.d.).
An influential report by the Battelle Memorial Institute, commissioned by 
the Regional Chamber in 2000 with funding from the Danforth Founda-
tion and Civic Progress, evaluated the position of the St. Louis region in the 
biological and life sciences fields.4 The Battelle report proposed numerous 
specific strategies and actions designed to develop St. Louis as “BioBelt: the 
Center of Plant and Life Sciences” for the United States (Battelle Memorial 
Institute 2000). One strategy pointed to the importance of more effectively 
leveraging the substantial intellectual resources of the region. These include 
the three research universities located in the city: Washington University,  
a leading private university internationally renown in science and
medicine among other fields and recognized by Battelle as the predominant 
life sciences research anchor for St. Louis and the State of Missouri;  
St. Louis University, a Jesuit institution that also operates a well regarded 
medical school and life sciences departments; and the University of
Missouri-St. Louis, established in 1963 as the newest campus in the  
University of Missouri system and known for standout programs in  
business and optometry. The report references the large stock of highly  
educated and skilled life science workers engaged in the private sector,
many of whom are interested in entrepreneurial opportunities or wish to 
avoid having to leave the region following corporate employment cutbacks. 
A second strategy focused on building entrepreneurial culture and infra-
structure, both in order to attract and retain innovators and other talent, 
and to be able to ensure that more of the economic benefits from  
intellectual property stay within the region. Not coincidentally, in the same 
year the Danforth Foundation announced the establishment of the Donald 
Danforth Plant Sciences Center, a scientific research, testing, and training 
institute to be located some 14 miles west of downtown St. Louis in the 
suburb of Creve Coeur, following in 2003 with a $124 million commitment 
in support of plant and agricultural sciences (Tranel 2004, p.65).
These attempts to transform the St. Louis economy were not immediately 
successful: they forced introspection, compiled and promulgated  
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2 CET is located at the eastern edge of 
what is now Cortex; see below.
3 The Regional Chamber and Growth 
Association is the Chamber of  
Commerce of St. Louis. The name of  
the organization has since been  
simplified to the Regional Chamber.
4 The Danforth Foundation was estab-
lished in 1927 by William H. Danforth, 
the founder of Ralston-Purina, along
with his wife, Adda (Bush) Danforth 
(Danforth Plant Science Center 2011). 
Before closing in 2011, the philanthropy
focused on higher education, religion, 
and development of the St. Louis region. 
Civic Progress is a coalition of the
chief executives of major St. Louis region 
employers, founded in 1953 (Civic 
Progress n.d.).
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information, generated new organizational and programmatic infra- 
structure, and generally advanced the cause by small steps. On the other 
hand, the efforts lacked coordination and the full commitment of the  
various regional institutions and power brokers (Harrington 2016; personal 
communications). The decentralization of the St. Louis region, the inertia 
of the historically dominant corporate business culture, and divergent  
opinions about the most beneficial ways to proceed kept the construction of 
an entrepreneurial ecosystem from being a clear region-wide priority. Some 
of the organizations no longer exist, others remain active or have merged 
into newer efforts.5
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5 Two of the major components of 
Innovate St. Louis have become separate 
organizations that pursue the original
missions (personal communications). 
The Gateway Venture Mentoring Service 
(VMS) operates business-tobusiness
mentorship programs. The IT Entrepre-
neurship Network (ITEN) supplies direct 
mentorship, business planning assistance, 
and networking to information tech- 
nology startups. The Coalition for Plant 
and Life Sciences evolved into the current 
BioSTL Coalition, adopting the name 
change in 2011 (BioSTL n.d.; personal
communications).
4   THE FIRST STAGES OF CORTEX
Shortly after its inception, the Coalition for Plant and Life Sciences  
established several subcommittees to investigate topics deemed important 
to installing a healthy and active bioscience industry in the region, such as 
local venture capital and supplementary forms of funding for start-up  
ventures. One subcommittee, tasked with assessing the region’s need for
wetlab space and other facilities specific to life sciences research and  
industry, visited Boston in 2002 to learn about the successes of that leading 
city. The members of the subcommittee found their interest spurred by a 
presentation given by the director of real estate for the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology that extended well beyond wetlab facilities to  
describe the investments that the university was making in Cambridge 
(personal communication). These investments were generating improve-
ments to surrounding neighborhoods (such as Kendall Square),  
encouraging the development of suitable locations for entrepreneurial  
ventures, and also creating vibrancyand street-level appeal (Nine Network 
2018). That the university was realizing a financial return while benefitting 
the community augmented the appeal.
Convinced that a similar approach could flourish in St. Louis, the Coalition 
decided to develop a site to support the operation and growth of life  
sciences innovators and startup firms. A new subcommittee stocked with 
local real estate professionals was charged with evaluating the space needs 
of fledgling biotechnology ventures and assessing the prevailing market.  
A nonprofit corporation was formed in 2002 to handle land assembly and 
management, named Cortex.6 The site selected was a wedge of land of 
almost 190 acres located in close proximity to BJD HealthCare, St. Louis 
University, and the medical campus of Washington University. The land
was zoned primarily for industrial use, and the location hosted mainly  
obsolete warehouses and manufacturing buildings designed to be  
6 The appellation, intended as a place-
holder, initially stood for Center of  
Research, Technology, and Entre- 
preneurial Expertise, with Exchange soon 
replacing Expertise (personal commu-
nications). The name stuck, however, 
and the acronymic expansion later was 
dropped. More recently the district 
gained the fuller title of Cortex  
Innovation Community.
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supported by rail service that no longer existed (City of St. Louis, 2012 
manufacturing buildings designed to be supported by rail service that no 
longer existed (City of St. Louis, 2012).7
Five institutions joined together to support the initial development of the 
fledgling entrepreneurial district: Washington University, St. Louis  
University, the University of Missouri-St. Louis, BJC HealthCare, and the 
Missouri Botanical Garden.8 All are nonprofit research-based organ- 
izations, all conduct and are heavily invested in the biological sciences, and
all are anchor institutions respected for their commitment to St. Louis.  
Three of the institutions directly adjoin the Cortex location; the other two 
are positioned within a few miles’ distance (Figure 3-2). Despite this  
proximity, the alignment of the five anchor institutions behind the
Cortex effort was exceptional, with little prior history of joint activity 
among them and scant tradition of St. Louis non-profit institutions directly 
reinvesting in their city (personal communications).
Four of the five organizations contributed substantial financial resources for 
Cortex to move forward: Washington University proffered $15 million, St. 
Louis University and BJC HealthCare allocated $5 million apiece, and the 
University of Missouri-St. Louis added $4 million. These contributions were 
pitched as investments, with the institutions expecting eventual returns. Yet 
it was not the chance for monetary gain that motivated the research
organizations, but the prospects of being better able to attract and retain 
talent in the region (including following corporate employment cutbacks); 
of connecting researchers, clinicians, and students to exciting entrepreneur-
ial opportunities that could succeed and expand locally; and of transform-
ing the image and the reality of the regional innovation economy (personal 
communications).
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7 Cortex operates 187 acres, of which 
some 30-35 acres are public right-of-way 
(i.e., streets) (personal communication).
8 BJC HealthCare is a nonprofit health 
care organization that operates 12  
hospitals in Missouri and Illinois along
with numerous other medical services 
including a physicians group, home care, 
behavioral health, hospice care, and
medical equipment provision. BJC runs 
two academic hospitals—Barnes-Jewish 
and St. Louis Children’s—that are
affiliated with the Washington Universi-
ty School of Medicine (BJC HealthCare 
n.d.). The Missouri Botanical Garden 
operates 79 acres of horticultural garden 
and a butterfly house, along with a large 
natural reserve some 35 miles west of 
St. Louis. The Garden is active in plant 
science and conservation, and maintains 
the second largest scientific collection 
of plant specimens in the United States 
(Missouri Botanical Garden n.d.).
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Figure 3-2. Cortex location.
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Much of the credit for garnering the support from the five institutional 
anchors and their financial backing is accorded to Dr. William H. Danforth, 
who more so than any other single individual involved was universally 
respected for his intellectual prowess, powerful leadership, vision for the 
region, and devotion to civic improvement (Nine Network 2018; personal 
communications). Multiple interviewees independently affirmed that Dr. 
Danforth’s extraordinary repute, personal integrity, vision of civic better-
ment, and vigorous persuasion, along with his influence with Washington 
University, the strongest and wealthiest of the five organizations, were 
responsible for coalescing the assembly and propelling the effort forward. 
That the Chancellor of Washington University, Mark S. Wrighton, had pre-
viously been a professor at and then Provost of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology surely helped as well (personal communication). 
The $29 million capital investment permitted Cortex to move forward with 
acquiring, developing, and marketing land. The City of St. Louis and the 
State of Missouri contributed as well, after much lobbying and coaxing by 
the Coalition and its institutional supporters. The state, via the Missouri 
Source: Adapted from St. Louis Base map by Stamen Design,  
http://maps.stamen.com
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Development Finance Board, awarded up to $12 million in tax credits over 
five years to assist Cortex in land purchase and assembly. This was the first 
time that such state incentives had been allocated to a long-term develop-
ment concept rather than a discrete building or project (Melcer, 2003). The 
Board purportedly was convinced in part by the fact that the public, in the 
form of the University of Missouri-St. Louis, was already invested  
(personal communications). The pool of tax credits was structured to  
support a revolving fund designed to leverage additional private and 
non-profit donations, many of which were secured from locally-head-
quartered corporations including Monsanto, Energizer, and Edward Jones 
(personal communication).
In 2006, the City of St. Louis granted Cortex extensive authority over 
the site, including eminent domain, tax abatement, and zoning powers. 
Through these actions, the city essentially delegated de facto governance of 
the location to the Cortex organization. With Cortex developing and oper-
ating the location, the name soon became applied equally to the nonprofit 
corporation, its first building (the Cortex building), and to the district itself. 
This nomenclature parallels the conception of Cortex by its leadership and 
backers as “an idea, an organization, and a place” (City of St. Louis, 2006).
Expending a sizeable share of its available resources, Cortex developed the 
first new building on the site, Cortex 1. This $36 million multitenant  
facility opened in 2006 and contained more than 150,000 square feet of 
office and life sciences research space (Wexford Science and Technology, 
n.d.). Although Washington University committed early on to being an 
anchor tenant for the building, acting as the developer and constructing 
the facility without a full complement of committed tenants represented 
a considerable speculative risk by Cortex. The bold move was justified as 
a necessary leap of faith to build “buzz” around the new district and to be 
able to seize opportunities that might arise to secure innovative firm  
tenants (personal communications). The gamble paid off when Stereotaxis, 
a medical technology company incubated at the Center for Emerging Tech-
nologies that reportedly was planning to move to San Diego within a year 
or so, decided to stay in St. Louis instead and anchor the new multitenant 
facility (personal communications).
Cortex built a second building specifically to retain the headquarters of 
another St. Louis firm considering relocation (personal communication). 
Solae, a supplier of soy protein products that began as a joint venture be-
tween DuPont and Bunge (it is now fully owned by DuPont), moved from 
its downtown St. Louis location on the campus of Nestle Purina PetCare to 
the new 160,000 square foot Cortex facility in 2008 (Brown, 2006).
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Figure 3-3. Cortex 1.
Cortex was envisioned as a place to spark innovation and provide St. Louis 
with an attractive and conducive setting for local entrepreneurs. Its first 
building was intended to house university spin-outs and other entrepre-
neurial firms interested in commercializing the research being produced 
by the anchor institutions, but a good portion was occupied by Washington 
University itself (personal communication). The second Cortex facility 
housed an established, sizable local company. Both the Cortex 1 and  
Solae buildings were designed and constructed with a suburban office park 
character, including ample parking (Figures 3-3 through 3-7); the develop-
ments were overseen by real estate professionals experienced with that style 
(personal communication).
5   FROM BIOSCIENCE PARK TO INNOVATION DISTRICT
Source:  Author. (June 5, 2019).
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Figure 3-4. Cortex 1, rear view with portion of parking lot.
Source: Author. (June 13, 2016).
Figure 3-5. Cortex shared parking, rear of Cortex 1 building at left, @4240  
                   and Solae building in background right.
Source: Author. (June 13, 2016).
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Figure 3-6. Cortex shared parking, rear of @4240 in background.
Source: Author. (June 15, 2016).
Figure 3-7. Solae Headquarters.
Source: NextSTL. https://nextstl.com/2011/11/cortex/ (accessed May 23, 2019)
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At the end of 2007, the onset of the Great Recession brought development 
in Cortex to a halt (personal communication). The board of directors, 
which consisted mostly of real estate professionals from the five anchor 
research institutions, soon realized that attracting large tenants to secure 
buildings would not be viable as a continuing strategy. Moreover, they  
recognized that the emerging development pattern of Cortex was not  
suitable for creating a vibrant Cambridge-like environment for entrepre-
neurship and innovation.
In 2010, Cortex conducted a national search for a Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) to manage its operations. Up to this point, Cortex had carried no 
operating staff, with the Cortex board of directors subcontracting and over-
seeing the building developments. Perhaps more importantly, the board 
sought a full-time dedicated leader capable of offering new development 
strategies and steering Cortex toward achieving the vision of its founders 
(personal communication). The search concluded successfully with the hire 
of Dennis Lower, an economic development professional who had guided 
the development of two science and technology parks previously.
Lower, in addition to hiring a modestly sized staff, made a number of 
changes to Cortex’s development approach that reflect the components of 
an innovation district strategy. Rather than focusing solely on the plant  
and life sciences, Cortex expanded its targets to a much broader scope of 
innovation-intensive and entrepreneurial ventures in order to widen its 
potential appeal, diversify its industrial portfolio, and expand opportunities 
for cross-disciplinary connections. Unlike most science parks or incuba-
tors, Cortex sought to become attractive to companies at all stages in their 
lifecycles, with the goal of cultivating extensive networks and producing an 
articulation between entrepreneurial ventures and established organ- 
izations, including the anchoring research institutions (personal  
communications). Mechanisms toward this end included supplying a  
variety of space options and transforming the office park character of  
Cortex into a more amenity-rich and mixed-use environment, often termed 
“live-work-play.”
Cortex assembled a master plan in 2012 that emphasized developing  
additional buildings to host a greater variety of activities. Total buildout 
called for 4.5 million square feet of space designed for a variety of uses and 
more than 13,000 jobs (Read 2016). The master plan also encompassed 
the “live” and “play” elements through the installation of bicycle paths and 
greenways, a new light rail transit (MetroLink) stop9, and a 3.5-acre public 
park that doubles as an arts and gathering space (Figure 3-8).10 A 16-silo 
grain elevator, prohibitively expensive to relocate, remains in operation in 
the middle of Cortex, lending visual distinctiveness as well as a reminder  
of the link to region’s agricultural economy (Figure 3-9) (personal  
communication). Occasionally, light projections have turned the elevator 
into a temporary art exhibit (Fowler, 2017).
9 The Cortex MetroLink station received 
a $10.3 million TIGER (Transportation 
Investment Generating Economic  
Recovery) grant from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation in 2014 and 
opened in July 2018 (United States 
Department of Transportation 2014; 
Schlinkmann 2018).
10 At least so far, the “live” element of 
live-work-play in Cortex includes fitness 
and dining but not residences. Several 
individual development plans that have 
incorporated apartments in mixed-use 
buildings have failed to come to fruition.
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Figure 3-8. Cortex Commons.
As a financing component of the plan, St. Louis approved Cortex as a 
tax-increment financing (TIF) district, permitting it to issue bonds worth 
up to $160 million in order to fund further acquisition, infrastructure  
provision, and development of the site. In addition, the TIF designation 
further cemented Cortex’s site governance role.11,12 Cortex retains the 
eminent domain authority delegated by the city, and though it has not yet 
used this power, its ability to do so if necessary is a useful tool of persuasion 
(personal communication). Instead, Cortex has purchased properties from 
landowners, resulting in the displacement of a handful of active industrial 
or warehousing businesses and the denizens of two small residential en-
claves (City of St. Louis, 2006).
11 Missouri law (Chapter 353 of the 
Revised Statues for the State of Missouri 
2000) permits municipalities to assign
the operation of tax-increment financing 
districts only to for-profit urban re- 
development corporations (Missouri
Department of Economic Development, 
n.d.). In 2004, Cortex had created just 
such an entity, the CORTEX West
Redevelopment Corporation, as a sub-
sidiary organization, demonstrating how 
long the idea had been percolating of
requesting tax-increment financing 
authority from the City of St. Louis (City 
of St. Louis, 2006). It should be noted that 
the bonds issued by Cortex (rather, the 
CORTEX West Redevelopment Corp- 
oration) are supported solely by the 
anticipated property tax increases in the 
district and are not guaranteed by the 
City of St. Louis—Cortex accepted the 
financial risk along with the bonding 
authority (personal communication).
12 The TIF district was divided into  
eleven areas (RPAs, or redevelopment 
plan areas), which permitted Cortex to
activate each independently and thus 
stage bonding and development activity 
over time (personal communication).
Source: Author. (June 16, 2016).
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Figure 3-9. Ray-Carroll County Grain Growers Elevator “D” grain silos.
Source: Author. (June 5, 2019).
Building construction resumed with the recovery from the recession  
(Figures 3-10 through 3-12). Wexford Science and Technology, a developer 
specializing in research parks, was brought in as a partner to manage the 
expanding real estate portfolio, with Cortex continuing as the master
developer of the site as a whole. A renovated AT&T/Bell Labs facility,  
renamed @4240, opened in 2013. It houses several Washington University 
offices, remote locations for major firms such as Boeing and Square, and 
numerous small firms, as well as Venture Café and the Cambridge  
Innovation Center (described below). The IKEA St. Louis store was in- 
augurated in September of 2015, adding retail to the Cortex portfolio and 
signifying the broader commercial appeal of the district (Schremp Hahn 
2016). The newest building in Cortex, 4220 Duncan, contains  
Microsoft, Accenture, a public fitness center operated by BJC Healthcare, 
and a restaurant, among other tenants. The facility, which opened in 2018, 
also hosts “Innovation Hall”, a free meeting and event space modeled after 
the Boston innovation district’s District Hall (Kukuljan, 2018; personal 
communication). A boutique hotel is scheduled to open toward the end of 
2019 (Bolinger 2018; personal communication).
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Figure 3-10. @4240 building, Cortex Commons in foreground.
Source: Author. (June 5, 2019).
Figure 3-11. 4260 Forest Park.
Source: Author. (June 5, 2019).
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Figure 3-12. 4220 building.
Source: Author. (June 5, 2019).
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Under Lower’s leadership, Cortex attracted, created, or reinforced a number 
of entrepreneurial supports, termed “innovation centers” (Cortex 2014). 
BioGenerator, a bioscience-focused accelerator and investor created by the 
Coalition for Plant and Life Sciences in 2002, relocated to Cortex, occupy-
ing lab space in the Cortex 1 building (BioGenerator, n.d.; personal  
communications).13 The Center for Emerging Technologies incubator,  
located across the street, merged into Cortex. Encouraged by Wexford,  
the Cambridge Innovation Center (CIC), a “full-service” co-working space, 
selected Cortex in St. Louis as its first location outside of the Boston area 
(Harrington 2016; Read 2016; personal communication). CIC has since  
expanded in Cortex and also operates the co-working, office, and  
laboratory space contained in the CET building under contract, freeing 
CET’s personnel to focus on programming and services.14 CET delivers  
several entrepreneurship training programs of differing lengths and  
intensities, as well as continuing education for more established companies, 
in the areas of biotechnology, information technology, and consumer and 
manufactured products (personal communication). Workshops, seminars, 
and mentorship events are also offered on a regular schedule. Venture Café, 
supported financially by Cortex management, operates weekly gatherings 
intended to network entrepreneurs and businesses as well as the broader  
regional innovation community (Harrington 2016). Venture Café also 
schedules concerts, food trucks, special events, and handles programming 
for the new Innovation Hall. Idea Labs, created and administered by  
Washington University students, is an organization that matches interested 
entrepreneurial students with health care challenges identified by  
practitioners and researchers. Together with Med Launch, a similar venture 
affiliated with St. Louis University, Idea Labs performs dozens of con- 
sultations and leads to the launch of several new ventures each year  
(Harrington 2016; personal communications). Not all of the innovation 
centers have been successful: TechShop, a chain membership-based maker 
space and fabrication workshop, closed in 2017 as the company abruptly 
went bankrupt. It had been in operation in Cortex fewer than 18 months. 
Yet, supported by advice and encouragement from Dennis Lower, a new 
maker space opened one year later, less than a mile distant from Cortex in 
the Academy neighborhood, using equipment acquired from the St. Louis 
TechShop (Schremp Hahn, 2018).
Together, these shifts in direction in Cortex also describe a different  
approach toward economic development. Instead of focusing exclusively 
on the provision of affordable wetlab and office spaces, real estate assets 
are promoted as one facet of a multi-dimensional appeal to innovative 
enterprises that also includes varied entrepreneurial and business supports, 
networking, and more (Cortex 2014). The improved aesthetics, mixed-use 
environment, and “live-work-play” atmosphere inculcated by building 
renovation, shared spaces, and diverse events serve to attract entrepreneurs 
and skilled workers. Ultimately, rather than being the next “shiny object” 
13 BioGenerator assists promising bio- 
science startups in advancing to self- 
sufficiency by channeling venture capital 
investments, providing business advice 
and mentoring, and offering flexible and 
affordable laboratory space along with 
access to specialized equipment, thus 
fulfilling the role of commercialization 
center in the terminology of the Battelle 
report (Battelle Memorial Institute, 2000; 
personal communications).
14 Some of Cortex’s “innovation centers” 
operate under externally opaque man-
agement and ownership structures in 
relation to Cortex proper and Wexford 
Science and Technology, mainly to satisfy 
financial and legal requirements while 
maintaining coordination and continuity.
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that for a limited time can lure firms and entrepreneurs, the innovation 
district aims to provide an enduring “value proposition” in developing and 
strengthening an entrepreneurial ecosystem (personal communications).
By the end of 2016, the Cortex Innovation Community has swelled to 
encompass more than 250 companies, compared to about 35 in 2010, and 
more than 4,000 workers (Barker and Bryant, 2016). More than half of 
these firms operate in the area of information technology, though these 
firms represent considerably less than half the total employment and floor 
space (personal communication). Cortex has garnered national attention as 
a model for innovation district development, with its personnel reporting 
that they present the history of the district and the ideas that underpin its 
development to companies, site selectors, and economic development  
practitioners four or five times per week on average (personal  
communication).
6   KEY ENABLING FEATURES
Cortex was a departure in several ways from earlier efforts to establish and 
promote the entrepreneurial ecosystem in St. Louis. First and foremost, 
Cortex is a deliberate and direct effort to shape a particular physical loca-
tion, primarily via site governance and active real estate development and 
management. Although its inception preceded the application of the  
innovation district concept in the United States and its first iteration did 
not embrace all of the elements that now identify an innovation district, 
Cortex presaged the innovation district concept as employed in other cities 
with its focus on support for entrepreneurs, continual engagement among 
actors, and spatial clustering of innovative activity. The early start on these 
features enabled Cortex to fill in the other aspects of innovation districts 
such as a mix of activities and varied amenities later in its development.
Second, the coalition of anchor institutions that came together to support 
and oversee the Cortex development was a new phenomenon in St.  
Louis. There was little history of St. Louis institutions reinvesting in their 
city, and certainly not doing so together. Indeed, as far as the authors are 
aware, the substantial and continuing sponsorship of the five anchoring  
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research organizations, both financially and through ongoing leadership 
and participation, is unique among innovation districts in the United 
States.15 For the most part, the returns on the investments to these  
institutions have not been direct, but rather have come in the form of  
commercialization and entrepreneurship opportunities for faculty, staff, 
and students; employment for graduates; physical and economic improve-
ments to the area adjacent to several of the institutions; and the “buzz” of 
excitement around the Cortex innovation district.
Third, Cortex was established early on as a non-profit entity distinct from 
its parent organizations and financial backers. Partly because of this  
status, Cortex was able to garner the legal authority to operate TIF districts, 
purchase and convey land, and enact zoning decisions despite owning very 
little of the site outright. Furthermore, its administrative and legal structure 
provides Cortex the advantage of being able to segregate day-to-day  
operations from strategic planning and financing (Read 2016). The organi-
zation’s staff enjoys an independent operational flexibility advantageous for 
real estate marketing and firm recruitment while progress toward achieving 
long-term economic development goals is tracked and guided by the direct-
ing board—and the CEO bridges the two perspectives. The arrangement 
has been effective in minimizing clashes between the dual innovation dis-
trict roles of real estate developer and economic development organization, 
and between approaches that support entrepreneurial ventures and those 
that cater to mature corporations (personal communications).
15 Wagner, Katz, and Osha opine that  
innovation districts in Cleveland, Ohio, 
and Indianapolis, Indiana, have the 
capacity to pursue a comparable  
sponsorship and participation model 
(2019, p. 24).
7   CORTEX: A PROVISIONAL SUCCESS
As explained in Chapter 1, it is too early to be able to judge the final  
success or failure of innovation districts. Even considering its extended  
history, Cortex did not begin as an innovation district and continues to 
evolve as it expands. Nevertheless, as its national reputation attests, the 
Cortex Innovation Community boasts substantial achievements so far, 
namely the development of an active and growing innovative and entrepre-
neurial ecosystem, centered around the primary disciplinary strengths of its 
founding institutions, that helps retain the intellectual property and human 
capital produced within the region.
Cortex certainly appears to present a good fit with the rationales justifying 
innovation districts explored in Chapter 1. Sited in a relatively well-defined 
area, of a size that assures internal proximity and within easy reach of five 
research institutions, the innovation district is positioned spatially to con-
tribute to and benefit from knowledge spillovers. As Cortex developed from 
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a concentration of research offices to a more comprehensive entrepreneur-
ial ecosystem and mixed-use environment, with concomitant increases in 
the scale and variety of economic activities and supporting organizations, 
the potential value of the location increased and Cortex’s distinctiveness in 
comparison to competitor locations intensified. Yet there is doubt regarding 
the degree to which the ecosystem will be self-sustaining in the long term 
(see below).
Certainly, the innovation district has transformed a formerly underutilized 
and blighted neighborhood into a flourishing location for innovation and 
employment in bioscience and other technology-intensive fields.16 Cortex  
is referred to as an exemplar of how economic development policy can  
amplify innovative activity within both entrepreneurial and established 
firms. The name Cortex has become associated with the area surrounding 
the site proper, contributing to refashioning the economic image of St. 
Louis regionally and nationwide, which is quite close to the definition of 
effective place-making.
16 As in many states, the predicating 
conditions of “blight” that the State of 
Missouri considers to constitute a public 
interest in redevelopment in order to 
justify a TIF designation are inexact and 
vulnerable to manipulation (e.g.,  
dilapidated structures, substandard 
appreciation of taxable assessed value). 
In 2007 and 2008, the Missouri state 
courts ruled against a challenge to 
Cortex’s TIF authority that contested the 
determination of blight (Missouri Court 
of Appeals Eastern District, 2008).
8   CHALLENGES FOR THE CORTEX INNOVATION COMMUNITY
As Cortex continues to expand, both spatially and in its influence on 
surrounding residential communities, its socioeconomic inclusivity and 
impacts on land development, living costs, and neighborhood character 
are likely to present ongoing challenges. The record of Cortex with regard 
to inclusion and diversity is less than clear, and generally has received little 
attention despite the pervasive regional racial segregation and income in-
equality that have garnered national publicity (personal communications). 
Some part of the appeal that persuaded the City of St. Louis to delegate 
extensive fiscal and regulatory authority to the innovation district  
was the potential of Cortex to couple physical revitalization and job  
creation with social policies such as workforce and community develop-
ment. Cortex supports financially and contributes to the leadership of the 
Park Central Development Corporation, a non-profit organization to which 
the cash-strapped city of St. Louis has devolved substantial responsibility 
(and provides some funding) for planning and city management in the 
residential neighborhoods surrounding the innovation district (personal 
communication). The Cortex organization actively promotes STEM  
(science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) and entrepreneurship 
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education in schools across the region, as do many of the innovation dis-
trict’s companies (personal communications). On the wider scale, Cortex 
and its leadership collaborate in diverse efforts among leading St. Louis  
organizations to strengthen the city and region as a whole (personal  
communication). Regarding workforce, the innovation district maintains 
an internal inclusion goal and conducts outreach efforts to encourage  
diversity in contracting (personal communication). Yet as non-public  
entities, Cortex, Wexford, and their subsidiaries need not follow or provide 
data regarding city workforce regulations, such as a City of St. Louis  
mandate of minimum labor hour shares for women, racial and ethnic 
minorities, apprenticeship program participants, and city residents that 
applies to sizable public works projects (Kurtovic 2012; Read 2016).  
(Cortex claims to have exceeded the shares voluntarily.) Are the efforts and 
activities of Cortex and its constituent firms sufficient to spread the benefits 
of the innovation district widely, particularly to disadvantaged populations?
Another topic in flux is the impact of Cortex on nearby residential com-
munities. The Forest Park Southeast and Central West End neighborhoods 
abut the innovation district, and together offer an assortment of historically 
prosperous and up-and-coming locales. Cortex’s growth has triggered sub-
stantial development in both communities, much of it residential (personal 
communications).
Whereas this activity provides housing options nearby for Cortex work-
ers—likely enhancing the “live” aspect of “live-work-play”—not all current 
residents are receiving reciprocal benefits. Most of the attractive employ-
ment opportunities in the innovation district require considerable skills 
or experience and may be inaccessible to many people living in the neigh-
boring communities. A vigorous real estate market does not advantage all, 
and Forest Park Southeast, in particular, contains a substantial low-income 
population. There exist no ready satisfactory redresses for the issues of  
living cost escalation, displacement, and change in community character 
that can come with economic growth and development.
Moreover, as Cortex continues to grow, it may soon consume all of the land 
under its jurisdiction (personal communications). Sustained ex- 
pansion may push the innovation district into the adjoining neighborhoods 
and their invigorated development markets. Some social service providers 
formerly located near to the hospitals and transportation links were ousted 
by Cortex developments; the potential for lower market-value uses to be 
displaced is real (personal communication). “Town-gown” discord is part 
of the equation as the research universities expand as well, extending their 
physical footprints and activities further into the surrounding  
communities.
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The challenges described above can be perceived as positive in that they  
reflect consequences of the successful development of an innovation  
district. A different type of challenge is to maintain momentum.17  
Multiple interviewees asserted that despite Cortex’s accomplishments to 
date, continuing boosts in the form of supportive policies, funding, and 
ongoing engagement of institutional and regional leadership are crucial to 
the future success of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Common concerns 
are that St. Louis has insufficient locally-sourced venture capital, still lacks 
a self-sustaining entrepreneurial and startup culture, and may not be able 
to maintain effective and supportive leadership at the organizational and 
governmental levels over the extended time period necessary. The lengthy 
buildup that led to relatively recent successes, paired with traditional local 
conservativism, may cause regional actors to become satisfied or  
complacent (personal communications).
There may be risks associated with Cortex’s diversification of its portfolio 
to include more technologies and industries outside of the plant and life 
sciences arena (Read 2016). Cohesion and complementarity among actors 
and service providers may diminish. Companies that are not engaged in 
bioscience activities may not realize as much advantage from locating near 
to some of the anchor institutions.18 To the extent that the St. Louis region 
offers a limited pool of potential entrepreneurs and innovative firms, the 
innovation district could find itself in competition with other St. Louis area 
centers of innovation.19 On the whole, interview respondents do not ob-
serve much evidence of these problems. Nevertheless, Cortex could benefit 
from stronger connections to the hubs of innovative activity around the 
region, to form a more cohesive regional-scale entrepreneurial ecosystem 
and avert intraregional rivalry inasmuch as possible (Nine Network 2018; 
personal communications). Multiple efforts in this regard are ongoing  
(personal communications).
Dennis Lower, who brought the vision of the St. Louis innovation district 
to its current fruition, recently announced that he will retire from Cortex at 
the end of 2019 (Rubbelke 2019). Recruiting an equally capable and enthu-
siastic leader and implementing an efficient leadership transition will be a 
primary task of the Cortex directing board and institutional sponsors in the 
coming year.
17 The opposite issue of tempering  
unrealistic expectations also was  
mentioned, but infrequently (personal  
communication; also see Reed 2016).
18 Technology-neutral innovation 
districts are not uncommon, though 
some are located within larger and more 
varied innovation-based economies than 
St. Louis (e.g., Barcelona, Boston).
19 Other concentrations of innovative 
activity in the region include the western 
suburb of Creve Coeur, centered around 
the Danforth Plant Science Center; 
Washington Avenue in downtown St. 
Louis, including the software and com-
puting technology incubator T-Rex; the 
North Park business center adjacent to 
the University of Missouri-St. Louis; and 
the OPO (“Old Post Office”) co-working 
center for digital startups in St. Charles.
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CHAPTER 4: THE I.D.E.A. DISTRICT OF SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
The I.D.E.A. District is an emerging innovation district located in the East 
Village neighborhood of San Diego. This chapter explores the local and 
regional setting, the motivations behind the innovation district, and its  
current status and accomplishments. After gauging the progress made so 
far, the closing section describes the uncertainties and concerns that may 
affect the future development of the I.D.E.A. District.
1   OVERVIEW
2   REGIONAL BACKGROUND AND SETTING
Both the city and the metropolitan region of San Diego have been  
expanding rapidly in population for decades. More than half of the region’s 
residents live in the city proper, with suburbs and unincorporated areas 
accounting for a sizable minority (Figure 4-1). This fits a common city- 
metropolitan pattern among major urban centers in the West and  
Southwest of the United States that have become popular destinations for 
both domestic and international migration.
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Figure 4-1. San Diego city and metropolitan population.
Note: This figure consistently uses the United States Office of Management 
and Budget (2013) definition of the San Diego metropolitan area as  
consisting of San Diego County in California.
Source: United States Census Bureau (1900-2010).
The economic strengths of the San Diego region historically have been 
in transportation and logistics, trade, and the military (City of San Diego 
2014). All of these are linked to the geographic location of the city near to 
Mexico and on the Pacific Rim and distinct from the activities that form 
the core of the entrepreneurial ecosystem (see below). San Diego claims the 
largest mainland concentration of military personnel in the United States, 
with about 110,000 members on active duty (most of them assigned to the 
Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard) and another 33,000 reserves and  
civilian employees (San Diego Military Advisory Council 2018). Military 
retirees frequently remain in the region; veterans comprise about 9  
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percent of the regional population (San Diego Regional Chamber  
Foundation 2017). Private sector industries that are linked to defense  
activities and spending include construction, civil and electrical engineer-
ing, transportation, metal fabrication, shipbuilding and repair, health care, 
and security (San Diego Military Advisory Council 2018). For example, the 
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company is the largest new-construction 
shipyard on the Pacific Coast of the United States, serving construction and 
repair needs for both the United States Navy and private oil and cargo  
carriers. The company has operated in San Diego since 1960 and today is 
part of General Dynamics (NASSCO 2019).
More recently, San Diego has hosted a burgeoning tourism sector (personal 
communication). The city’s picturesque oceanside cliffs, mountains, and 
beaches draw many tourists, as does the pleasant climate. Much econ- 
omic development effort, especially in downtown San Diego, has focused 
on catering to both business travelers and vacationers by providing or 
enhancing visitor attractions and amenities, including a convention center, 
entertainment and hospitality services, and sports venues (personal  
communication). The local craft brewing industry has expanded greatly 
during the previous decade (personal communication).
Sizeable portions of San Diego’s downtown area impart an impression less 
of a traditional employment-focused central business district and more 
of an entertainment destination: an abundance of residences targeted for 
well-to-do and childless households, jobs and establishments that provide 
entertainment and other services as opposed to productive industries, and 
a perception of impermanence. Interview respondents proffered suggestive 
descriptions such as “lack of family atmosphere”, “more dogs than children”, 
and “hollowed-out economy” (personal communications). Most of the 
large corporations and research drivers in the region are located in suburbs 
or outlying areas of the city, including the Interstate 8 corridor several miles 
north of downtown and further north near the campus of the University 
of California, San Diego. Some interviewees mentioned the prevalence of 
reverse commuting—downtown residents traveling to work locations else-
where. Indeed, whereas Census Bureau estimates show the adjacent  
neighborhoods of Civic/Core and Gaslamp absorbing heavy commuting  
inflows, the East Village neighborhood and especially the the I.D.E.A.  
District evidence a much different pattern (Table 4-1).
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Note: Neighborhood and downtown boundaries follow San Diego Down-
town Partnership (2016, p. 3).
Source: United States Census Bureau (2015).
Table 4-1. San Diego city and metropolitan population.
Employed
Residents
Net commuting inflow
Net commuting share of residents
75,807
14,941
60,866
407%
19,837
627
19,210
3,064%
7,901
461
7,440
1,614%
10,144
5,060
5,084
100%
1,041
1,525
-484
-32%
Downtown Civic/Core Gaslamp East Village I.D.E.A.
Downtown Neighborhoods
In addition to its strengths in tourism and defense- and transportation- 
related industries, San Diego also boasts a robust innovation sector, with 
concentrations in biotechnology and information technology. Bio- 
technology activity in the region centers around the University of  
California, San Diego (UCSD), an institution that boasts an exceptionally 
strong reputation in the natural sciences, computer science, and  
engineering. A vigorous pharmaceuticals and life sciences industry  
cluster has developed adjacent to the campus in the La Jolla and Torrey 
Pines neighborhoods, located about 15 miles north of the city center;  
numerous San Diego-native startups operate next to prominent in- 
ternational firms such as Novartis, Pfizer, and Vertex Pharmaceuticals.
3   THE SAN DIEGO ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEM
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Several major information technology firms operate in the Torrey Pines 
area as well, including chipmaker Qualcomm1, Amazon2, and GoPro,  
a mobile camera designer founded by a UCSD graduate (personal  
communication). In downtown San Diego, numerous buildings and co-
working venues house many more information technology ventures, 
together comprising a sturdy but geographically scattered mix of recently 
founded and more mature innovation-oriented companies. One hot spot 
spreads along Broadway and includes the former NBC Building, a 25-story 
local landmark that was repurposed in 2016 as office space and  
accommodates a variety of different size firms (personal communications).
On the whole, the San Diego entrepreneurial ecosystem tends to be  
championed and led by the private sector, both by startups and established 
companies in technology fields and by business support and development 
industries such as real estate, banking, and construction (personal  
communication). Local government, from City Council to the Mayor’s 
Office and the Planning Department, typically plays a low-key and often 
informal role, such as extending behind-the-scenes support, approving  
submitted development plans, and promoting the city’s entrepreneurial 
activity to external investors (personal communications).3,4 Multiple inter-
viewees opined that the current political climate makes it difficult for San 
Diego politicians to appear friendly toward business and real estate  
development interests. The mostly hands-off treatment produces a void in 
terms of public leadership, at the same time leaving plenty of opportunity 
for grassroots activity, promotion by nonprofit and business associations, 
and the active involvement of the entrepreneurial community (personal  
communications).
Although the entrepreneurial ecosystem in San Diego is dynamic and 
vibrant, the region is in some ways overshadowed by its larger neighbors 
to the north, namely Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area. There is 
a perception, corroborated anecdotally, that larger firms and especially in-
vestors are diverted from considering San Diego, and that many successful 
home-grown entrepreneurial companies eventually will be lured northward 
along the coast by richer funding (i.e., venture capital) and networking 
opportunities.
1 Qualcomm is one of only two Fortune 
500 companies headquartered in San 
Diego. The other is Sempra, the energy 
company parent of the San Diego Gas 
and Electric utility (Gomez 2018).
2 Amazon’s activities in San Diego 
include software development, machine 
learning, cloud computing, and digital 
entertainment (Bravo 2018).
3 The San Diego Department of City 
Planning periodically has been merged 
into the Development Services Depart-
ment, which is responsible for building 
inspections and permitting, the last time 
being from 2011 to 2013 under Mayor 
Jerry Sanders (Sutro 1992; Showley 2011; 
Keatts 2013; Showley 2013).
4 Monumental changes made to the legal 
authority and tools used by California 
development agencies have encumbered 
public sector engagement in economic 
development activities during the past 
eight years (see, for example, Muller 
2013, Webster 2017, and Beyer 2019).
4   INNOVATION DISTRICT ORIGIN AND LOCATION
I.D.E.A. is the brainchild and project of real estate developers David  
Malmuth and Pete Garcia (I.D.E.A. District n.d.). The district encompasses 
approximately 93 acres on 35 city blocks in the East Village neighborhood 
at the eastern edge of San Diego’s downtown area, abutting a north south 
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section of Interstate 5 (Figure 4-2).5 The primary aim of the I.D.E.A.  
District is to enlarge and enhance the innovation economy in downtown 
San Diego, and in so doing generate job opportunities, expand economic  
activity, and inject vibrancy into the area (personal communications).  
The initials stand for Innovation, Design, Education, and Arts, reflecting 
the intention for the innovation district to help to integrate arts and design 
disciplines and educational programs into the local innovation ecosystem. 
The ultimate realization of the district after 10 or 15 years would be to reach 
3 to 4 million square feet of office and commercial space, 13,000 jobs, and 
housing for 10,000 residents (I.D.E.A. District n.d.; personal  
communications).
5 Whereas the innovation district has 
occupied the same general spatial posi-
tion since its inception, its boundaries
have been modified over time to a small 
degree to incorporate new elements 
and to accommodate changes in the 
surrounding environment. The  
branding and identity of the I.D.E.A. 
District do not rely on a precise  
geographical definition.
Figure 4-2. I.D.E.A. District and San Diego downtown neighborhoods.
Note: San Diego’s downtown neighborhoods are not officially designated, 
so the boundaries vary somewhat according to the source.
Source: Adapted from base map found on I.D.E.A. website;  
http://www.ideadistrictsd.com/
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I.D.E.A.’s origin was in response to various plans being floated by and for 
the National Football League franchise San Diego Chargers in 2010  
(personal communication). At the time, the team owner was seeking to 
move from Qualcomm Stadium to a new downtown venue that would be
the centerpiece of a larger tourist-oriented development.6 He ultimate-
ly threatened to relocate the team in the absence of an agreement for a 
new stadium.7 The primary sites suggested for the new stadium were at 
the south end of the Gaslamp Quarter and East Village neighborhoods of 
downtown, near to Petco Park, the home of the San Diego Padres of Major 
League Baseball. Both Malmuth and Garcia, however, believed that further 
entertainment-and tourism-led development was not the best economic 
development option for the adjacent communities or for the city as a whole.
At around the same time, Malmuth visited Barcelona, Spain, and toured the 
22@ innovation district. Impressed with the inventiveness of that endeavor, 
he decided to try to apply the innovation district approach in San Diego 
(personal communication). Malmuth and Garcia subsequently agreed to 
work together, and they drafted a vision statement, refined and adapted the 
notion by workshopping it in a class taught by Malmuth at the NewSchool 
of Architecture, and solicited opinions and backing from local residents 
and property owners.8
Siting the I.D.E.A. District in the East Village was a natural choice, as the 
neighborhood was one of the last locations in downtown San Diego that 
was not densely occupied, with a sufficient quantity of land available for 
purchase and redevelopment (personal communications).9 East Village 
offers proximity to civic institutions and the downtown innovation eco- 
system, supporting linkages to existing entrepreneurial ventures, networks, 
and business services (personal communication). The neighborhood is 
readily accessible via highways and the Metropolitan Transit System’s light 
rail trolley and bus routes. FRED, an on-demand shuttle service, offers free 
transportation around the downtown area.10 East Village is close to  
residential communities that present variety in character and demographic 
composition, including racially mixed and moderate income Golden Hill to 
the northeast and Barrio Logan to the southeast, predominantly white and 
moderate-to-upper income Balboa Park and Bankers Hill to the north, and 
lower income and heavily Hispanic Grant Hill, Logan Heights, and  
Sherman Heights to the east and southeast (personal communication).
While still perceiving the innovation district as an alternative to a new  
football stadium and expanded entertainment district, the developers drew 
the I.D.E.A. District boundaries a little further north to avoid direct com- 
petition (personal communication). In 2010, the area that would be  
incorporated within the innovation district contained mainly low- 
density retail and industrial operations (e.g., warehouses, automotive sales 
and repair), along with quite a number of vacant parcels. The remainder of 
6 Qualcomm Stadium, known as San 
Diego Stadium from 1967 to 1981, as  
Jack Murphy Stadium from 1981 to
1997, and renamed SDCCU Stadium 
in 2017, is located at the intersection of 
Interstate 8 and Interstate 15 some six
miles northeast of downtown San Diego.
7 The Chargers relocated to Los Angeles 
in 2017.
8 The NewSchool of Architecture is  
located at F Street and Park Boulevard, 
within the boundaries of the I.D.E.A. 
District.
9 Respondent interpretations differed,  
but some perceived the innovation  
district as driven primarily by the desire 
for development in the East Village 
neighborhood to benefit the general  
public, with the nature of that develop-
ment decided secondarily as an innova-
tion district (personal communications). 
In this, there are similarities to the Bos-
ton Innovation District (see Chapter 6).
10 FRED, which stands for Free Ride 
Everywhere Downtown, is subsidized 
through downtown parking revenue  
(Van Grove 2019).
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the East Village neighborhood interspersed these uses with small single- 
and multiple-unit residences, art studios occupying repurposed residential 
or warehouse spaces, and a few social service providers. Many residences 
and business establishments occupied historic buildings in need of  
maintenance but fundamentally sound and suitable for renovation. The 
neighborhood as a whole offered a “gritty vibe” that to locals signaled  
impending gentrification (personal communications). Prior to the  
establishment of the innovation district, some East Village land owners  
had already razed structures in anticipation of rising land prices, though 
the Great Recession briefly tempered expectations.
11 Some interview respondents suggest-
ed that city permitting and other reg- 
ulatory processes may occur less 
smoothly and quickly than would be 
the case with direct public involvement 
(personal communications).
5   DEVELOPMENT OF THE I.D.E.A. DISTRICT
The innovation district is not a single unified development project. There is 
no overall master plan for the location nor a development plan submitted 
to or approved by the city government. The land is owned and managed by 
various parties, who have come together via agreement, cooperation, and a 
commitment to the vision first introduced by Malmuth and Garcia.
Because the innovation district does not receive financial or in-kind 
support from local government agencies, nonprofit institutions, or oth-
er anchoring establishments, its development and implementation must 
follow the mechanisms of the private sector land market (personal commu-
nications). This has meant seeking investors, ensuring a competitive or at 
least an adequate return on investment, and staging development with early 
proceeds applied to later phases. The expanding population, relatively ex-
pensive land, and consistently strong real estate market in San Diego limit 
the flexibility of market-driven development.11
Although a positive return is necessary for the feasibility of the private 
sector land development process, the development partners Malmuth and 
Garcia contend that profit is not their chief motivation (personal com-
munications). An innovation district is not the easiest or most lucrative 
development opportunity for the location, but has the potential to generate 
lasting public benefit for the East Village neighborhood and for the City of 
San Diego. At least one of the major East Village landowners who supports 
the innovation district project is credited with a similar determination to 
pursue a lesser remuneration in order to benefit the community (personal 
communications).
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To implement and manage their building projects, Malmuth and Garcia 
partner with a real estate development company. The first agreement that 
the two developers entered into, with the local firm Lankford and Associ-
ates, dissolved (amicably) once it became clear that the parties entertained 
different development goals. Their current real estate partnership is with 
Lowe Enterprises, which is based in Los Angeles (I.D.E.A. District. n.d.; 
personal communication). Other activities within the innovation district, 
such as the Makers Quarter (described below), proceed independently  
with voluntary coordination.
The I.D.E.A. District ostensibly is agnostic regarding kinds of innovation, 
technology, and industrial sectors. Its proponents recognize, however, 
that information, design, and arts ventures are the most likely occupants 
(personal communications). These are the industries best aligned with the 
knowledge and skill bases of other downtown employers, and whose  
employees may be most attracted to the urban amenities, dense built en- 
vironment, and “live-work-play” lifestyle opportunities of an innovation 
district. By way of contrast, life science firms typically require more ex- 
tensive and expensive space, and already concentrate in La Jolla and Torrey 
Pines to benefit from the research activity and expertise at UCSD. There are 
no plans to assemble wet lab space in the innovation district.
The development of the innovation district is proceeding in stages  
(personal communication). The first two to three years were aimed mostly 
at publicization and community engagement through repurposing and  
activating some of the underutilized sites within the district (personal  
communications). This part of the effort has focused on the Makers  
Quarter, a six-block section of the innovation district that currently houses, 
among other activities, an information systems consultant; a charter  
elementary school; a handcrafted furniture company; a graphic design
company; a co-working space; a coffee shop; a combination karaoke bar, 
video game arcade, and bowling arena; and an independent brewery.12  
The Fab Lab, launched with funding from the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, is a small-scale and relatively low-cost custom 
fabrication facility geared toward amateurs in the community (personal 
communication). Most of these establishments have opened in the last 
five years. Several are housed in rehabilitated buildings, such as the former 
Snowflake Bakery on 16th Street. The Makers Quarter is centered on the 
SILO open space, a formerly vacant lot that now accommodates a wide 
variety of outdoor events, including concerts, plays, dances, do-it-yourself 
workshops, art shows, and food festivals; and the SMARTS Farm, a com-
munity and educational garden (personal communications).
12 These establishments are, in order, 
Fuse Integration, the Urban Discovery 
Academy, the Moniker Group (which
includes the furniture manufacturer, the 
graphic designer, the co-working space, 
and the coffee shop), Punch Bowl
Social (part of a chain based in Denver), 
and 10 Barrel Brewing (Makers Quarter 
n.d.; Johnson 2018).
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As a component part of the innovation district, the Makers Quarter is in-
tended to gather public support while also providing the broader  
community with a linkage to the district, an awareness of neighborhood 
continuity and authenticity, and a voice in directing development (personal
communications). The planners of Makers Quarter have from its beginning 
solicited ideas from nearby residents, patrons, and visitors, and are contin- 
uing to request feedback regarding the form that the spaces in the area 
eventually should take. Unlike the I.D.E.A. District as a whole, the Makers 
Quarter does have a master plan, created in part by the development firm 
Lankford and Associates, mentioned above. This plan calls for a buildout 
that includes 1 million square feet of office space, 140,000 square feet of 
retail, and at least 800 housing units (Van Grove 2018). 
Now, several years into the development of the innovation district, build-
ing construction has become a major focus. The first new building, IDEA1, 
held its grand opening ceremony in December of 2017. It provides 42,000 
square feet of office space that is largely flexible and reconfigurable (person-
al communication). The mixed-use structure also contains 295 apartments,
12,000 square feet of retail space for several restaurants and other service 
establishments, a fitness center, and a rooftop clubhouse and spa. “The 
Hub”, an open-air atrium that includes a film projection system and an  
indoor conference space on the second floor, is designed to host various  
entertainment and networking events (Showley 2017). Malmuth and 
Garcia’s original intention was for this building to be devoted much more 
heavily to office space, with some ground-floor retail but no residential 
component. Because they could not obtain financing for speculative office 
construction, however, more than half of the leasable space in IDEA1 is 
residential, though the construction method permits future conversion to 
office use. The San Diego Community College District owns the building, 
signing a 99-year lease agreement. The two developers are working on the 
next building (preliminarily named IDEA2), which they hope will include 
housing units offered at below market rate (Showley 2017).
The Makers Quarter also has developed a new building, Block D, contain-
ing 53,000 square feet of office space with restaurant and other retail space 
on the ground floor (Van Grove 2018). The construction of this building 
emphasizes minimized energy use through ventilation, passive cooling, and 
active shading systems (BNIM n.d.).
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6   ASSESSMENT AND CHALLENGES
The I.D.E.A. innovation district is still in its nascent stages. Thus far, the 
bulk of the effort has been directed toward placemaking and the first couple 
of building construction projects. The programming and services that exist 
are oriented chiefly toward makers and millennials—activating spaces, 
encouraging visitors, and promoting the innovation district and especially 
the Makers Quarter widely. The approach is to craft a location that is at-
tractive to entrepreneurs and innovators rather than to create or financially 
subsidize entrepreneurial and innovative businesses. The actions have been 
effective in repurposing spaces and drawing interest and attention, but also 
have incurred fears of displacement, as discussed below.
Several serious challenges to the continued progress and development of 
the innovation district are evident. There is no institution anchoring the 
district. With the San Diego city government unwilling or unable to par- 
ticipate directly, the possibilities are restricted to private or non-profit  
establishments. Malmuth and Garcia initially contemplated the NewSchool 
of Architecture as an anchor institution. The design expertise and facilities 
of the school could be helpful resources, but the institution lacks size and 
stature, does not conduct very much research, and its for-profit status has 
produced unstable enrollment and finances (personal communication). San 
Diego City College, one of three main campuses of the San Diego Com-
munity College District, is located just north of the innovation district, 
but it also is not a suitable anchor (personal communication). City College 
conducts a minimal quantity of research, and its students and faculty tend 
to restrict their off-campus activity to food and small retail purchases.
The University of California, San Diego is a more promising prospect for 
an anchor institution. Although the campus is not close to downtown San 
Diego, some of the numerous startups generated from the university’s sub-
stantial research activity might consider a downtown location, especially as 
the innovation district becomes more attractive with further development. 
In addition, UCSD anticipates a Spring 2021 opening date for an extension 
site located at the intersection of Park Avenue and Market Street, just inside 
the southern boundary of the I.D.E.A. District. This building will house lec-
tures, performances, continuing education classes, and workshops, and will 
adjoin a 426-unit residential tower. The university site will bring a light rail 
extension connecting to the main UCSD campus (University of California, 
San Diego 2018; University of California, San Diego 2019). It remains to be 
seen how strong a link the downtown extension will deliver between the 
innovation district and UCSD’s cutting-edge research.
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In order to access financing, the developers of the innovation district work 
within the confines and dictates of the private market. That market is strong 
in San Diego, including in the East Village neighborhood as an anticipated 
site for near-term development. Without public support, and lacking one 
or more sizable tenants to stabilize the venture from the real estate perspec-
tive, many desirable options are out of reach (personal communication). 
Suitably housing startup firms and entrepreneurial establishments requires 
adjustable rental timing arrangements and malleable space configurations, 
yet the construction approach of IDEA1 is less flexible than could have 
been achieved with a greater up-front expenditure (personal comm- 
unications). The development partners have been compelled to compro-
mise on the balance of office with residential and retail space, with the latter 
helping to subsidize the former (personal communication). It is not clear 
how the developers will be able to achieve their objective to include  
below-market-rate housing in the next building. More generally, the  
divergent time horizons for the aims of economic development (relatively 
long) and those of real estate development (typically much shorter) cause 
friction, such as led to the dissolution of Malmuth and Garcia’s partnership 
with Lankford and Associates.
As with most local economic development, the innovation district likely is 
causing residential displacement. The denizens of East Village largely seem 
to be supportive of the changes that are accompanying ongoing develop-
ment, but this may be because the current residents already represent a shift 
in the population of the neighborhood. Rising costs and the popularity of 
the placemaking efforts have had the consequence of pushing out low- 
income individuals, such as artists and those who had located in the  
neighborhood to receive social assistance. The rough edge to the neighbor-
hood has mostly evaporated; this transformation of the character of East 
Village had seemed inevitable for most of the past decade (personal  
communications).
The potential impacts on nearby San Diego communities are also con-
cerning, particularly the demographically diverse and relatively affordable 
neighborhoods of Barrio Logan and Golden Hill (personal communi-
cations). Though the prospect of rapid stadium-led tourist development 
fled with the football Chargers, the slower-paced office, commercial, and 
residential expansion currently occurring in East Village also carries the 
propensity for boosting property values and adding pressure for redevel-
opment over a wider geographic area. This is one reason for Malmuth and 
Garcia’s aim to include accessibly-priced housing units in new construction. 
More importantly, if the innovation district is able to incorporate a wide 
variety of activities that support employment at multiple skill levels as well 
as provide educational and advancement opportunities, it will mean more 
chance of integration with and benefit to surrounding communities. 
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San Diego’s strong real estate market and the lack of public involvement in 
the development process, however, yield a dearth of specific tools available 
to combat gentrification and displacement (personal communication).
Overall, the development of the innovation district to date largely fits with 
the reasoning described in Chapter 1. The I.D.E.A. District is situated close 
enough to contribute to and intermingle with the entrepreneurial com- 
munity scattered throughout downtown San Diego, and the modest size 
and compact layout of the innovation district ensure internal proximity as 
it matures. The mixed-use aspect of the newly constructed buildings, the 
event and networking spaces, the multiple transportation options, and the 
variety of amenities available in the district and particularly in the Makers 
Quarter, generate the “live-work-play” environment to attract entrepre-
neurs and other workers and residents.
Other aspects of an effective entrepreneurial ecosystem, though, seem to be 
beyond the influence of those developing the innovation district. There are 
no tools or inducements in place or feasible to introduce in the near term to 
make sure that the innovation district contains a mix of companies in terms 
of size and stage of development (personal communication). The desired 
blend of residential and employment space is proving difficult to achieve. 
The goal of a research anchor depends on whether the combination of indi-
vidually insufficient local institutions with a research university extension 
proves to be adequate.
Finally, the decentralized leadership and ownership of the I.D.E.A. District 
may constitute a vulnerability in the future. No central agency or person 
possesses authority and oversight over the entire innovation district, and no 
formal mechanisms exist to prevent or resolve disputes. The operation and 
progress of the district depend on the committed participation and volun-
tary cooperation of multiple actors. This structure has worked fairly well so 
far. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that shared interest, community- 
oriented altruism, and mutual goodwill will continue indefinitely to secure 
coordination and maintain commitment to the vision of the innovation 
district.
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On June 2014, Detroit’s Mayor Mike Duggan officially declared and  
designated the Detroit Innovation District, a 2,750-acre designation for the 
Downtown, Midtown, and New Center -neighborhoods (see Figure 5-1). 
The event launch, held in TechTown, a business innovation hub located in 
Midtown Detroit, included an invite list of prominent community leaders 
from anchor institutions and supporting foundations. Bruce Katz,  
previous vice president and director of the Metropolitan Policy Program 
at the Brooking Institution in Washington D.C., was in attendance as an 
invited speaker. Only three days earlier, Katz, and colleague Julie Wagner, 
released their report, “The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New Geography 
of Innovation in America” (Katz & Wagner, 2014), a report which continues 
to influence innovation district policy. Anticipating success for the Detroit 
Innovation District, Katz, who featured prominently in the strategic design 
of the Detroit Innovation District, stated, “What’s going to happen is we’re 
going to have a two-plus-two-equals-five effect. Collaboration and synergy 
in this district are going to have unanticipated discoveries for the market” 
(Broda, 2014).
1   INTRODUCTION
Figure 5-1. Map of the Detroit Innovation District used in public brochures.
Source: Subbiah, 2014
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This paper documents the deployment of the Detroit Innovation District 
as an economic development strategy and its subsequent slow demise. Two 
principal reasons contribute to this demise. The first is the lack of a clear 
and agreed upon understanding of the intention of the model. Turf  
battles and power dynamics revealed internal disagreement between stake-
holders on the purpose of the innovation district and that complicated its 
implementation. This led to a division within the leadership. While some 
favored isolating the innovation district to a high-tech, high-growth busi-
ness development cluster strategy, others questioned how to convert it into 
a more inclusive strategy with outreach into the neighborhoods outside the 
boundaries of the innovation district. The second reason is that the absence 
of basic infrastructure in Detroit –such as sewerage, lighting, and roads– 
shifted the focus from harnessing innovation and attracting capital  
investments in the technology and entrepreneurial sector to attracting  
investment for economic development. Feeling the pressure of time and  
the need to yield immediate results, stakeholders gravitated toward  
easily implementable measures more closely associated with traditional city 
building than fostering an innovation district. Findings from the case of the 
Detroit Innovation District contribute to larger over-arching discussions on 
the challenges of harnessing a knowledge economy in Detroit and in similar 
post-industrial cities with shrinking populations and declining resources.
That the Detroit Innovation District strategy is no longer a leading econom-
ic development effort is not necessarily a negative conclusion of this study. 
The experiences of the leaders guiding its implementation and the  
challenges they faced speak to the importance of local context. The  
excitement for the innovation district strategy held particular sway in  
Detroit as Katz and Wagner publicly featured the city’s innovative potential 
in their national report, in addition to personally consulting with  
Michigan and Detroit leaders on the implementation of the Detroit  
Innovation District strategy. From the onset this mounted the pressure 
to implement a successful strategy. At the same time, among locals there 
existed a concerned undercurrent of an exclusionary strategy focused on a 
growing central business district surrounded by severely declining neigh-
borhoods. In many respects, this Detroit case study provides a different 
example from our other cases on the dynamics of strategy formation,  
approach to implementation, and the consequences thereof.
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In the absence of a formal regulatory environment and the historic lack of a 
functional planning department, individuals in various capacities (such as 
someone in a private corporation, an investor, or a foundation head) may 
collaborate to fulfill the role generally assigned to city government (Kinder, 
2016; Peck, 2012). As such, a small contingent of people serve as decision 
makers within the area encompassed by the Detroit Innovation District. 
This means that a variety of elite individuals armed with the power to  
influence change are in charge of the decisions that impact the downtown 
core. These are the people I interviewed.
From April 2015 to March 2016, I conducted interviews ranging from one 
to two hours each with the most visible and key figures spearheading the 
development of the Detroit Innovation District. This list included 27 inter-
views with individuals at the state and local level and is comprised  
primarily of individuals who sat on the Detroit Innovation District  
Advisory Committee (see Figure 5-2).
2   METHODS
Figure 5-2. Detroit Innovation District Advisory Committee.
Source: Adapted from Broda, 2014.
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Through snowball sampling, my list grew to include state and local level 
representatives, prominent economic developers, real estate agents,  
developers, architects, and consultants to the project. Because of their high 
profiles and public visibility, interviewees signed letters of consent  
guaranteeing their anonymity. I recorded and transcribed all interviews.  
I read the transcripts several times, coding and recoding them for re- 
occurring themes. These themes informed the argument presented in this 
paper.
My understanding of the situation was broadened through four un- 
published drafts outlining the Detroit Innovation District strategy.  
I received copies of these drafts from my interviewees. Consultants in  
Lansing drafting policy recommendations for the state of Michigan  
prepared the first draft; a committee consisting of a local representative,  
a representative from a state consultancy, and a representative from a  
national consultancy prepared the second draft; and Detroit representatives 
prepared the third and fourth drafts. In addition to these drafts, I used  
promotional brochures, media sources, and printed and online materials of 
the Detroit Innovation District to contextualize my findings.
From Henry Ford’s Detroit, a city bustling with industrial activity and an 
influx of labor that reached a population peak of 1.85 million in 1953, to its 
current population, which hovers below 700,000 with more than 40% of the 
residents living in poverty, the history of Detroit’s founding, its rise during 
industrialization, bankruptcy, and its ultimate “death” is well rehearsed 
(Bomey, 2017; Galster, 2018; Manning Thomas, 2013; see also special issue 
Sugrue, 2014; Tabb, 2015).
A wide variety of scholars discuss the factors that contributed to this  
Detroit’s decline, some concentrating on larger global forces, others focus-
ing on changes at the local level. Numerous retellings simplify Detroit’s 
growth and its demise to the reliance on a single industry: the automobile. 
The story is more multifaceted and complex, which makes it challenging to 
pinpoint the reasons that led to the adoption of an innovation district  
strategy and shaped its scope. Regardless, certain historical events and  
economic development strategies to deserve highlighting due to their  
relation to Detroit’s innovation district strategy.
3   REGIONAL BACKGROUND AND SETTING
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3.1 The automobile industry
Detroit’s domination by the automobile industry and related spin-offs is as 
relevant today as it was during the height of industrialization, though for 
different reasons. In the early 1900s, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, 
the “Big Three” formed Detroit’s economic base and had a tremendous 
effect on the urban landscape (Ryan, 2008). The presence of the  
oligopolistic giant automakers had a tremendous effect on the urban land-
scape. At the height of industrialization, the automotive sector dominated 
the urban landscape with their superblock factories and suburban-type 
housing for manufacturing labor (Ryan, 2012; Ryan & Campo, 2013).1  
To alleviate the increased presence of the increased presence of automobiles 
on the road, street facing store fronts were pushed back to widen streets 
(Ryan, 2008). What was once a city with smaller parcels of land and con-
centrated populations, was slowly consumed by the super-block factory 
footprints, roads, highways, and parking lots that broke up the density and 
transit oriented development on which innovation district strategy depends 
(see Chapter 1, especially section 4).
The departure of automobile factories and operations from the city center 
is also an important contribution to the challenges of implementing the 
Detroit Innovation District. The large abandoned factories certainly affect 
density, but in addition, the outcome of companies moving their operations 
away from downtown to the outskirts of the city (Garreau, 1992; McCarthy, 
1997), and later to greenfield sites in the suburbs (Hyde, 1982; Neill, 1995), 
resulted in the decentralization of people and large demographic changes. 
Edge cities grew to become self-sufficient, with commuters traveling  
between edge cities, rather than from the edge to the core (McCarthy, 
1997). Despite the slight resurgence of the central business district, this is 
a pattern that persists today with commuters holding 70% of the jobs in 
Detroit (Detroit Future City: 2012 Detroit Strategic Framework Plan, 2013). 
In addition, two of Michigan’s largest research campuses (University of 
Michigan and Michigan State University) reside outside of the city center 
resulting in spin-offs growing with the cities of their respective locations 
or outside of the state rather than locating in the greater downtown (see 
Figure 5-3).
1 Ryan and Campo (2013) argue for the 
importance of preserving the automobile 
heritage to ensure the city of Detroit and 
its inhabitants remain connected to their 
historic path. In this article, they state 
that the contemporary landscape is not 
reflective of its automotive past because 
many of the automobile factories have 
been demolished. I differ from this per-
spective in that I focus on the ways the 
automobile industry affected the density 
of the city, the creation of highways and 
parking lots.
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Figure 5-3. Commute times from Downtown Detroit (Zero Mile) to Michigan 
                   State University and the University of Michigan.
Despite the loss of the automotive manufacturing and direct competition 
with other cities and countries in the vehicle market, the automotive  
legacy continues with this sector seeking to corner the market in automated 
vehicle technologies. The legacy of the automobile industry remains present 
not only in the amount of blight caused by decentralization, not only in the 
abandoned factories that take up massive amounts of space, nor in their 
demise that left gaping swaths of derelict land, but also in the innovation 
district strategy. The respondents I interviewed firmly believe in the  
capacity to tap into the innovative energy that existed in Henry Ford’s  
Detroit and to compete against other regions on the cutting edge of  
autonomous vehicle technologies.
Source: Author, 2019.
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3.2. Placemaking efforts and planning techniques
Many efforts to reverse decline in Detroit focus on remaking the built  
environment through placemaking, many of which targeted the re- 
vitalization of the greater downtown. Adopted tactics, such as waterfront 
redevelopment, casino construction, and sports-led regeneration, are 
congruent with urban revitalization efforts to harness a tourist economy 
(Eisenschitz, 2010; Grodach & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2007; Klingmann, 2007). 
In the 1970s, beginning with the five-term tenure of Mayor Coleman Young 
and continued throughout Mayor Dennis Archer’s two terms in office,  
revitalization was always closely tied with the physical environment.  
When Young entered office in 1974, Detroit-based corporations were in the  
process of building coalitions to address causes ailing the city. Two in- 
fluential organizations included the New Detroit Committee of 1967 and 
the Detroit Renaissance Inc., of 1973 (Benyon & Solomos, 1987). Mayor 
Young leveraged support of the business community through these  
coalitions, particularly under his initiative, Moving Detroit Forward: A  
Plan for Urban Economic Revitalization (Manning Thomas, 1990). This 
bold initiative sought to finance $3 billion worth of improvements through 
federal and state funds allocated over a five-year period (Neill, 1995).  
From this fund, Detroit’s riverfront slowly developed through flagship 
projects such as the Renaissance Center, a collection of towers for office, 
hotel, and retail use, funded through private-public partnership with the 
Detroit Renaissance Inc.; the Joe Louis (Hockey) Arena; the extension to 
Cobo Hall, Detroit’s convention center; and other smaller projects such 
as the Max Fisher Riverfront Apartments and Hart Plaza. To connect the 
major riverfront establishments to the entertainment neighborhood known 
as Greektown, Young secured funding for the Detroit People Mover, a two-
mile ring light railway (Eisinger, 2000).
During Mayor Young’s tenure, the Michigan legislature developed state-
based intervention approaches focused on targeting delineated boundaries. 
A series of public acts were enacted to create boundaries with jurisdictional 
authorities (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1999). PA 198 enacted the Plant 
Rehabilitation and Industrial Development District. PA 575 enacted Down-
town Development Districts, Development Authorities, and Tax Increment 
Finance Districts (Bieri & Kayanan, 2014). Three additional legislative acts 
created the Economic Development Corporation, the Downtown  
Development Corporation, and the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation 
(DEGC). The establishment of the DEGC ushered in an era of project-led 
approach to development with tax breaks and incentive packages  
(McCarthy, 2002). In 1994, President Bill Clinton implemented em- 
powerment zone policies specifically to address issues that produce  
economic, environmental, and social improvements. That same year, under 
the Dennis Archer Mayoral Administration, Detroit secured $100 million 
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in federal funding over ten years dedicated to increase economic develop-
ment within a geographic span of 18 square miles, an overlay that includes 
the property of the Big Three automakers, financial institutions, and an 
additional 80 programs scattered across the space (Boyle & Eisinger, 2001).
These efforts contributed to the beautification of the downtown core, but 
they could not stop population decline. Facing increased levels of poverty 
within the central city, higher taxes were imposed to compensate for the 
eroding tax base. These were not sufficient to compensate for the loss of 
population and income and resulted in a decline in services. This cycle of 
disinvestment and Detroit’s ongoing borrowing practices to pay off debts 
reached its climax in 2013, the year Detroit filed for bankruptcy, the largest 
filing in US history. One direct connection between bankruptcy and the 
strategic aims of the Detroit Innovation District was the focus generated 
on blight removal. The final Plan of Adjustment prepared by Emergen-
cy Manager Kevin Orr secured $1.4 billion for public services and blight 
removal (Bomey, Helms, & Guillen, 2014). This reinvestment of unsecured 
debt funded Detroit’s Blight Removal Task Force Plan, a multilevel strategy 
to address and/or demolish the 84,641 blighted structures and vacant lots 
(Blight Removal Task Force Plan, 2014).
The re-envisioning and remapping of Detroit through the Blight  
Removal Task Force Plan, as well as other extremely detailed documents, 
such as the Detroit Future City Strategic Framework Plan (Detroit Future 
City: 2012 Detroit Strategic Framework Plan, 2013), build on the momen-
tum of collaboration and influenced the siting for the innovation district in 
a pre-imagined boundary already targeting growth strategies and increased 
land values. The Detroit Future City Strategic Framework influenced target-
ing the neighborhoods which were ultimately included within the border 
of the Detroit Innovation District. Detroit Future City, an extensive report 
that served for many years as a strategic framework for the city, divides the 
city into five planning elements: economic growth, land use, city systems, 
neighborhoods, land and building assets. The report does not remove the 
focus on manufacturing, but it does suggest diversifying the economic base 
to include the food processing sector, medical technology, and education 
and digital/creative industries, while emphasizing the need for targeted 
education and training programs. Within the plan is a specific focus on 
increasing the value of land and investments in the city in places with the 
highest potential of jobs. This undergirds reasoning to focus on the central 
business district for the Detroit Innovation District but also leads to  
critiques that economic development efforts target the downtown while  
the remainder of the city continues to shrink (Moskowitz, 2015).
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3.3 Race and Racism
Detroit’s trajectory cannot be separated from the role of race in its  
formation and racism in its decline (Benyon & Solomos, 1987; Darden, 
Hill, Thomas, & Thomas, 1987; Newman & Safransky, 2014; Sugrue, 2014). 
During the decentralization of Detroit, racist policies preventing African 
Americans from moving into the burgeoning white suburbs forced  
segregation and resulted in the concentration of African Americans with-
in the city center faced with employment, housing, and police treatment 
discriminations (Neill, 1995; Sugrue, 2014; Vose, 1959). The 1967 rebellion, 
which killed 41 people and destroyed 1,300 buildings, further exacerbated 
white flight. By the 1990s, 78% of Detroit’s population was African  
American (Neill, 1995). As of the US Census 2010, African Americans 
make up 83% of Detroit’s population. However, in the Greater Downtown, 
which encompasses the Detroit Innovation District, black residents account 
for 69% of the population, down 5%, with whites accounting for 22%, up 
3% from the 2000 Census (7.2 SQ MI: A Report on Greater Downtown  
Detroit, 2015). The increased racial diversity of the Greater Downtown 
is not in itself negative, but it is necessary to question the reasons for the 
decline in black residents and the connections between innovation district 
strategies that cater to higher skill sets that black residents may not possess.
Attention to class and race issues is of critical importance in the  
development of the downtown Detroit. The Brookings report on inn- 
ovation districts discusses the proximity of innovation districts to low- 
income neighborhoods as a “focus on expanding opportunities to  
disadvantaged populations” (Katz & Wagner, 2014). Gesturing to side-by-
side co-location invokes the image of trickle-down economics, the image 
that benefits accrued within the bordered space of the innovation district 
will spill-over to the remaining neighborhoods, already less fortunate for 
their lack of inclusivity within the boundary. The problem with this line 
of reasoning is that real estate prices in close proximity to the innovation 
district are rising. The low-income neighborhoods purported to house the 
service labor are slowly becoming unaffordable to that demographic.  
Telling from the increased diversity of the downtown core is that high 
skilled, college-educated individuals are occupying the jobs that located in 
central business districts, or their vicinities, since these areas are targeted 
for the growth of the knowledge economy. The long-term result, particular-
ly in cities with sustained population loss attempting to reinvigorate  
downtowns, is the “uncoupling” of the economic city (Mallach, 2014), 
where a spatial redistribution between economic and residential activity is 
occurring.
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4   HISTORY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
The declaration of the Detroit Innovation District occurred in the  
summer of 2014, but foundational elements of a renewed interest in the  
city appeared over a decade earlier. In 2000, Wayne State University,  
Henry Ford Health System, and General Motors funded the creation of  
an entrepreneurship hub called TechTown. Though initially residing within 
the university campus, in 2004 it incorporated as a non-profit and Sasaki  
Associates designed a new space for it near Wayne State University’s  
campus. TechTown’s initial focus was technology-based spinoffs. However, 
with time leadership decided that the focus needed to work with businesses 
at all stages and include small businesses and commercial corridors outside 
of the central business district (personal communication, 2016). In this way, 
TechTown’s trajectory parallels the Detroit Innovation District strategy.
The momentum of tech-based developments relocating in Detroit con- 
tinued with the Compuware World Headquarter’s move to the heart of 
downtown in 2003, followed by Dan Gilbert, one of Detroit’s largest  
property owners, relocating Quicken Loans in 2010. In 2012, Henry Ford 
Hospital opened the Henry Ford Innovation Institute to develop and  
commercialize the hospital’s intellectual assets. The space, located within 
the hospital, provides a fabrication laboratory, engineering services to pro-
totype ideas, 3D printers, learning seminars, resources and support to scale 
an idea. The target for the institute is to use innovation to improve health-
care and to improve the experience of the patients. The Model G Patient 
Gown, a product that emerged from a collaboration between the hospital 
and design students from the neighboring College for Creative Studies, put 
the Institute on the map and demonstrated the importance of cross-sectoral 
collaboration and the role of place in fostering a creative and supportive 
environment (“Model G Patient Gown,” 2015).
Redevelopment was also underway in Corktown, a neighborhood that is 
not incorporated in the Detroit Innovation District maps until later ren- 
ditions. The existence of makerspaces in Corktown, most noticeably 
Ponyride (established 2011) were fodder for a possible relationship between 
Corktown and the activity in the innovation district. Though Ponyride  
has since relocated to New Center, Corktown continues to see a real  
estate boom due to Ford Motor Company opening The Factory, a dedicated 
space for engineers to focus on business models for electric and self-driving 
vehicles, as well as the recent purchase by the Ford Motor Company of the 
abandoned Michigan Central Depot, a former train station that has been 
vacant for 30 years and serves as a landmark for the Corktown neighbor-
hood (Gallagher, 2018; Livengood, 2018).
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Finally, the role of Midtown Inc., a non-profit economic development  
organization formerly known as the University Cultural Center  
Association, to revitalize Midtown is important because of the  
organization’s focus on building the cultural component of the district, 
ensuring the right amenities to attract knowledge workers, and providing 
services such as extending Wayne State University policing services to the 
neighborhood and adding bike share systems (Doucet & Smit, 2016).
5   HISTORY OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH DISTRICT STRATEGIES
The Detroit Innovation District spans 4.3 square miles encompassing much 
of the greater downtown, including the Central Business District, Mid-
town, and Corktown. The borders of the Detroit Innovation District remain 
in contention, but generally, the Detroit riverfront creates the southern 
boundary, interstates 75 and 375 form the eastern boundary, and interstate 
94 the northern boundary, with an additional northern extension to include 
the Henry Ford Health System just north of Grand Boulevard. M-10 forms 
the western border with an extension to include the Corktown neighbor-
hood (see Figure 5-4).
Figure 5-4. Detroit Innovation District.
Source: Author, 2019.
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The origins of the Detroit Innovation District strategy began at the state 
level. According to individuals driving the development of the Detroit 
Innovation District, Bruce Katz played a role in highlighting existing assets 
and resources that could be leveraged to create an innovation district in 
2008, years before the 2014 official announcement. In December of 2013, 
the Brookings Institution, in tandem with Business Leaders for Michigan, 
a non-profit consulting and research arm of the state of Michigan; The 
Reinvestment Fund, a community development institution with offices in 
Philadelphia and Baltimore; Public Sector Consultants, a research and pro-
gram management firm; and the Michigan Municipal League, a non-profit 
business management consultant organization, collaborated to develop 
firm aims and objectives for the district. Four main goals were outlined 
(The Detroit Innovation District: Recommendations for State Alignment and 
Investment, 2013):
1.  Create a dense and vibrant residential environment
2.  Increase the number of small businesses
3.  Upgrade infrastructure and public spaces
4.  Support the development of space and talent to grow emerging  
     clusters in the digital and creative industries, healthcare industries,  
     and small-batch manufacturing
The committee selected Detroit as the location for the first innovation  
district fearing that a faltering Detroit would negatively impact the remain-
der of the state. As one individual on the advisory committee expressed, 
“Detroit has to do well, or the rest of the state will not do well when it 
comes to international commerce” (personal communication, 2015). 
Therefore, the committee agreed that Governor Snyder would formally 
declare the district, determine a team to deploy the idea, and then officials 
in Lansing would step back to allow local Detroit leaders to implement the 
district.
The move of the innovation district strategy from the state level to the city 
level implicated local Detroit foundations. Foundations in Detroit had a 
rich history of funding revitalization efforts in Downtown and Midtown. 
The New Economy Initiative (NEI), the strategic grant-making branch of 
the Hudson-Webber Foundation, has been instrumental in this respect 
investing over $50 million in the area since 2010. The mayor, with input 
from the NEI and Mass Economics, the organization hired by the NEI to 
consult on the development of the Detroit Innovation District, created an 
advisory committee of 18 individuals as the public face and steward of the 
Detroit Innovation District. This star-studded cast represented home grown 
entrepreneurial initiatives and leaders of all the major public institutions 
and private corporations within the Detroit Innovation District boundary. 
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Three working groups sat below this advisory committee, each focused on 
a specific area of development: 1) Physical Place, 2) Innovation and Com-
mercialization, 3) Building Detroit’s Knowledge Economy. These groups, 
made up of ten to twelve people, were tasked with presenting concrete plans 
for their respective areas to the advisory committee (Detroit Innovation 
District Strategy Document to Advisory Committee, 2015).
By May 2014, a new committee had revised the state-level draft and were 
working on a second more context-specific version. Of interest between this 
second draft versus the state level draft, was that the fourth goal, focused on 
supporting the emergence of clusters, was moved to the top of the list.  
This is congruent with the aim of creating a globally recognized place by 
fostering an entrepreneurial and innovation ecosystem. The stated goals of 
this locally derived draft were to reignite the innovation potential of De-
troit, a city with an historic past of innovation, and to move away from the 
post-World War II model of innovation as closed-off and secretive with  
intellectual capital housed in industrial centers and laboratories. The  
wording of this document frames the opportunity to develop an  
innovation district in Detroit in the language of the new spatial geography 
of innovation and the trends of young urbanites seeking urban living and 
transit-oriented development as a way to underpin the need for density.  
The overarching vision in this document is that the innovation district 
would raise the status of Detroit to “be a globally recognized center of 
ideation, commercialization, and talent that powers economic opportunity 
for the residents of the city and repositions Detroit’s role in the national and 
global economies” (Lewis, Lynch, & Vey, 2014: p 8). This local draft aims to 
provide a firm governance structure and leadership platform to target re-
form within the district and calls for a Detroit Innovation District manager 
to oversee development in the district and to formalize economic, physical, 
and networking asset development while having a direct line to the Mayor, 
as the city is the lead actor in the Detroit Innovation District effort.
In February 2015, a third draft, Detroit Innovation District Strategy  
Document to Advisory Committee, was presented (2015). This document 
laid out the strategy to highlight tangible and visible outcomes in the  
Detroit Innovation District. In this document there exists recognition for 
the attraction of new talent, but also to create pathways for existing  
residents. The initial phase of this implementable strategy is to derive a 
short list of initiatives to implement within a 24-month time frame. Here 
we see the establishment of a tangible metric, one that begins to ground 
the concept of the innovation district into a more feasible idea of what can 
be accomplished as an organized district. The number one recommenda-
tion is to focus on infrastructure. Once again, this demonstrates the shift 
away from growing specific clusters to a focus on density. The argument in 
focusing on infrastructure is that only 4% of the buildings in the district 
were built after 1980, while the remainder were not conducive to current 
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technology needs. A few elements have remained consistent regarding the 
understanding of what an innovation district would mean for Detroit.  
The first is that the district would function as a special zone for funding 
priorities of the state, as well as provide the justification for additional 
financial support from the federal government in the concentrated area. 
Additionally, the Detroit Innovation District would become an exper- 
imental area for the Mayor to advance changes in zoning regulations.
Part of the work that emerged from early Detroit Innovation District 
advisory and working group meetings was deriving an asset inventory for 
Detroit. The assets highlighted as part of the Detroit Innovation District 
include (see Figure 5-5):
•  Two hospital research centers (Henry Ford Health System, Detroit Medical 
    Center)
•  Five hospitals (Children’s Hospital of Michigan, Karmanos Cancer Center,  
    Rehabilitation Institute of Michigan, Harper University Hospital, John D  
    Dingell VA Medical Center)
•  Five satellite university facilities (University of Michigan Detroit Center,  
    Michigan State University Detroit Center, Grand Valley State University,  
    Lawrence Technological University Detroit Studio, Central Michigan  
    University)
•  One Research One (R1)2 University (Wayne State University)
•  One design school (College for Creative Studies
•  Two accelerators (TechTown Detroit, TechStars Mobility)
•  One innovation institute (Henry Ford Innovation Institute)
•  Five venture capital firms headquartered in Detroit (Detroit Venture  
    Partners, Renaissance Venture Capital Fund, Fontinalis Parners, GM  
    Ventures, LLC, Rock Ventures)
2 Research One is a university classifica-
tion by the Carnegie Foundation  
indicating the highest category of  
research activity.
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Figure 5-5. Detroit Innovation District Asset Inventory.
Source: Adapted from Kresge, 2016.
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The concentration of these institutions in the greater downtown impacted 
the decision to overlay an innovation district in that area (The Detroit  
Innovation District: Recommendations for State Alignment and Invest-
ment, 2013). According to drafts for the innovation district, the decision 
to focus on the New Center, Midtown, and Downtown neighborhoods was 
also a result of the demographics. While most of Detroit was losing its  
population, the targeted area of the Detroit Innovation District comprised 
3.1 percent of the city’s land area, a little over 3 percent of the city’s  
population (22,018), 52 percent of the city’s employment base, and 9  
percent of its business establishments (4,700) (Lewis et al., 2014). Despite 
employment decline in the city, the Central Business District was  
demonstrating growth. Investments were also concentrating in that area 
with over $880 million invested in the Central Business District, Lafayette 
Park, and Rivertown areas between 2010 and 2012 (7.2 SQ MI Report:  
A Report on Greater Downtown Detroit, 2013).
Considering these upward trends in growth and investments, accelerating 
this revitalization became the central justification in labeling the space an 
innovation district. As one respondent at the state level stated when asked 
the purpose for an innovation district in Detroit:
“[T]his should be something where we are unabashed and unafraid 
to say, we’re gonna double down in this area because it is important, 
because we cannot fail. And so, it doesn’t mean we’re screwing over 
the rest of the state, it doesn’t mean we are not going to invest  
anywhere else, but we are absolutely going to prioritize some  
commitments here” (personal communication, 2015).
In the 2014 public declaration of the Detroit Innovation District, officials 
did not specify the exact geographic boundaries of the district, preferring 
instead to name general areas it would encompass, thus foreshadowing 
internal disagreements on the official boundary. Consistent across all maps 
is the Woodward Avenue corridor as a focal point of the innovation district. 
The main differences between the various iterations are the fluctuations 
with the Corktown neighborhood line on the western border and the New 
Center neighborhood on the northern border (see Figure 5-6).
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Figure 5-6. Detroit Innovation District borders from 2013 – 2015.
Source: Author, 2019
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In all maps, Eastern Market also remains outside of the district. Unlike the 
formerly bustling urban agriculture markets in Chicago and New York with 
warehouse structures now converted into trendy lofts or office spaces,  
Detroit’s Eastern Market maintains its economic vitality as an operating 
market in the heart of the city. Depending on whom you ask, Eastern 
Market sits either on the periphery or within the boundaries of Detroit’s 
Innovation District. This is an important distinction. Proponents for its 
inclusion argue that urban agriculture is a growing sector with  
opportunities to demonstrate innovation through leadership and new  
conceptions of agricultural production. In addition, as a popular  
destination for a diverse array of people, Eastern Market epitomizes the 
type of spontaneous interaction innovation district boosters proclaim as 
necessary for innovation. In fact, in 2013, the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, a university that has significantly invested in developing the 
area surrounding its urban campus, recognized Eastern Market as a prime 
example of urban placemaking (Silberberg, Lorah, Disbrow, & Muessig, 
2013). However, opponents’ concerns center on the health and sanitation 
issues posed by an industry that slaughters animals on site. This raises 
questions about the idea of what innovation is and what it is supposed to do 
and if agriculture and livestock too closely connote an antiquated model of 
production not suitable for the tech economy. Furthermore, some  
respondents believe the layout of the Eastern Market impedes the ability  
to build around density.
6   CHALLENGES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO ITS DEMISE
Spatially, a tension exists in determining the hard lines between where 
the innovation district begins and where it ends. But this same tension is 
evident in terms of the types of knowledge that can exist within the space. 
Whereby one individual adamantly believes that it is incorrect to target 
specific sectors because it will limit the possibility for new innovative and 
emergent sectors, another feels strongly that “[MSU’s] music school, isn’t 
necessarily helping in the innovation space” (personal communication, 
2015). When asked what elements do not belong within the space, one 
respondent’s answer included the jail residing in the Downtown, heavy 
manufacturing, and a single-family house on 50 acres enclosed by a white 
picket fence, specifying:
6.1 Lack of definitional clarity
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“So I think that there are a number of different things and not all 
of them negative, they just don’t belong in the area, if you define it 
as a dense, vital, connected environment, just intuitively as you go 
through the list, you say, ‘ok, this makes sense and this doesn’t’”  
(personal communication, 2015).
Another respondent said, “I think that there are innovative things that are 
going on in [sic.] the craftsman side as well [that] probably don’t fit most 
people’s definitions, but they do from an asset building perspective for us” 
(personal communication, 2015). The lack of agreement among invested 
stakeholders between what ought and what ought not to exist in the space 
challenges the dissemination of the strategy. This issue is not easily resolved 
as fundamental disagreements exist among stakeholders on whether  
creating limits curtails the possibility for new innovations or if it is im- 
perative to set clear cut boundaries.
A clear definition for the term innovation never appears in any of the  
unpublished drafts documents describing the Detroit Innovation District. 
This holds true for the state level organizing committee, the advisory  
committee, and the working groups. The ambiguity of the term purpose-
ly leaves open space for interpretation of the term. Individual actors can 
strategically position the definition of innovation and the purpose of the 
district relative to their own personal interests so to marshal people and 
resources to achieve particular goals. At the same time, the purported 
flexibility in how the term is interpreted and how it is meant to indicate a 
welcoming of novel ideas or approaches is actually constrained in practice 
because the lack of agreement kept the strategy at a standstill.
6.2 Regional inclusion
One point of contention is the frustration among the local innovation 
district stakeholders on the lack of regional collaboration between those 
charged with the implementation of the strategy and nearby research uni-
versities. Take for example this comment: “I think the third stream of work, 
which to me is more interesting and potentially compelling in the long run, 
but is harder to land, is how do we get the three universities doing more in 
the city. The three, meaning Wayne [State], and [University of]  
Michigan, and Michigan State, and if you look at them as the largest  
producers of knowledge in the region, how do we translate that to more 
actions like commercialization within the city of Detroit? I think that is not 
an easy question to answer” (personal communication, 2015).
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The University Research Corridor, an alliance between the three R1  
research universities in Michigan (Wayne State University, University of 
Michigan, and Michigan State University), works to mediate such divisive 
comments. From its perspective, the tools to accommodate the knowledge 
economy are not changing fast enough: “policy makers aren’t on the  
cutting or the bleeding edge, they’re thinking on the trailing edge”  
(personal communication, 2016). The organization is quick to point out 
that Michigan’s regional health is demonstrated in the 32,000 students  
that graduate yearly from Michigan universities. Whereas in the early 2000s 
Michigan did not have enough job opportunities to capture these graduates, 
forecasts are demonstrating growing possibilities due to Amazon, Google, 
and Microsoft having operations in Michigan, as well as Ford hiring  
programmers and software engineers to accommodate its new identity  
as a mobilities company. However, these job opportunities are primarily 
located outside of the Detroit Innovation District and outside of Detroit. 
Even those that are not would still complicate the problem of people com-
muting to work rather than living within the city, negating aspirations to 
create a contained live-work-play environment.
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6.3 Placemaking
The pressure to compete with other cities for talent circumvents a tactic to 
build a knowledge economy. The Detroit Innovation District stake- 
holders readily acknowledged what they stand to lose in the “war for talent” 
(personal communication, 2015) if “they need to be running but are  
actually moving at a very slow pace” (ibid.). Acquiring talent and address-
ing the immediate needs of the residents becomes the prime consideration, 
while fostering an innovation ecosystem is considered the responsibility of 
others: “I’ll let the Mayor figure those things out, I’ll let the federal govern-
ment figure those things out, my job is to get people the things they want 
now” (personal communication, 2015). “[C]reating distinctions between 
innovation and entrepreneurship is unnecessary for this position because 
I just need to focus on the pragmatic side of developing the city” (ibid.). 
This sentiment is a reoccurring theme among stakeholders and highlights 
the problems of visibility and funding. As one respondent expressed, the 
complication of building an innovation district is that it first requires an 
element of success before people will actually stand behind the concept and 
“wave the flag” (personal communication, 2015). This is true for economic 
development and planning endeavors necessitating proof of initial success 
in order to expand (Myrdal, 1957).
Standing behind the concept requires two things. The first is the obstacle of 
demonstrating the purpose of focusing on innovation. However, as more 
than one respondent stated, the “innovation concept is still very squishy” 
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(personal communication, 2015). The second is the need to demonstrate 
success, or at least progress, and this is most readily accomplished by 
physical changes to the environment. Therefore, as repeatedly expressed by 
respondents, among government it became apparent that the concept was 
more about activating blighted areas and less about the innovation piece for 
the city (see below).
There exists a fervent belief in the importance of experience of place to 
attract talent. Here I do not refer to having the right funding sources or the 
right types of research, I am precisely referring to the experience of place as 
the focal point respondents gravitate toward so that these types of  
comments became common:
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“Placemaking is critical to create the culture and reviving the density 
for the people doing the innovating. The innovating itself comes from 
the creativity of the individual doing the work. But without the place-
making they don’t want to be in that space to do the work. So that 
is why you’re seeing growth in the region happen in areas that have 
superior placemaking” (personal communication, 2015).
“[T]ake the place and make it more receptive and welcoming” (per-
sonal communication, 2015).
“[T]he most important thing is not so much the development of the 
individual patent or issue but can the culture of the district be one 
where it is walkable, bikeable, and hyper caffeinated. Cause that is 
where creativity happens” (personal communication, 2015).
Stakeholders firmly believe creating a welcoming and safe place to live 
is sufficient to attract the talent and firms that are integral to fostering a 
knowledge economy. The goal becomes creating a physically compelling 
site because, as one respondent vehemently argued, “people aren’t going 
to decide to live here because it is an innovation district. I mean, they are 
going to decide to live here cause it’s like a cool classic mixed-use district, 
they want the bars and restaurants, they’re not moving here because there 
is some worker space on the corner” (personal communication, 2015). 
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This demonstrates another example of the innovation component as too 
“squishy” since, for one, people are skeptical, and two, it is challenging for 
Detroit to focus on innovation when basic needs such as lighting, sewer, 
and safety take precedence in the declining city and stakeholders are work-
ing to cast Detroit’s image in a more favorable light.
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6.4 Space and Funding
Space and funding persist as problems. At the local level, there is more  
demand for incubators and accelerators than supply. There is a lack of  
physical and cheap space for high-tech/high-growth firms. As for funding, 
there is a disconnect between the actual versus the perceived access to  
capital and talent. Thus, funding for smaller enterprises is readily available, 
but the awareness of its availability, in addition to the procedural knowl-
edge on how to access it, is also lacking. The same funding pockets are not 
available for larger ventures. Because the current Duggan Mayoral Admin-
istration is focused on small business development, securing growth capital 
at the $5-10 million level is challenging. In addition, resources are  
concentrated in specific clusters, rather than spread out across sectors.
Many respondents attribute the lack of funding for later stage development 
and the reticence to spread resources across sectors to an overarching risk-
averse attitude of Detroit investors. A byproduct of such risk aversion and 
the comfort of investing in more established endeavors results in a lack of 
access for experimental capital, another critique expressed of Detroit’s  
innovation district strategy. Entrepreneurs attribute the lack of  
experimental capital to a dearth in “new money,” as opposed to the handful 
of foundations that are continuously circulating capital that is highly  
structured and controlled (personal communication, 2016).
The lack of funding is also equated with the inability of city government to 
hire forward-thinking leadership with an entrepreneurial mentality. The 
city has made a few prominent hires, such as Beth Niblock, poached from 
her position as the Chief Innovation Officer (CIO) of Louisville, Kentucky, 
to serve as Detroit’s first CIO and Jill Ford, an entrepreneur turned angel 
investor working in the tech scene (“City’s new star hire is a self-starter,” 
2014). However, in the eyes of many of the Detroit Innovation District 
stakeholders, the city has a long way to go in acquiring the types of experts 
needed to create a well-functioning innovation ecosystem.
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The information technology (IT) talent gap posed a heafty challenge for the 
Detroit Innovation District stakeholders. The factual reality is a brain drain 
punctuated by the destitute secondary public education system, which does 
not prepare graduates for jobs in the IT sector. Some training programs are 
underway, but by and large the concern remains the inability to find  
individuals with proper skills to fill the demand for jobs.
Two other challenges in relation to expertise were mentioned by  
respondents. The first is the critique that Detroit lacks the generational 
knowledge in managing a startup venture. This lack of expertise is also 
evident in infrastructural challenges. Small businesses face undue com- 
plications in obtaining required permits to upgrade the existing infra- 
structure because a system is not in place to accommodate non-traditional 
operating procedures. Common examples include zoning codes restrictive 
to mixed-use developments argued as necessary to attract a talented class, 
as well as obstructions to high-tech infrastructure development. One  
hospital executive, focusing on the need for speed in an innovative  
economy questioned the possibility of moving fast in the absence of experts 
on legal matters related to patenting an innovation, or a human resource 
department that can put together a job description for a production  
designer (personal communication, 2015).
6.5 Expertise
7   MODIFICATION OF STRATEGY
The Detroit Innovation District strategy in Detroit is under constant flux 
and, by most accounts, is no longer an active strategy. At the leadership  
level, one main division occurred between the advisory board members 
with ties to the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (DEGC) and NEI 
leadership. The former was interested in moving toward a high-tech, high-
growth business development cluster strategy targeting the food sector, 
medical health, and mobility, while the latter wanted a broader, more 
inclusive implementation to benefit a wider range of neighborhoods and 
residents.
In 2017, the Hudson-Webber Foundation, its parent organization, succeed-
ed in a second round of funding (Raising 2.0) to sustain NEI initiatives 
through 2020. As NEI leads the charge on the Detroit Innovation District, 
this has resulted in increased efforts to redefine the concept and streamline 
objectives. The last proposal on the table (2015) entailed creating three 
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funds tied to specific deliverables (Detroit Innovation District: Update for 
DiD Advisory Committee, 2015). The first is the Detroit Innovation Real 
Estate Fund (DIRT). Its purpose is to activate the role of place for  
innovation and entrepreneurial uses. NEI funds $0.5 million, in addition 
to $3.5 million contributed by Midtown Detroit, Inc., and Invest Detroit. 
Funding from NEI is dedicated to acquiring properties for commercial  
purposes, while $3.5 million is dedicated to assist entrepreneurial and  
business ventures in obtaining property and adequately preparing it for use.
The second fund (Challenge) is outwardly focused on improving the lives  
of the residents in any of the Detroit neighborhoods; in other words, it is 
not confined to the geographical boundaries of the innovation district.  
The purpose of this fund is for residents of Detroit to address problems  
in their neighborhoods. It is explicitly not intended for industries or com-
mercial enterprises. The model for Challenge is to emulate pitch challenges. 
Residential pitches are confined to addressing problems faced by Detroit 
residents with innovative solutions. It is perceived as a way to incorporate  
a characteristic of the innovation culture (the pitch) but limiting it to 
improving communities. NEI funds this program with a $1 million budget 
and would also own the delivery of the product, which can later be added 
to its portfolio.
The third and final fund is the Project Grant Fund. This $250,000 per year 
fund exists to help broker projects already under way or to seed projects 
that NEI identifies as focusing on community needs. An example of a  
project that it is funding is Community Fiber, an extension of Gilbert’s 
Rocket Fiber, an internet service provider, to two designated Detroit  
communities outside of the Detroit Innovation District. This fund operates 
on an open call grant submission basis or through requests for proposals.
Yet to be determined are the administration, management, and governance 
of the three funds. One possible solution is to establish three fellows to each 
oversee a fund: A fellow from NEI would oversee the Challenge Fund. Two 
others from two other organization would tend to the DIRT and the Project 
Grant Fund.
As it relates to the advisory committee, the last advisory committee meeting 
was held in December 2015. Two years after the formal declaration, three 
of the original advisory group members were longer on the committee. In 
addition, the working groups no longer convene.
One of the reasons attributed for the lackluster commitment was the 
absence of wholesale support and buy-in from the city government and 
administration. In addition, outside of the Brookings Institution and major 
Michigan stakeholders, the public was hardly cognizant of the strategy and 
the attempts to rebrand the greater downtown. In other words, at the local 
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level, the Detroit Innovation District did not function as a brand or as a  
signifier of targeted development within a particular geography. As two 
people expressed:
“Well, one piece of feedback that I heard from a couple of leaders was 
that our innovation district was, is, this huge lie, this huge box on a 
map. And while everyone agrees that there are different pockets of  
innovation going on, like the hospitals or up by Wayne State, or 
Downtown, everyone is like, ‘This is huge! Our innovation district 
is forced for miles.’ And I heard some people say it was actually like, 
five times the size of the biggest innovation district...why don’t we just 
circle the whole city while we’re at it, you know?” (personal  
communication, 2016)
“Some people felt like this stuff, some of it’s already happening and it’s 
just another brand to throw on top of a pile of brands that are all  
doing the same thing. So, there was definitely some skepticism. I’m 
not saying that it was deserved, but that was the challenge that I 
saw” (personal communication, 2016).
Based on many similar comments, one way to spin the outcome of the  
Detroit Innovation District is to proclaim that it failed as a high-tech  
innovation strategy. However, another way to frame its contemporary state 
is to recognize that the stakeholders adopted a global strategy and con- 
textualized it to better match Detroit’s reality. Like other economic  
development strategy fads, the buzz about innovation districts can be 
harnessed or co-opted to serve local needs. From the onset, the Detroit 
Innovation District strategy was largely criticized for concentrating on a 
downtown core that was already in the process of growing. The Detroit 
Innovation District strategy gradually shifted its focus to include the  
neighborhoods outside of the innovation district boundary and moved 
away from high-growth innovative startups to include smaller  
neighborhood-type businesses.
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8   CONCLUSION
This chapter documents the complications of implementing the Detroit  
Innovation District and provides necessary empirical evidence for a  
relatively young urban strategy rapidly adopted by economic developers 
and urban elites across the globe. I argue that the idea of an innovation 
district, especially with such an aspirational and promising name, makes 
it an easy and enticing strategy to grasp. In Detroit, a city with an obvious 
landscape of abandonment, this translates to stakeholders focusing  
primarily on aesthetic changes to the city to create lively spaces where  
residents can feel safe and buy into the narrative of Detroit’s comeback.
Like many other cities seeking solutions to compete on the global scale, 
over the past several decades, Detroit has embraced a long string of 
fad-driven economic development strategies. The innovation district is no 
different. Interviews with economic developers, elected officials, philan-
thropists, and other urban elites navigating the development Detroit’s  
Innovation District indicate how the innovation district rhetoric is a 
dopted to target development within a delineated geography. These  
boundaries create a space that allows the Detroit stakeholders to rationalize 
pro-growth policy despite the shrinkage occurring in the remainder of the 
city. And yet, even within the bounded space, the line between building for 
innovation and standard city development is blurred in practice, meaning 
that stakeholders recognize how grasping up and coming trends is useful to 
receive funding for basic city provisions.
There are benefits from Detroit’s attempt to implement an innovation  
district that can be separated from the many parallel initiatives occurring  
in Detroit not directly tied to the innovation district strategy. The first is 
that the Detroit Innovation District served as a platform to coalesce leader-
ship around a table to collectively discuss a tech-based economic develop-
ment strategy for Detroit. An asset inventory and categorization of stated 
aims was one outcome that materialized from advisory board and working 
group meetings. The second is that Detroit was given national attention  
due to the Brookings report and the amount of time Bruce Katz and 
his team dedicated to the city. This partnership also contributed to the 
above-mentioned asset inventory and provided a direct link for Detroit 
leaders to brainstorm strategies with innovation district and economic  
development consultants across the nation. The third, and most important, 
is that it highlighted the importance of inclusive city-wide development. 
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Considering the history of development favoring greenfield sites (vacant 
land on the suburban fringe) and the detriments that has caused to the city, 
the innovation district’s attempt to focus on creating density and retaining a 
job base in the city is positive. However, the boundaries of the Detroit  
Innovation District neglected outlying neighborhoods that constitute  
majority of the city. The focus of an innovation district, based on Brookings’ 
definition, is the growth of the tech-based economy. But the issue of the 
neighborhood inclusion diluted the strategy or made it less focused on tech 
and more focused on ensuring the inclusion of low-income communities.
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On January 4, 2010, the Honorable Thomas Menino delivered the inaugural 
address for his sixth, and final, term as Boston’s Mayor. He announced the 
creation of what would ultimately come to be known as the South Boston 
Seaport Innovation District:
1   INTRODUCTION
A new approach is called for on the waterfront – one that is both 
more deliberate and more experimental. Together, we should develop 
these thousand acres into a hub for knowledge workers and creative 
jobs. We’ll define innovation clusters – in green, biotech and health 
care, web development, and other industries. And there, we’ll  
experiment with alternative housing models. We will test new ideas 
that provide live/work opportunities to entrepreneurs and affordable 
co-housing for researchers.
Mayor Thomas Menino, Inaugural Address, January 4th, 2010
The announcement was met with excitement among some, and  
apprehension among others. Few were privy to the mayor’s plans for the 
waterfront beforehand, and the announcement left City Government 
officials wondering what steps to take, and businesses and residents in and 
around the district wondering what changes this might mean for their  
neighborhoods.  
Within just few short years, the South Boston waterfront witnessed a nearly 
unprecedented boom of construction and job creation. The first of its kind 
in the United States, Boston’s Innovation District became a poster child 
for innovation-led economic revitalization. The pace of development was 
staggering. A 2013 promotional flyer boasts the addition of over 200 new 
businesses and 4,000 new jobs to the Seaport since 2010, with over $1.8 
billion in new construction. By 2016 the number of new jobs was  
estimated at nearly 6,000 with even more development still under  
construction or permitted. The District attracted tech incubators (e.g.  
Greentown Labs, DryDock), co-working spaces (WeWork, Space with a 
Soul), a private college focused on entrepreneurship (Babson College), 
while the Cambridge Innovation Center (CIC, later renamed Community 
Innovation Center) took over management and event programming for 
District Hall. Old warehouses were rehabilitated and flipped into condos 
and studio apartments, with the Seaport notably becoming the fastest  
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growing neighborhood in the entire Commonwealth of Massachusetts be-
tween 2010 and 2015. Boston Mayor’s Office staff reported hosting weekly 
delegations of development officials from around the world, all vying for 
similar transformations.  Perhaps the District’s crowning achievement was 
the 2017 announcement that General Electric (GE) would move its  
corporate headquarters from Connecticut to the Seaport, bringing over  
500 high-end executive jobs.  
However, the Seaport’s tenure as home to scrappy tech start-ups was rather 
short, and the original vision of a 24-7 live-work-play laboratory for start-
ups and millennial tech-workers never fully materialized. By 2017,  
commercial leases had risen from above $50 and in some cases $80 per 
square foot—effectively pricing out start-ups in favor of banks, law firms, 
and corporate giants seeking to rebuild their brand image and attract young 
talent. The City was more than eager to modify its original vision to accom-
modate. After mayor Marty Walsh took office in 2014, the City formally 
pulled back its singular attention to the Seaport to instead support several 
“Innovation Hubs” in different neighborhoods around the City. They even 
abandoned the Innovation District moniker and formally rescinded its 
branding campaign. As one staff respondent claimed, “Nobody calls it the 
Innovation District anymore…”(personal communication). 
Today, the Innovation District is quickly becoming an enclave for “the 
empty nesters, investors, and people who live there five months of the year” 
(personal communication). Unlived in condos that sell for an average of 
$2,117 per square foot are flipped for at least $500,000 above the original 
price (Logan, 2016). Affordable housing is non-existent and rents in the 
District have skyrocketed (McMorrow, 2013), exacerbating gentrification 
pressures in South Boston and other nearby working class neighborhoods. 
High-end boutiques and destination restaurants line the waterfront and 
luxury vehicles navigate the streets. And although some innovative start-
ups still exist in the nooks and crannies of Fort Point, the foci of entrepre-
neurial energies have pushed further east to the Marine Industrial Park.
Was the South Boston Innovation District successful or a victim of its own 
success? Or perhaps the Seaport was always destined to become a high-
end luxury “Downtown South” regardless of initial efforts to steer it in a 
different direction? The answer likely depends on whom you talk to. Nary 
would an economic developer turn down the opportunity to claim home 
to the likes of Vertex and GE.  Yet, the Seaport no longer exemplifies the 
live-work-play model for sustainable urban development as strongly touted 
by the Brookings Institution and others. Instead, it has become more of an 
“edge city” or urban office park that just happens to be a stone’s throw from 
one of the most historic downtowns in the nation.
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This chapter considers the Boston Seaport, in terms of its successes and 
shortcoming, as a model of urban revitalization built on entrepreneurship 
and innovation. We begin with a brief orientation to the geography and 
neighborhoods of the Seaport, considering both the Seaport’s history as 
well as the relevance of the context of the broader Boston regional entrepre-
neurial ecosystem. We then quickly turn to profiling pivotal events that laid 
the modern foundation for the development of the Innovation District and 
its eventual transformation. We argue that although the Mayor’s support 
may have contributed to the initial recognition of the District as an  
innovation hub, once the idea took hold, the pace of development  
ultimately overtook the ability of public officials to buttress the district from 
market forces. 
2   THE SEAPORT, ITS HISTORY AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
What is now referred to as the South Boston Seaport did not exist in  
Boston’s Colonial era. It is landfill created through the dumping of sludge 
and sediment from the dredging of Boston Harbor during the 1800s and 
into the early 1900s (Figure 6-1). The modern shape of the Seaport began to 
take shape by the twentieth century with the western portion becoming the 
city’s hub for commercial shipping and rail transportation and the eastern 
portion becoming a U.S. military base acting as a key transport hub for the 
Army and Navy through the First and Second World Wars (Figure 6-2).  
Figure 6-1. South Boston Seaport, circa 1838. Figure 6-2. South Boston and Seaport, circa 1946.
Source: United States Geological Survey. Source: United States Geological Survey.
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The South Boston Seaport is not a stand-alone district with a homogeneous 
identity. It is rather a collection of four distinct neighborhoods—each with 
its own history and character, but whose past and future are intertwined 
through proximity and a series of deliberate actions to bind them together: 
Fort Point, Fan Pier, Seaport Square, and the Marine Industrial Park  
(Figure 6-3). To these traditional four, we add a fifth:  
Convention Center/D Street.
2-1. The Neighborhoods of the South Boston Seaport.
Figure 6-3. South Boston Seaport, circa 2018.
Source: Google Maps, authors labeling.
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The Seaport has its roots as one of the premier hubs for shipping and trans-
portation on the East Coast, and it was Fan Pier that connected Boston to 
the rest of the world. At the turn of the 20th Century, rail yards covered 
much of the Seaport, with the Hartford, Boston and New York railways all 
terminating at the Fan Pier terminal. Trains would enter the terminal, fan 
out, and connect to different shipping births (Figure 6-4).
Fan Pier
Figure 6-4. The Fan Pier Rail and Shipping Freight Yards (approx. 1900).
Source: U.S. Library of Congress.
As the shift to containerization favored deep water ports in other locations 
and the demand for rail waned, so did the fortunes of the Fan Pier  
terminal. Rail companies eventually sold their interests and the property lay 
dormant. This changed the completion of the John Joseph Moakley Federal 
Courthouse in 1999 – the first tenant of the new Fan Pier. The Institute of 
Contemporary Art (ICA) was the next major tenant. At the time, much  
of the areas was owned by the Pritzker family of Chicago, who intended for 
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a $1 billion hotel, condominium, and office complex. They put out a bid for 
a cultural component of their development on a donated 0.75-acre parcel of 
land, Mayor Menino selected the ICA (Flint & Abraham, 1999) and the ICA 
opened in 2004 following a massive fundraising campaign (Leblanc, 2003). 
The building, features a large public patio with contemporary bleacher-like 
seating prominently facing the water, is one of the few remaining low-rise 
buildings on the site.  
With the city’s vision for a new center of innovation and the Big 
Dig opening up new avenues for development along the harbor, two 
major projects—Fan Pier, which was initially owned by the Pritzker 
family, and the planned BCEC [Boston Convention and Exhibition 
Center]—helped usher in a new era of progress for waterfront  
development.
Joseph Fallon, president of The Fallon Co. as cited in The Story of Fan 
Pier, a Catalyst for Boston’s Waterfront
Jumping on the speculation bandwagon, in 2005, developer Joe Fallon, 
purchased the 21-acres of land on the waterfront between the ICA and the 
Federal Courthouse from the Pritzker family of Chicago for $115 million. 
The Fallon Company was already involved in three other major Seaport 
projects in the: a luxury condo development known as Park Lane Seaport 
(2005), as well as two hotels with connections to the Boston Convention 
and Exhibition Center (BCEC), the Westin Waterfront (2007) and the 
Marriot Renaissance (2008). His plan for Fan Pier was to build a $3 billion 
mixed-use development of office buildings, five-star hotels, luxury condo-
miniums, and high-end retail.
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Figure 6-5. View of Fan Pier from Downtown Harborwalk.
Source:  Renski. (April 6, 2017).
Fort Point
The warehouses and brick factories of Fort Point once served and were 
served by the shipping and rail connections of Fan Pier. However, deindus-
trialization and modernization of freight shipping took its toll leaving the 
neighborhood largely abandoned by the 1970s when its older brick urban 
fabric and warehouses were turned into studios and galleries by squatting 
artists. Fort Point later became the initial hub of start-up culture in early 
days of the Innovation District (Figure 6-5).  
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At the western edge of Fort Point is the Gillette manufacturing facility, one 
of the few remaining large-scale traditional manufacturing uses left in the 
neighborhood. To the east of the Gillette factory is where GE proposed its 
2.7 acre “Innovation Point” global headquarters. The original plan for  
Innovation Point called for the rehabilitation of two historic six-story  
buildings (formerly owned by the New England Confectionary Company) 
and the construction of an entirely new 12-story office tower. Plans for the 
office tower have since been scrapped, as GE recently announced it would 
be scaling back its Boston headquarters from an 800 to a 250-person  
workforce.
Figure 6-6. Warehouses turned Innovation Space in Fort Point.
Source:  Renski. (March 18, 2017).
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Seaport Square
Seaport square was once a rail switching yard for the Fan Pier terminal, 
turned parking lot (Figure 6-7). It is now in the next phase in the develop-
ment of a high-end mixed-use community in the middle of the Seaport.  
Figure 6-7. The view of Seaport Square, Fort Point, and Fan Pier circa 1999.
Source:  Boston Redevelopment Authority. The Seaport Public Realm Plan, (1999).  
In 2006, John Hynes, a Boston millionaire, purchased 23-acres to the East 
and South of Fan Pier with the intention of developing a mix of luxury  
condominiums, boutique shops, upper floor office space and restaurants in 
the area immediately south of Fort Point and abutting Fan Pier to the east. 
This development, now known as Seaport Square, is currently seeing the 
completion of its early phases along Seaport Boulevard.  When finished,  
it will mark the completion of much of the original development for the 
Seaport initiated under the Menino Administration. By its expected  
completion date in 2020, the 23-acre development is anticipated to include 
retail, offices, hotel space, underground parking, open air plazas, and over 
3,000 high-end residential units (Figure 6-8). District Hall, the envisioned 
hub for the entrepreneurial community in the Seaport, was the first build-
ing constructed for Seaport square and remains the most striking example 
of the city’s 30-percent innovation uses set-aside.
Note: Financial District skyscrapers in background.
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Figure 6-8. Artist Rendering of Seaport Square’s Pedestrian Commons.
Source:  Epsilon Associates, Inc, 2017.
The 190-acre Marine Industrial Park was originally the location of the 
South Boston Army base, which was decommissioned in 1974. In 1983,  
the city created the Marine Industrial Park by purchasing the Bronstein  
Industrial Center, a massive eight-story 1.4 million square foot complex 
once used to store military supplies, as well as some of the neighboring 
properties from the U.S. Army and Navy (“The Innovation and Design 
Building,” 2018) (Figure 6-9). The lease on the Bronstein building was 
split into two halves. The eastern side eventually became home to the Dry 
Dock—an incubator specializing in bio-pharma, marine and other  
businesses needing a shared wet-lab facility—as well as a number of other 
innovation-based companies. The western side was eventually renamed the 
“Innovation and Design Center,” first becoming home to the Boston Design 
Center (a showcase and workspace for design professionals) and later to 
ventures like the MassChallenge Accelerator, the Autodesk Building,  
Innovation, Learning, and Design (BUILD) space, a testing facility for  
Reebok, and numerous other start-ups including some MassChallenge 
graduates.
The Marine Industrial Park
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Although not typically considered one of the four primary “neighborhoods” 
of the Seaport, the area around the BCEC is slated to be the next major site 
for redevelopment in the Seaport. Like Seaport Square to its north, much of 
the 60-acre property where the BCEC now sits was originally used for rail 
yards and supporting warehouses. The BCEC was authorized in 1997 by an 
act of the Massachusetts legislature in light of growing concerns that Boston 
lacked a facility to adequately host major conventions and events. Along 
D street, abutting the convention center to the east, a number of old ware-
houses were recently redeveloped into condos, restaurants and boutique 
hotels. The western portion of the BCEC parcel remains a parking lot, but 
master planning is underway and may include some form of mixed  
commercial and residential space. 
Figure 6-9. The Innovation and Design Center / Bronstein Building.
Source:  Grillo, Thomas, The Boston Business Journal, May 27, 2014.
D Street / Boston Convention and Exhibition Center
124
CHAPTER 6:  BOSTON’S INNOVATION DISTRICT
Figure 6-10. The Boston Convention and Exhibition Center and D street (pre-redevelopment).
Source:  David L. Ryan. Boston Globe, “Baker halts $1b expansion of Boston convention  
              center.”  April 29, 2015.
3   SETTING THE STAGE FOR DEVELOPMENT
The seeming meteoric transformation of the Seaport from parking lots to 
global innovation hub undermines the importance of the several decades of 
massive investments set in one of the most vibrant knowledge economies in 
the nation. In fact, one could reasonably argue that even in the absence of 
Mayor Menino’s efforts, high-end development of the Seaport would have 
happened anyway.  
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The success of the Seaport cannot be disentangled from the larger Boston 
region. Boston is unique among our case studies in that it represents a  
market with deep innovation economy and a vibrant entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. For example, the Boston metropolitan areas consistently ranks 
in the top five for Venture Capital in the U.S., representing 10% of all U.S. 
venture capital investments in 2017.1 It ranks third among all large metros 
(population 1 million+) in its share of the adult workforce with a graduate 
degree, and is home to leading educational institutions such as the  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Harvard University, Boston 
University, Tufts and many, many more.2 The Boston Metro area has 12th 
highest share of online job postings in technology-related jobs.3 There 
are weekly entrepreneur meet-ups groups, established mentoring clubs 
and networks, numerous educational seminars hosted by area companies, 
universities, and incubators.  This is opposed to the more the common case 
where policy leader view Innovation Districts as the means for building a 
positive entrepreneurial climate by concentrating the scattered bits of an 
ecosystem so the might benefit from knowledge spillover and other scale 
economies. 
Although true that the Seaport was an underutilized industrial zone that 
suffered from years of disinvestment and neglect, the foundational entre-
preneurial infrastructure existed in the region long before Menino  
proposed the Seaport. In fact, several of our interviewees mentioned that 
the Seaport was conceived as a means for the City of Boston proper to tap 
into the entrepreneurial energy of the region that had largely eluded it.  
As one interviewee put it “…with so much talent and entrepreneurial  
energy, why not direct construction to the blanket of parking lots and  
empty warehouses that covered much of the South Boston Waterfront?” 
(personal communication). 
In particular, Boston officials looked at Kendall Square in the neighboring 
City of Cambridge with more than a fair bit of envy. Kendall Square is a 
mixed-use neighborhood to the north of MIT that attracted several early 
bio-technology research labs. Eventually, Kendall Square morphed into a 
start-up haven, claiming home to the Cambridge (now Community)  
Innovation Center (CIC). The CIC provides co-working and incubation 
space for over 400 start-ups, as well as research offices for many leading 
tech companies, including Hubspot, Apple, IBM, Google, Amazon, and 
Microsoft. 
Despite the noted rivalry, the economies of Cambridge and Boston are 
closely intertwined. The booming entrepreneurial economy in Cambridge 
directly and indirectly seeded many start-ups that eventually landed in  
1 National Venture Capital Association / 
Pitchfork data, https://nvca.org/research/
pitchbook-nvca-venture-monitor/.
2 U.S. Bureau of the Census, American 
Community Survey, 2017 Five Year 
Estimates.  
3 Based on an analysis of 2018 Indeed.
com job posting data. Available from 
https://www.hiringlab.org/2019/04/18/
tech-hubs-2019/. 
3.1. Regional Context and the Boston Area Entrepreneurial Ecosystem
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Fort Point seeking cheaper space or entered the MassChallenge acceler- 
ator program. Others, like Vertex, found the Seaport a far superior location 
to scale up operations and signal to the world that they were now a major 
player (personal communications).  While not right next door, the deep 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of meet-ups, mentoring networks, co-working 
spaces, and the like, that developed to support and sustain the start-up 
culture of Cambridge could easily be accessed by Seaport firms. Although 
it was not long before similar activities and support networks migrated to 
the Seaport with District Hall serving as the hub. Finally, the deep pools 
of young talent that attracts tech companies and venture capitalists to the 
region are not limited to a Cambridge address.
There is also symbiosis between innovation in the historic core of Boston, 
Cambridge and Sommerville, and the Route 128 corridor that now serves 
as the region’s inner ring. Route 128 was among the first technology  
corridors in the U.S. and became home to early tech-giants such as Digital 
Equipment Corp (DEQ), Wang Laboratories, EMC, GTE, Raytheon, and 
many others. While technological and cultural shifts favored rival regions, 
such as Silicon Valley, the knowledge, talent and capital emanating from 
Route 128 continues to fuel the region’s knowledge and innovation  
economy. The Seaport has particularly benefited as established companies 
like Autodesk, Reebok, and GE recolonize the urban core in order to access 
youthful talent and ideas. Smaller and scaling companies in the Seaport 
also find this location advantageous for easily accessing some of their  
corporate clients located along the 128 corridor and beyond.
3.2. The Big Dig and the Clean-Up of Boston Harbor
The single largest factor influencing the ultimate development of the South 
Boston Waterfront was the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, a megaproject 
commonly referred to as the Big Dig. Listed as the most expensive highway 
project in the United States, the Big Dig connected central Boston to the 
South Boston Waterfront through the construction of two underground 
tunnels (I-93 and I-90) and the extension of the Silver Line connecting the 
peninsula to the airport.4 The Big Dig broke ground in 1982 and was com-
pleted in 2006. The project continuously ran behind schedule and was rife 
with cost overruns that inflated its cost from an original estimate of $2.6 
billion to $14.6 billion. 
Nevertheless, the Big Dig has dramatically reshaped the city of Boston and 
played a major role in opening the Seaport for further development. With 
a dedicated exit ramp off the MassPike (I-90) and direct connections to 
Logan International Airport, the Seaport is now arguably the most  
assessible location in Boston. Its accessibility to distant locations was cited 
4 The Silver line is a bus-based rapid 
transit system connecting Roxbury and 
downtown Boston to the Seaport and 
Logan Airport.  From South Station to 
the Seaport operates along a dedicated 
underground right of way and circulates 
above ground on city streets for the 
remainder of its route. 
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several times as a key critical advantage of the Seaport in many of our  
interviews, and likely played a key role in transforming the district into 
downtown office park for corporate headquarters (personal  
communications). 
The cost overruns and continual disruptions and delays associated with 
the Big Dig may have also indirectly contributed to the elevated pace of 
development upon its completion. Richard A. Dimino, the president of 
the Artery Business Community, stated that the efforts of the Big Dig, 
‘’demonstrates a wonderful story about how Boston’s new central highway 
system sets the stage for economic growth going into the next millennium” 
(Daniel, 2006).5 Of course, this could only happen “as long as development 
continues” (ibid). As a seeming financial boondoggle, it was imperative that 
the city and the state recoup investments from the project and the South 
Boston Waterfront presented that opportunity. This, in turn, may have led 
the city to favor larger, luxury residential developments, hotels, and glass 
office towers over more “neighborhood scale” treatments, such as walk-up 
townhouses, schools, and markets. 
The clean-up of the Boston Harbor in the 1980s and 1990s was another 
pivotal event in making the Seaport an attractive place to live, work and 
visit. The Boston Harbor was widely recognized as the dirtiest harbor in 
the nation, surrounded by brownfields and suffering from over a century of 
contamination of sewage and sludge from Boston and neighboring com-
munities. Nobody wanted to be near the water, and the public was advised 
to immediately go to a hospital if they fell into it. By 1985 a federal judge 
ordered the United States Environmental Protection Agency to oversee 
the clean-up of the harbor, culminating in one of the largest public works 
projects in New England and one of the nation’s greatest environmental 
achievements. Thirty years of litigation and billions of dollars later, U.S. 
Court officers officially declared the clean-up complete in 2016.  
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5 The Artery Business Community, now 
known as A Better City (ABC), is a non-
profit with a governing board of business 
and institutional leaders.  Recognizing 
the benefits that would result from the 
new connection, ABC banded together 
to represent the interests of the business 
community and to involve themselves as 
the key intermediary between project  
officials and the City of Boston, con-
vening meetings on everything from 
construction mitigation to the number 
of highway ramps that would serve the 
downtown (“Our Origins: The Artery 
Business Committee,” n.d.).  To date, 
ABC continues to work with the  
Massachusetts Department of  
Transportation and the City of Boston 
and is in the process of working on a  
proposal for a long-term transpor- 
tation plan that will alleviate some of the 
congestion issues already evident in the 
commute in and out of the South Boston 
Waterfront (Powers, 2013).
Menino’s proposed Innovation District included 1,000 acres covering 
Fort Point, Seaport Square, Fan Pier, and the Marine Industrial Park. The 
Innovation District was not the first time these 1,000 acres were cobbled 
together, and these predecessor plans laid much of the fabric for Menino’s 
ultimate vision for the Innovation District.
In 1999, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), under Menino’s 
orders, developed the Seaport Public Realm Plan. This was followed a year 
later by the South Boston Waterfront Municipal Harbor Plan. Both  
documents seek to guide development and land use on the 1,000 acres of 
3.3. Precedent Plans, Waterfront Regulation, and Overlapping Authorities
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the southern peninsula with an emphasis on residential, commercial office, 
hotel, retail, and tourist-based developments. It is worth noting that the 
term “innovation” is largely absent from these plans, as are other contem-
porary concepts, such as the 24-7 neighborhood, that features prominently 
in later planning documents. However, these plans do outline the impor-
tance of mixed-use construction that underlies a vibrant 24-7 community. 
This would be accomplished mainly through the inclusion of housing, 
which comprises 40-percent of development activity under the Seaport 
Public Realm plan. Punctuating this, Thomas O’Brien, director of the BRA, 
stated, “The new housing to be developed must also have a sizable afford-
able component, and the BRA will not allow only the affluent to have the 
opportunity to live in this area” (The Seaport Public Realm Plan, 1999:  
p. i).6  Planning and development in Seaport is further complicated by state 
regulations governing waterfront development. Of particular importance is 
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection Public Water-
front Act, more commonly referred to as Chapter 91. Chapter 91 is a public 
trust that grants jurisdiction over land uses in state tidelands and waterways 
to the state Department of Environmental Protection (Environmental  
Permitting in Massachusetts, 2003: p. 35-36). Much of the Seaport are  
considered tidelands and any structures and other forms of physical  
development along the waterfront must adhere to Chapter 91.
Development within the Seaport is even more complicated because of the 
overlapping interests of local and state governments, not to mention the 
many well-heeled private concerns. While the BRA owns many of the key 
parcels in the Marine Industrial Park, most of the land is controlled by 
MassPort, a state transportation authority. MassPort-controlled parcels  
include the ship maintenance dock, the marine passenger terminal, and 
most of waterfront property east of D street. The 70-80 acres comprising 
the BCEC and its abutting properties along D Street also fall under the 
jurisdiction of a state authority – the Massachusetts Convention Center 
Authority. 
The practical relevance of Chapter 91 and the web of public control has 
likely been to slow the pace of private sector development, although it also 
ultimately favors larger developers with the legal staff and political capital 
needed to navigate the complex regulatory waters and curry favor with 
public officials in order to get projects permitted and approved. Although 
most interviewed said that the City and the state generally have a cordial 
relationship, it is also clear that they do not always share in the City’s vision 
for redevelopment. MassPort favors keeping parcels relatively underutilized 
for the sake of preserving the working waterfront and retaining the option 
for future use of its land for transport. This is exemplified by the current 
Chapter 91 license, which limits activities in the Park to marine industrial, 
transport and related uses. The City prefers a more expansive inter- 
pretation of permitted uses, including options for mixed used development 
6 Following the Seaport Public Realm 
and the South Boston Waterfront  
Municipal Harbor Plan, a wide variety of 
planning documents were generated and 
approved by the BRA for development 
of the Seaport, but none encompass the 
complete 1,000 acres of the Innovation 
District.  Each neighborhood has its own 
sub-plan that builds on the maiden  
documents: the Fort Point District 100 
Acre Master Plan (2006), the Fan Pier 
Master Plan (2007), the Seaport Square 
Master Plan (2010), and the Raymond L. 
Flynn Marine Park Master Plan Update 
(2017).
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and pedestrian scale retail and service, citing low demand for tradition-
al waterfront uses (Raymond L. Flynn Marine Park Master Plan Update, 
2017). Further inland, the BCEC’s primary interests for its parcels along 
D street are for additional lodging and restaurants to accommodate event 
guests, not necessarily to provide additional residential housing options, 
public spaces, or other neighborhood-scale public amenities.
3.4. Control over Development
Mayor Menino’s relationship to the powerful BRA was another critical 
factor that influenced the development of the South Boston Waterfront. 
Created in 1957, the BRA controls all economic development planning and 
real estate permitting in Boston. Any new development in Boston requires 
its approval. The BRA also owns much of its own land, collects its own 
revenues, and manages its own budget (McMorrow, 2014). For much of its 
history, the Mayor had nearly full reign over the BRA, namely by 
appointing all members of its five-person oversight board. Past Mayors  
opportunistically used the BRA’s power of eminent domain to raze  
neighborhoods and build signature skyscrapers (ibid.). For the Innovation 
District, all development required a final sign-off by the Mayor himself. 
Menino used his power over the BRA to steer development toward the 
South Boston Waterfront, while, at the same time, drawing key concessions 
from developers in order to advance his vision of a 24-7 live/work  
community. Furthermore, it is a poorly kept secret that Menino played 
favorites. He facilitated development in the Seaport for his friends while 
rejecting applications from those not in his favor (Diesenhouse, 2015;  
McMorrow, 2014).
4   BUILDING AN INNOVATION DISTRICT
4.1. Previous Developments
In 2010, when Menino declared the Innovation District, the peninsula was 
not completely barren. However, the 1,000 acres were dotted with a variety 
of ad hoc building and parcel developments with no real coherence or  
connective tissue. Many start-ups had also already begun to take up  
residence in old warehouses of Fort Point, attracted by the gritty vibe of the 
artist colony and the abundance of cheap and flexible space. Even as late 
as 2010, large swaths of the Seaport were still empty parking lots while the 
shiny new office buildings going into Fan Pier largely remained vacant. 
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While much of the waterfront was projected for luxury development, 
the Marine Industrial Park on the far east side of the peninsula was to be 
protected for marine activity. In the early 2000s, development favored the 
maritime industry with thirteen seafood processors, and marine industrial 
terminals, dry docks, and warehouses located on-site. The Big Dig trans-
formed a 35-60-minute journey into a 10-minute trip for transporting 
seafood. The Marine Industrial Park was a center for skilled blue-collar jobs 
and new innovations related to marine activity that were occurring at the 
time. But maritime and industrial uses never generated enough employ-
ment to fully insulate them from the pressure of wealthier development 
interests. In the mid-2000s, Menino considered selling off the Marine  
Industrial Park. Yet when an opportunity arose for Cargo Ventures to  
convert the building into office spaces, Menino rejected the proposal fear-
ing that it would trigger office development across the South Boston  
Waterfront and that the proposal would not sufficiently support industrial 
and blue-collar jobs (Palmer, 2008). 
Except for the uncertainty of the Marine Industrial Park, many believed 
that high-end development would eventually overtake the South Boston 
Waterfront, extending the downtown south of the Fort Point Channel. 
Speculations on the benefits of the Big Dig had spurned development  
activity from private interests and from Menino. However, Menino was 
concerned that private interests were dictating the growth direction,  
proposing high-rises and sport stadium developments. Considering that 
federal, state, and local government coffers funded $20 billion to prime the 
peninsula (i.e., cleaning of the Boston Harbor, the construction of the  
Central Artery, the Silver Line Transitway, the Third Harbor Tunnel, and 
the Boston Convention and Exhibition Center), Menino felt it imperative 
that a doctrine protecting the public use of space and dictating private  
development was in order (The Seaport Public Realm Plan, 1999: p. i).  
More than anything, this order functioned as a way for Menino to ensure 
he had the final say on unfolding development.
In 199,7 Menino began promoting the idea of creating a Cyber District in 
the South Boston Waterfront—a short-lived predecessor to the Seaport 
Innovation District. The Fort Point neighborhood was already starting to 
demonstrate the formation of a technology cluster, with some dot-coms, 
new media, technology companies, web design shops, and internet  
consultancies moving in. Even a Computer Museum was operating in the 
space. There was reason for Menino to be hopeful. Development in Boston 
was flourishing. The office vacancy rate was 1.3 percent. Buildings in the 
South Boston Waterfront were leasing for $42 – 47 a square foot in the area 
compared to roughly $65 a square foot just a few short blocks away in the 
financial district (Krasner, 2001). The eventual completion of the Big Dig 
could only accelerate the development of the South Boston Waterfront. It 
seemed an opportune time to push development in the South Boston  
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Waterfront. That is, until the tech bubble burst in 2000 (personal  
communications). This was a definite set-back for Menino’s vision, but he 
did not give up on it.
In the mid-2000s speculative developers Joseph Fallon and John Hines 
purchased and planned for high-end residential and office space in Fan Pier 
and Seaport Square. But when the great recession hit in 2008, the City Hall 
halted all construction and marketing on the South Boston Waterfront, 
once again challenging Menino’s visions for the peninsula (personal  
communications).
Still, the Mayor remained persistent, and in 2009 founded Boston World 
Partnerships in order to recruit and retain growth-minded businesses in 
Boston. Boston World Partnerships was initially funded by $1 million from 
the BRA and $400,000 in seed funding from Procter & Gamble. Later,  
Boston World Partnerships received an additional $170,000 from a  
foundation run by State Street Corporation and Fidelity Investments 
(Kisner, 2010, Boston.com). In 2009, Boston World Partnerships claimed 
responsibility facilitating the move of Retail Convergence, an e-commerce 
company, from Downtown Crossing to the Seaport (US Fed News Service). 
Boston World Partnerships calculated that their connection translated to 
$14 million in immediate salaries for the 100 new employees the company 
hired (Psaty, 2010).
When these connections were brokered, Fidelity was active in the Seaport 
and Procter & Gamble’s Gillette factory sat right on the edges of what was 
to become the western boundary of the innovation district. State Street 
Corporation, though not located in the Seaport at the time, moved there 
soon after the announcement of the Innovation District. These organiza-
tions had vested interests in the ongoing development of the South Boston 
Waterfront as, at this point, they were still surrounded by parking lots and 
limited amenities.
4.2. Menino’s Innovation District: Setting the Plan in Motion
“Imagine a place where an entrepreneur creates a new product while 
drinking coffee with a friend from the nearby university. After devel-
oping her vision with the help of local talent, the venture capitalist 
across the street funds her vision, allowing it to become a reality. In 
collaboration with the anchor firm down the street, that product is 
scaled and changes the face of the industry.” 
Hammar, 2015.
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Whereas previous development was fragmented and saw a series of fits and 
starts, the innovation district was Menino’s opportunity to build a neigh-
borhood and leave an enduring physical legacy. Menino had a long-stand-
ing desire to “leave his fingerprints all over the Seaport” (McMorrow, 2014) 
and had approached his staff not long before his inauguration seeking ‘big 
ideas’ to mark his final term (personal correspondence).  Andrew Feiberg, 
then advisor to the Mayor, suggested the idea of an innovation district,  
having been previously exposed to Barcelona’s efforts with 22@bcn. He 
felt that Boston’s environment for innovation-led development was ripe in 
many respects: college graduates who wanted to stay in the area; budding 
entrepreneurs lacking start-up space; an excess of underutilized and  
relatively affordable derelict warehouses; among other things (personal 
communications).
In the weeks and months to follow, the Mayor’s Vision began to take shape. 
The general approach was to focus on a handful of innovation-related  
elements and then allow the market to take over. The Mayor’s office  
dedicated a fulltime staff-position to act as Innovation District Director/ 
Liaison. They made accelerated permitting and redevelopment in the 
Seaport a top priority of the BRA and used their extensive permitting and 
review powers to mandate that new development include a 30% set aside  
of space for “innovative uses.” They negotiated the creation of District Hall 
to serve as the communal anchor for entrepreneurs in the District. In an  
attempt to keep rents affordable, the City permitted “micro”-unit apart-
ments and further required 15% of new residential units be affordable by 
middle- and lower-income households. They recruited the pioneering 
accelerator program MassChallenge and the up and coming pharma- 
ceuticals giant Vertex to move into the largely vacant office towers of Fan 
Pier, the former for no rent. They also actively recruited restaurants, food 
trucks, breweries and other entertainment venues to set-up shop and help 
give the district more of an identity as a 24-7 “live-work-play” destination.
After Menino publicly declared Boston’s Innovation District, he insist-
ed that the BRA and all efforts moving forward brand the neighborhood 
with the new name (personal communications). The rebranding of the 
South Boston Waterfront is starkly evident in the marketing materials that 
followed his announcement. For example, the initial master plan for the 
Seaport Square neighborhood was developed in 2008, two years before 
the innovation district announcement, by the New York-based firm Kohn 
Pedersen Fox Associates (KPF) with Hacin + Associates acting as the local 
urban design consultant. Not once in the 1,354 page version of the 2008 
master plan does the word innovation appear. However, in 2010, following 
the public declaration of the innovation district, Hacing + Associates in 
collaboration with the real estate agency, Boston Global Investors, released 
a new executive summary of the master plan. This document is rife with 
innovation district rhetoric. Fueling this momentum, Menino assigned his 
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staff to continuously deliver presentations on his Innovation District. These 
documents, too, are filled with the promise of how space can fuel  
innovation (personal communications).
Establishing MassChallenge in the Seaport was perhaps the single most 
pivotal event that helped sell the brand of the South Boston Waterfront as a 
1,000-acre cubicle for innovation. MassChallenge began in 2009, attracting 
start-ups from around the globe to participate in its Boston-based accel-
erator competition. When the 2008 recession hit, John Fallon could not 
advance on his $3 billion destination neighborhood vision. When Menino 
received the tip that MassChallenge was looking for new space, Menino 
negotiated with Fallon for free rent space in the 14th floor of One Marina 
Park Drive in Fan Pier (personal communications). A venture capital firm, 
Spencer Trask & Co., and MassChallenge launched the start-up  
competition promising to award $25,000 for a business willing to locate  
in the Seaport Innovation District. Menino publicized this award at during 
his keynote speech at Boston Globe’s annual Globe 100 breakfast at the  
New England XPO for Business conference (Denison, 2010). From this 
competition, one hundred and ten entrepreneurs won free office space, 
access to business mentors, and legal advice. An example of the winning 
selections included a bottle-top water filter, a convertible stiletto high heel 
(from high heel to comfortable walking shoe), and a floating wind turbine 
that generates electricity (Ryan, 2010, July 26). This activity signaled that 
the new part of the city was going to be focused on innovation. It also  
signaled flexibility in the space and growth in creating a cluster.
Three years into its development, Menino recognized the need to meet the 
demands for affordable housing. To incorporate Menino’s vision for a 24-7 
neighborhood inclusive of artists, Menino created new zoning ordinances 
approved for the development of new houses, called InnoHousing, that are 
much smaller in size than the average apartment and include shared  
kitchen and communal living spaces.
Menino approved a $150 million housing development with micro-units, as 
small as 300 square foot dormitories with shared living spaces and elements 
for communal lifestyles (Casey, 2010). West Coast development firm  
Gerding Edlen Inc. agreed to build these micro-units, stating of the neigh-
borhood that the area is “a unique place where art, creativity, and  
innovation all collide” (Kelly Saito, president of Gerding Edlen, cited in 
Casey, 2011, October 20). The first units were designated for the Fort Point  
Channel neighborhood. They cost $150 million to build and they replaced  
a 5-story warehouse. Of the 200 units to be built, 19 were to be rented  
below market rates. “They were designed for a startup crowd but are  
actually targeting a richer demographic, perhaps one that lives in the 
suburbs but may want a place to stay overnight now and again” (personal 
communication).
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4.3. District Hall: Productive Public Space
Menino commissioned the development of District Hall in an effort 
to include civic space to anchor the district. District Hall, a $7 million, 
12,000-square-foot, free-standing public innovation center, was built “to 
foster collaboration among the young businesses and entrepreneurs”  
providing a “place or them to gather, innovate, and create jobs”(Farrell, 
2013). Billing itself as the first public-private partnership focused on  
creating a civic space targeting innovation, District Hall is a dedicated civic 
space where the innovation community can gather and exchange ideas, 
its homepage proudly hailing it as “a new home for innovation in Boston” 
(“District Hall Webpage,” 2018).  Unlike other innovation spaces in the 
district that are not easily accessible and guarded by private security, one 
of the benefits of District Hall is that it is open to the public and contains 
conference space, labs, classrooms for budding entrepreneurs. The building 
was built by Boston Global Investors a part of its 23-acre Seaport Square 
development and was leased to the city for $1 a year for five years.  
Community Innovation Center (CIC) currently holds the lease and has 
ongoing responsibility for its operation (ibid.).
The design of District Hall seeks to convey the feeling of a “public library 
meeting a community center” (Hacin + Associates designer, personal inter-
view, 8/02/16). Shaped by conversations with Kahn Pederson Fox, the lead 
designers behind the Seaport Innovation District’s master plan, the design 
of District Hall required flexibility to accommodate a number of possible 
eventualities. The aim was for the architecture to provide a “hack aspect” 
feeling through enclosed outdoor space to capture people’s imagination and 
attract millennials.
Classrooms and assembly spaces line the front structure of the building 
leaving the back structure available to accommodate an open floor plan 
co-working space (Figure 11). Clusters of two-person or four-person tables, 
couches with low-lying coffee tables, and a long rectangular table to accom-
modate eight people sit in the center of the room. Additional workspaces 
line windows that look out into the backyard. All the furniture is moveable 
and the plethora of floor or wall electrical outlets ensure batteries are  
constantly charged. Two retail establishments located in the building serve 
to keep the space open for 16 hours per day: Brew, a coffee shop that opens 
its business at 8 am and Gather, a full-service restaurant and bar that closes 
its doors at 2 am.
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However, District Hall is more than a building. Within District Hall there 
was initially an office for an Innovation District Manager who served under 
Menino’s administration. The role of this position was to both manage 
events within the building, but also to create networking opportunities for 
users of the space and the public to attend. In this way, District Hall was to 
serve as an “anchor” for the innovation district concept (personal commu-
nications). In addition to its monumentality, District Hall is a good  
example of the centrality of innovation in society, as well as what design 
reveals about the new world of work. The benefits provided by District Hall 
include social connectivity, blazing fast Wi-Fi and Internet access, and easy 
access to transportation (personal communications). District Hall both 
serves as a space to congregate a nexus of activity in cheap space while also 
marketing and framing the vision for the Seaport Innovation District.
Figure 6-11. Entry Banner for District Hall, showing basic floor plan on the left
Source:  Kayanan. (March 18, 2017).
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District Hall’s BRA agreement states that the purpose of a public innovation 
center is to make the city more competitive in attracting emerging innova-
tions, businesses, and jobs to Boston, retaining starts and innovations, and 
promoting innovation in existing Boston-based businesses (District Hall 
121B Agreement, 2013). Within the agreement, activities that qualify as 
innovation related and are accepted on premise include:
1.  Storytelling, idea generation, research, design, product development/ 
     improvement, demonstration, entrepreneurship, new business formation,  
     access to business and market opportunities;
2.  Create opportunities for conversation, mutual learning, interdisciplinary  
     collaboration, open-ended exploration, problem-solving, and networking;
3.  Improve access to and development of talent and access to capital;
4.  Create or improve opportunities for collaboration within or across the  
     education, business, government, and civil society sectors;
5.  Seek to improve the cultural, urban, physical, institutional, and policy  
     environment for innovation.
To date, District Hall has hosted events such as Rock Band competitions, 
parties on the street, weddings and receptions, and galas. That these events 
meet the specifications for the use of space points to the complication of 
pinning down the inputs of innovation as well as how public space is often 
commodified.
Nevertheless, the city and many others hail District Hall as widely success-
ful. As the first public innovation center in the United States, it put Boston 
on the map and today serves as a model for the development of public 
innovation centers. It is an established template where entrepreneurs can 
connect with other startups for resources and where the general public can 
continuously access Wi-Fi. District Hall, its name a prominent represen-
tation of civic centrality, serves as a branding mechanism to heighten the 
reputation of the Seaport Innovation District.
4.4. From Start-ups to Giants
By square footage, most of the commercial space in the Seaport is not part 
of the innovation economy. Rather, it serves traditional business tenants, 
many in law and finance, hotel rooms, upscale condominiums, and high-
end retail (personal communications). 
Even many in former Mayor’s office admit that the innovation district 
brand was primarily a way to get momentum going. However, the reality of 
the location meant that the Seaport would eventually require larger, more 
established legal and financial firms to bankroll the development. In turn, 
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large corporations looked to the seaport to tap into the innovation potential 
and start-up culture of the urban core, rebrand themselves as cutting edge, 
as well as attract and retain a tech-savvy workforce who increasingly favor 
urban amenities and lifestyles.
Vertex’s (2011) move to the South Boston Waterfront served as a signal  
that Menino’s vision was coming to fruition but also sent an early signal  
of things to come. Vertex had recently received U.S. Food and Drug  
Administration approval for a new drug, which shifted their status from a 
funky creative research and development lab in Kendall Square to a  
major pharmaceutical company (personal communications).  When  
Vertex had the opportunity to build, it could not find enough space in 
Kendall Square. Vertex also wanted to show the world that it had a business 
model that could scale up. People taking off from Logan Airport could see  
a shiny building with the Vertex logo (personal communications). Vertex 
also received tax breaks for moving to the Seaport. Thus, when Menino 
declared the innovation district there was not much money in city coffers 
for additional development (personal communications).
GE provides another example.  In 2016, GE announced its plans to move 
its global headquarters to the Seaport as a way for to rebrand its image to 
aligned with its Internet of Things direction. The move would also allow GE 
access to young talent as well as benefit from localized knowledge spillovers 
for smaller tech start-ups. When Jeff Immelt, the CEO of GE was asked why 
he decided to relocate the company from the suburbs of Connecticut to the 
Seaport, he replied, “I want [employees] to walk out of our office every day 
and be terrified. I want to be in the sea of ideas so paranoia reigns supreme. 
To look out the window and see deer running across? I don’t care about 
[that]” (cited in Logan, 2016, March 25). The deal was sweetened by $150 
million in state and local incentives for its promise to bring 800 jobs  
(Logan, 2018, May 2).
Moving to the South Boston Waterfront also made sense for established 
companies due to the available large open parcels conducive to new  
construction, as well as space for bigger floor plans. As a case in point, 
Procter & Gamble, the parent company of Gillette, agreed to sell GE 2.5 
acres of the 44-acre Gillette campus for GE’s move to the Seaport. GE 
promised to rehabilitate two empty brick warehouses that used to house the 
New England Confectionary Company (NECCO), and to construct a new 
building that BRA would own and lease back to GE rent free for up to 20 
years (Logan, 2016, March 25).  But by February 2019, the declining statue 
of GE forced a major shift in its plans.  While still planning to relocate to 
the Seaport, GE announced it would downsize its HQ workforce to just 250 
jobs instead of the initial 800 and would no longer build its 12-story office 
tower.  Instead it would lease space in one of the two recently renovated 
NECCO buildings. Nevertheless, GE intends to complete construction 
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on its promised public spaces along the harbor (Harrison, Feb 14, 2019).7   
Today, there are few large parcels left available in the Seaport. Whether that 
means the larger companies will continue to buy out smaller companies to 
expand their operations remains to be seen.
5   ANYWHERE AMERICA: THE MODERN DOWNTOWN OFFICE PARK 
Six months into his declaration of an innovation district, looking out onto 
the opportunity to convert clamshell flats into a new development, Menino 
stated, “Everybody expects us to build high-rise condominiums, offices, 
and retail in the South Boston waterfront; that’s anywhere America. I don’t 
want to be that location of anywhere America. I want it to be a special part 
of our city, a leader in the new economy” (Mayor Menino, cited in Ryan, 
2010). Almost ten years into its development, Boston’s Innovation District 
has effectively priced out the possibility for startups and virtually eliminat-
ing the possibility for a true neighborhood. The Seaport has become exactly 
what Menino said he would not build: high-rise condominiums, Class A 
offices, and luxury retail.  
“Walking around the SID you feel you are surrounded by Goliath 
building. It is not built at a human scale. It is built for a square foot-
age and a dollar and capacity amount to make a certain amount of 
cash” 
(personal communication).
7 Failing to live up to its promised 
employment goals, GE recently agreed 
to forego $87 million of Massachusetts’ 
relocation incentives package. 
5.1. Entrepreneurship Priced Out
When Menino branded the South Boston Waterfront as Innovation Dis-
trict, the main objective was to resurge the real estate market. To put it in 
the words of Dot Joyce, Menino’s spokeswoman in 2014, they wanted the 
Innovation District to “create a big tent to encourage more businesses to 
consider Fort Point Channel, the waterfront, and the Marine Industrial 
Park” (cited in Kirsner, 2014).  This immediate drew the concern of many 
residents of the Fort Point Channel and the artist communities who had 
worked hard to retain the gritty and authentic character of their neighbor-
hood. In the words of one respondent, “[they were] pissed that young bros 
139
CHAPTER 6:  BOSTON’S INNOVATION DISTRICT
were going to be put in the neighborhood.” It took a series of community 
meetings and door-to-door explanations to communicate the right message 
to the Fort Point community (personal communication).
Some expressed the concern that a district based on startups was a doomed 
idea from the start because it was missing the academic leg. One business 
management consultant discussed the challenges of a lack of satellite  
offices, university anchors, or anything to suggest connection to the  
Boston/ Cambridge area institutions. Plus, it was obvious to this consultant 
that the South Boston Waterfront would suffer from cheap space deficit as 
the area was designed to be an extension of downtown and Back Bay. In 
other words, it was always meant to be high-end and expensive (personal 
communications). Some respondents, critical of the themed development 
of the Seaport, emphasized that Boston’s economy was already  
innovation-related and that rebranding any one component of the city as 
innovative was unnecessary. 
While Fort Point and Fan Pier served as the initial spark, the Marine 
Industrial Park now anchors the core of entrepreneurial innovation in the 
Seaport. The Bronstein Center has been rebranded as the Innovation and 
Design Building and outfitted with flexible floor plans and over 1.5  
million square feet for smaller start-ups looking for space in an incubator 
and scaling companies looking for room to expand.  MassChallenge moved 
there in 2013, after Fallon decided not to renew its lease in his Fan Pier 
building.  Other start-ups moved in soon after, including several graduates 
from MassChallenge. The Innovation and Design Center also houses the 
research arms of larger companies, such as Adobe’s Autodesk and Reebok, 
but also carves out flexible floor plans for wet labs, maker spaces, and food 
and retail amenities (“The Innovation and Design Building,” 2018).
Almost ironically, many of the smaller startup and high-tech firms that 
have been priced out of the Seaport are now moving into the spaces in 
the traditional downtown, namely the Financial District and Downtown 
Crossing. Places the legal and financial companies are leaving vacant in 
their relocation to the more glamorous Seaport. Some see this fabric as 
more representative of the live-work-play lifestyle in that it offers cheaper 
space (around $30 to $40 per square foot versus $70+ for space in the new 
Seaport office buildings), it is better connected through transit-oriented 
development, there are more residential options, and new restaurants are 
continuously opening (personal communications). Discussing the  
existence of any regrets in moving his company from the Seaport to 
Downtown Crossing, Art Pappas, the CEO of Bullhorn, said, “I like being 
where the next up-and-coming neighborhood is. I’m calling it Innovation 
Crossing. The Innovation District is kind of crossing the channel” (cited in 
Chesto, 2017).
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5.2. Not an Innovation District nor a Neighborhood
The Innovation District model is predicated upon the belief that dense, 
mixed-use, transit-oriented developments will attract the right mix of 
creative and talented individuals. These individuals will, in turn, collaborate 
in an environment conducive to the spontaneous interaction that leads to 
ideation and, ultimately, commercialization. Despite the planning  
documents that hail a narrative of protecting the public realm, ensuring 
diversity in housing, and promoting community, the focus on any form of 
inclusion has fallen short—particularly with respect to diversity of housing 
and work opportunities. 
It is telling to compare Hynes’ initial master plan for Seaport Square  
(completed in 2009) with the budding reality on the ground. An article in 
the Boston Herald ran the heading: “Rising tide for Seaport; Hynes scheme 
foresees homes, church, parks, visitor center” (Grillo, 2010). The same  
article cites “Hynes plans to add playgrounds and ballfields, which will  
contribute to making it a home for families” (Grillo, 2010).
The built environment tells a different story. The church was demolished 
and moved across the street from Hynes’ development, the amount of park 
space is seriously under question, and a visitor center was never built. WS 
Development, the commercial arm of the Seaport Square, proposed sup-
planting a 1.25 acre park with a new office building (Logan, 2017a, 2017b). 
For a while, within these same plan alterations, the permanence of District 
Hall remained in question. One idea included razing the structure to make 
space for an office building. When adamant support for District Hall came 
forward, Joseph Fallon suggested building a new center inside of another 
building. These proposed changes triggered an outpour of letters both  
supporting and opposing the idea. The discrepancy with District Hall 
points to the lack of investment in keeping the Seaport an affordable and 
flexible space for innovation. Despite the fact that the developer ultimately 
agreed to extend District Hall’s lease for another 10 years (Logan, 2017c), 
attempts to retain the Seaport as an innovation district are long gone.
There are no schools, libraries, or grocery stores on site in the South Boston 
Waterfront. The area lacks the feeling of community. This might be under-
stood from the perspective that the South Boston Waterfront is in early 
stages of development. However, if existing plans do not include these  
amenities, then time will not increase the feeling of community. Menino 
wanted a lively 24-7 neighborhood, but this outcome is precluded by the 
lack of public space and community amenities.
In terms of housing, one- to two-bedroom condominiums are the primary 
stock. Rare is it to find three-bedroom options, the type most conducive to 
families. Housing diversity also falls short in the lack of affordable options. 
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In the innovation district there is a 30-percent affordable housing require-
ment for all new residential developments. However, developers can pay to 
not build affordable units on their parcel but to have the city put the units 
elsewhere (personal communications). Once the market took over,  
developers were able to circumvent inclusionary development policies.  
Developers contributed a total of $12 million toward affordable housing 
and linkage funds generated by commercial properties brings the total 
to $31 million, but those monies have been spent developing affordable 
housing in lower-cost areas of the city rather than the waterfront (Collins 
& Forry, 2017). The live-work-play component of the innovation district is 
only for the wealthy. The rest must commute.
While it remains highly accessible for those coming in from Logan or east- 
bound on I-90, the South Boston Waterfront suffers from ever-worsening 
internal congestion. Mayor Walsh’s administration’s Go Boston 2030 plan 
seeks to decrease reliance on vehicular transportation, yet City Hall is  
addressing congestion by building more parking in the Seaport. One  
engineering firm will design a 550-space addition to an existing garage 
in the Marine Industrial Park, plans are already underway for 2,100 new 
parking spaces, and the Massachusetts Port Authority is constructing a 
1,550-space garage for $85 million near the Boston Convention and  
Exhibition Center (Ramos, 2017a). The heavy reliance on cars, minus the 
incorporation of schools, libraries, or large parks, leads some to state that 
the Seaport looks more like a suburban office park than a neighborhood. 
Speaking to this, Ramos (2017) described the Seaport as having a subur-
ban office park vibe: “there’s hardscape everywhere —surface parking lots, 
concrete sidewalks, overly wide streets.” The increased focus on cars and 
parking garages also begs the question of how this contributes to a dense 
and connected innovation ecosystem.
Blue-collar jobs and those in the service sector cannot exist in the pen- 
insula. A few indications point to the Marine Industrial Park slowly losing 
its grip on maritime industry. Jamestown Properties, an investment and 
management real estate company, purchased the master lease to the Boston 
Design Center and Bronstein Center in 2013 for $120 million. Incorporat-
ing the price of upgrades into the rent means that long-time tenants, such 
as Design Communications, a 40,000 square foot sign making company 
working over three-decades out of the Bronstein Industrial Center, will be 
pushed out (Logan, 2015). Furthermore, the recently completed master 
plan for the Marine Industrial Park strongly advocates for a greater mix 
of uses by integrating residential, office, industrial and other uses into the 
many city-owned buildings in the park. Meanwhile, the Boston Planning 
and Redevelopment Authority is already looking to new neighborhoods for 
industrial uses and blue-collar jobs for Walsh’s Imagine Boston 2030 city-
wide master plan.
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Back at City Hall, the general consensus under Mayor Walsh’s adminis-
tration is that innovation need not be confined to one location. In fact, a 
series of neighborhood innovation district initiatives are currently under-
way throughout the city (Mayor’s Office, 2014). District Hall, while initially 
only managed by an in-house Innovation District Manager, is now also tied 
directly to the Office of New Urban Mechanics and the Startup Manager, 
two offices within city government. The Mayor assigns a representative 
from New Urban Mechanics to rotate through the Seaport and the other 
neighborhood innovation districts. Overshadowed by glass façade high rise 
condominiums, the single floor District Hall seems to have done what it 
could for the Seaport Innovation District: namely, raise real estate prices.
6   CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED
On the one hand, Boston offers an excellent case study in what to do to  
promote innovation districts. On the other hand, it provides an  
equally valuable study of what not to do to if one wishes to remain true  
to the vision of an innovation district as a continually and self-renewing 
hub for new companies and new ideas. The importance of strong leadership 
cannot be over stated. The strong support of Mayor Menino and insistent 
promotion and branding efforts were pivotal in establishing the Seaport as 
an Innovation District. The mayor’s early efforts advocating for live-work-
play friendly policies (such as permitting micro-unit apartments, requiring 
set-asides for innovation and public space, hiring a district liaison to work 
with existing residents) all held considerable promise in crafting an en- 
vironment in which entrepreneurs and innovators could flourish. 
Yet, despite these efforts, the Boston Seaport eventually transformed into 
what many believed was always its true destiny – a shiny suburban office 
park that just happened to be in the heart of the city.  The Big Dig re-
opened the Seaport to the rest of the city and the rest of the world, and the 
clean-up of the Boston Harbor made it one of the most beautiful. The 2008 
recession hastened major high-end developments, such as Seaport Square 
and Fan Pier, allowing entrepreneurs seeking cheap and flexible space to fill 
the empty warehouses of Fort Point and develop roots in the District. But 
once the market picked-up, these developers brushed-off their plans and 
continued to pursue their original visions. The city either lacked the power 
or the will to curtail these powerful market forces, and the election of a new 
mayor, with a new vision, put a formal end to Menino’s plans. 
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The vision for a live-work-plan district in the Seaport is not entirely gone, 
however. Fort Point remains the home for many enterprising small and 
medium sized technology companies. Some of these tenants moved to the 
District as struggling start-ups when it was an entrepreneurial frontier and 
have since found the Seaport a useful space to grow. As one interviewee  
explained, when the company was starting out, Fort Point provided afford-
able rents in informal spaces and was relatively easy to access from areas in 
Boston. Furthermore, the youthful adherents to 24-7 coder-culture liked 
the gritty vibe and co-locating with the artist and artisan studios – even 
absent places to eat or get coffee. As other small tech companies moved 
in, they benefited from the agglomeration of ideas and the general buzz 
of begin part of a vibrant growing neighborhood wrapped in a cultural 
movement. As the company expanded, their needs changed. The internal 
accessibility to the city lessened with increasing congestion, the external 
connections to clients along Route 128 or access to Logan became more 
prominent. They added marketing and accounting staff who preferred to 
commute in from the suburbs. Some directly benefited from the influx of 
corporate headquarters and other well-heeled companies, who eventually 
became clients and partners. In short, the district evolved along with the 
needs of its some of its tenants.  
It is also possible that the vision for a live-work-play community might be 
realized at the far end of the peninsula in the Marine Industrial Park. The 
covenants limiting development to marine and related uses under Chapter 
91, coupled with state ownership of the drydock, marine terminal and  
several key parcels make high-end development highly unlikely. There is 
also considerable space for small and medium sized companies in the  
colossal Innovation and Design Center and its neighboring building.  
Furthermore, the recent update to the master plan clearly advocates for an 
increased mix of uses in the abundant city-owned parcels, including  
retaining some industrial uses while adding more amenities along with  
upper floor residential and flex space (Raymond L. Flynn Marine Park  
Master Plan Update, 2017). It also calls for developing a more ped- 
estrian-scale street network and additional public green space.  
Unfortunately, the fulfillment of this vision would be at the direct loss of 
some of the last remaining and dedicated industrial spaces in the city. 
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Chapters 3 through 6 describe the innovation district case studies,  
supplying detailed descriptions and assessments to help policymakers  
better understand and contemplate the economic development application 
of innovation districts in these four and other potential locations. This  
final chapter briefly reviews five key themes by examining contrasts across 
the cases. For these subjects, the direct comparison across multiple  
innovation districts acts to sharpen distinctions and clarify insights  
valuable for policy development. The last section of the chapter concludes 
the report.
1   OVERVIEW
2   COHESIVE AND EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP
For all that it is a cliché of economic development and policymaking in 
general, leadership has been critically important in the development of the 
four innovation districts. Although leadership may not refer to quite the 
same thing across each of the cases, as a broad characteristic its  
presence and effectiveness relate directly to the progress and positive 
outcomes we observed. The varying types of leadership on display and the 
different contributions of the individuals spearheading or managing the 
innovation district projects illustrate the diverse functions of leadership in 
innovation district policy development and operation.
Cortex, the St. Louis entrepreneurial district begun in 2002 that later 
evolved into an innovation district, was backed from its inception by an 
association of elite actors representing respected nonprofit institutions and 
organizations. The substantial resources controlled or steered by this group 
and the reputations of many of its members certainly contributed to its 
influence; however, earlier efforts to develop the entrepreneurial  
community advocated by many of the same individuals and organizations 
did not flourish in anywhere near comparable fashion. One difference may 
have been swelling anxiety over the continuing decline of the region’s  
corporate strengths and traditional industries. Yet comparable  
economic circumstances did not maintain efforts in the same way in the 
case of Detroit. The achievements of Cortex owe a great deal to its early 
champions’ capabilities to persuade, cajole, and maneuver to secure  
substantial institutional, political, and financial support.
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A different aspect of leadership is exemplified by the transformation of  
Cortex into an innovation district in the early 2010s. Dennis Lower, the 
CEO hired by the board of directors to rescue the then faltering effort, 
reimagined the site as a modern innovation district, then designed and 
led the implementation of tactics that accomplished the makeover. With-
out these two types of leadership, it is unlikely that the Cortex Innovation 
Community would exist in the form and with the momentum that it boasts 
today.
The trajectory of Boston’s innovation district can be traced through its 
leadership as well. Initiated by a strong mayor, the early development of 
the district was directed by the machinery of city government to generate a 
location explicitly and distinctly geared toward entrepreneurs and innova-
tion. The thriving entrepreneurial ecosystem of the Boston region ensured 
interest in the new district, including from plentiful potential tenants, yet 
it is hard to imagine that the particular site would have developed as it did 
lacking active city management. By the same token, the change in leader-
ship that occurred with the mayor’s retirement and replacement with a  
successor who was more agnostic toward the type and characteristics 
of development in the Boston Seaport proved to be decisive. Absent the 
leadership that had guided the Boston innovation district along its narrow, 
targeted development path, the critical entrepreneurial ecosystem  
components of the area could not be maintained.
The Detroit and San Diego cases also demonstrate the crucial role of leader-
ship in establishing and sustaining innovation district policies. The Detroit 
innovation district effort boasts the involvement of many local leaders and 
organizations, importantly achieving an unusual agreement regarding the 
need for a technology-based economic development strategy for Detroit. 
Yet this leadership group lacks unity in direction and commitment to a 
common vision. The particular issue of how wide to spread the umbrella of 
the innovation district, including whether and how to emphasize neighbor-
hood inclusion, has split and undermined the innovation district project.
The I.D.E.A. District in San Diego illustrates both the importance of leader-
ship and some of its limitations. Private sector actors, two real estate  
developers in particular, have led the development of the district by supply-
ing the vision, persuading landowners and other stakeholders, and hiring 
planners and development partners. They brokered a consensus on both  
the end goals of the innovation district and how best to make progress 
toward those goals. Nevertheless, the structure of the project is tenuous in 
depending on informal voluntary cooperation; relying solely on personal 
leadership for cohesion makes the future of the innovation district  
susceptible to deviating opinions on aims or tactics or to the departure of 
principal participants.
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Financial resources constitute a second major theme manifested through 
the case study narratives. Even though the four innovation districts exhibit 
starkly contrasting funding models, each case corroborates the significance 
for effective development of obtaining secure and sufficient funding.
The Boston city government provided considerable institutional support 
and staff resources to help guide the early development of the Seaport, but 
relatively little in direct funding. Instead, its strategy was to leverage public 
resources in order to catalyze private sector investment, such as expand-
ing public transit and issuing master leases while letting private entities 
conduct and manage redevelopment. Although this approach allowed the 
mayor’s office to guide much of the initial progress of the innovation  
district, control was lost with the pace of development and the shift of  
focus with the new mayor.
In St. Louis, it was the substantial initial contributions from the surround-
ing research institutions that furnished Cortex with the resources to begin 
acquiring land and developing structures. This early activity signaled  
progress and potential to politicians and other outside observers,  
convincing the City of St. Louis and the State of Missouri to delegate  
public land use regulation and financing authorities. The sharp contrast 
between the well-funded nonprofit organization and the chronically  
resource-starved city government assisted in persuading the governments 
to empower Cortex.
The Detroit Innovation District does not manage programmatic funding 
itself, but rather operates on the basis of resources available for component 
aspects such as small business development and targeted industry clusters, 
leading to inconsistent financial support across the entrepreneurial eco- 
system. Furthermore, with the City of Detroit slowly recuperating from  
insolvency, most of the funding for the innovation district originates with 
and is relatively tightly directed by foundations. These philanthropic  
organizations generally are disinclined toward experimentation and 
risk-taking, which are activities integral to a healthy entrepreneurial  
ecosystem.
Distinctively, the San Diego innovation district possesses no long-term or 
committed funding, and thus operates according to the strictures of private 
sector land development. Combined with a strong real estate market that 
offers attractive competing opportunities (see below), the requirement to 
secure market financing forecloses some options available in other  
3   FUNDING
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innovation districts. The consequences so far include compromise on the 
mixed use composition of development and a slower than desired pace 
of development, both of which may damage perceptions of progress and 
thereby hamper efforts to acquire additional financing.
4   ENGAGING WITH THE REAL ESTATE MARKET
We deliberately selected the four case studies to provide variety in  
regional economic environments (see Chapter 2). The two innovation  
districts located in strong real estate markets, propelled by dynamic  
innovation-oriented economies, enjoy opportunities and face challenges 
distinct from the innovation districts in relatively weak real estate markets.
Rapid-paced market development practices, escalating land values, and 
robust competition from development alternatives jointly constrain the 
possibilities accessible to the innovation districts in Boston and San Diego. 
Approaches that do not match the rate of return that accrues from  
developing the “highest and best” land uses are more financially costly  
and thus require more resources. Moreover, continuous vigorous real estate 
pressure makes it difficult to control the pace and direction of development. 
The Boston Innovation District demonstrates how the local entrepreneur-
ial ecosystem designed to include resource-constrained entrepreneurs and 
startup firms was overwhelmed and quickly subsumed by high-end  
development and facilities occupied by large corporations. This extreme  
a fate is unlikely to befall the innovation district in San Diego, at least in  
the near future, as the smaller regional economy and tourist-oriented 
downtown do not generate as much real estate pressure as in Boston.  
Yet the lucrative nature of residential development, luxury housing in  
particular, leads us to question whether the I.D.E.A. District will be able  
to create space attractive to entrepreneurial and innovative ventures in  
sufficient concentration to realize the economic advantages of an  
innovation district.
The much weaker real estate markets in St. Louis and Detroit permit a 
greater degree of control over development with fewer up-front expendi-
tures of resources.1 The Detroit Innovation District largely has been unable 
to embrace this advantage due to some of the other circumstances  
1 As a much more extensive example, the 
billionaire Dan Gilbert has achieved an 
unprecedented density of ownership and 
control of land in downtown Detroit and 
adjacent neighborhoods by investing in 
a multitude of properties purchased at 
extremely low prices following the city’s 
bankruptcy (Feloni 2018).
152
CHAPTER 7: COMPARATIVE LESSONS AND CONCLUSION
surrounding its operation, including the absence of an agreed-upon  
strategy direction and funding sources that lack fungibility. Cortex’s  
ability to purchase and control development and construction on its site is 
related directly to the scarcity of development pressure and restrained land 
costs in the St. Louis region, even for a swath of underutilized land directly 
adjoining several prominent research institutions.
The opposite consequence of a weaker real estate market is that it provides 
fewer market-driven development opportunities upon which to build,  
including in the area surrounding an innovation district. Economic  
development efforts in Detroit concentrate heavily in the downtown and 
immediately adjoining residential neighborhoods while most other sections 
of the city continue to wither. Consequently, the innovation district was 
perceived not just as a strategy for revitalization inside its own borders,  
but as a catalyst for remaking the surrounding areas as well. Cortex  
depended on its supporting research institutions as tenants and generators 
of entrepreneurial ventures until its progress was sufficient to attract  
outside attention and more diverse sources of demand.
5   ENGAGING WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY
The interface between the district and the surrounding community impacts 
the ability of the innovation district to gather public and political support, 
to expand over time, and to convey benefits to residents. The four innova-
tion districts have followed varied paths with regard to community  
relationships, ranging from cautious distance to coaxing to direct  
assistance, and these have yielded mixed outcomes.
The Detroit Innovation District’s extensive boundaries encompass much of 
the downtown and midtown areas of the city that were already experienc-
ing population growth and investment. Part of the leadership group pushed 
to extend the activities and benefits of the district beyond its borders into 
surrounding needy communities. Disagreement over the efficacy of this 
approach precipitated a rift. At this point, the strategy has shifted toward 
actions likely to benefit the broader Detroit community—in effect,  
abandoning the attempt to create a functioning innovation district in favor 
of more inclusive economic development policies.
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Throughout its development, Cortex in St. Louis has been buffered from 
the surrounding communities by several features: its control over the land 
within the district, the large institutional campuses and an interstate high-
way that border the district on three sides, and the residential preferences 
of district workers that predominantly entail commutes of at least several 
miles. Yet the innovation district has been forward-looking in engaging 
with residential communities. Cortex has cross-appointed advisory board 
members and contributed financially to the community development  
corporation working for the adjoining neighborhoods, and has been active-
ly involved in numerous local and regional outreach and education efforts. 
As the innovation district’s activity increases and diversifies, and its impacts 
on prices and community character expand, it remains to be seen how the 
nature and scope of its engagement efforts shift.
The city government in Boston initially engaged the occupants of the area 
to gain support for the innovation district, seeking to generate community 
trust and dissuade organized opposition following long-term neglect for the 
sector of the city. The local residents, however, largely artists and artisans, 
favored cheap space over posh amenities, and many were skeptical of the 
mayor’s innovation district plans. Unfortunately for them, assurances from 
the mayor’s office were short lasting. Soaring prices unsurprisingly  
accompanied the progress of the innovation district, and there proved  
to be no will to enact the robust policies that would have been necessary to 
protect residents from gentrification and displacement.
The San Diego I.D.E.A. District has sought involvement from and with the 
surrounding community from the start. The first phase of its development 
focused on engaging nearby residents through activating under-utilized 
land and involvement in designing the future vision of the Makers Quarter. 
Without any of the traits that insulate Cortex from its residential neighbors, 
the relationship of the San Diego innovation district with the community 
mirrors a more general conflict between current residents and regional 
growth interests. Real estate speculation already has resulted in dis- 
placement of low-income residents within the innovation district proper. 
As in St. Louis and Boston, residents of nearby neighborhoods, particularly 
those of low-to-moderate income, worry about rising prices and changing 
community character. Despite sharing these concerns, the leadership of the 
innovation district mostly feel powerless to address the issue.
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6   BUILDING COMMUNITY
Justifications for innovation districts that invoke placemaking and urban 
revitalization may relate to fashioning a functioning and effective  
community. Unfortunately, none of the four cases examined in this research 
demonstrate this aspect of innovation district policy very well.
The effect of San Diego’s I.D.E.A. District is more to redefine the local  
character than to create or improve the functioning of its community.  
The originators and proponents of the district argue that gentrification in 
East Village was inevitable, and would have occurred with or without the 
innovation district. They may very well be the case, with continuing  
population growth and extensive real estate development throughout the 
region. The innovation district, and the rest of the East Village neighbor-
hood, will keep only a physical resemblance to the community that existed 
previously. The community being shaped in its place has not progressed far 
enough yet to reveal its eventual characteristics. Will the innovation district 
achieve its aims of dense occupancy, mixed land use, diverse income levels, 
and a healthy balance of jobs and residences?
Boston’s innovation district strategy sought to establish a new community 
and connect it to existing and new job opportunities. The city wholeheart-
edly embraced the live-work-play mantra, promoting the creation of active, 
dense, mixed use neighborhoods as part of the innovation district. Yet 
accomplishing this aim was problematic in the face of swiftly in- 
creasing demand and mounting prices. As development gained in  
momentum, much of it became rushed, with insufficient attention placed 
on forming a functioning community. The newly constructed areas are 
short on civic amenities such as parks and other communal spaces and feel 
inauthentic. A vicious cycle emerged in which the lack of effective  
community building boosted insular luxury developments over more  
community-friendly alternatives, pulling development farther away from 
the community aspects originally desired.
The Cortex Innovation Community in St. Louis features a constrained live-
work-play aspect, emphasizing “work” and “play” far more than “live”. From 
its origin as a park for bioscience entrepreneurs, the district has catered to 
the preferences of life science researchers, many of whom are in family- 
oriented life stages, and who tend to appreciate a college campus-like  
environment. Most of the recently added amenities—a boutique hotel,  
a signature restaurant, a fitness club—follow the pattern of enhancing the 
desirability of an upmarket place to work and recreate. The challenges and 
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benefits of building a fully functioning community may come to the fore-
front as the innovation district continues to expand and intensify its  
influence on and interactions with the neighboring communities.
The story in Detroit may be the most straightforward. The area en- 
compassed by the innovation district simply is too large and dispersed  
to function as a single community. Although desirable locations are under-
stood to be integral in attracting talent and innovative firms, innovation 
district policies have not focused on the community scale. In a city that 
cannot reliably provide basic services over much of its jurisdiction,  
community building efforts might have further emphasized the develop-
ment chasm between the innovation district and the remainder of the city.
7   CONCLUSION
These five themes contrast the efforts and experiences of four very different 
innovation districts. Economic developers and policymakers seeking to 
establish or develop innovation districts may recognize similar features or 
challenges of their own locations. Although we consider these themes to be 
especially salient, they are just a few selected from the many detailed obser-
vations and topics contained in the four case-specific chapters that  
constitute the heart of the report. We urge readers to consider how  
understandings of the events and circumstances of each of the cases may be 
applied to improve policy efforts elsewhere.
As a final recommendation, we encourage researchers to return to the 
subject of innovation districts. As stated in Chapter 1 and elsewhere in this 
report, it is too early to conduct a systematic appraisal of the achievements 
of innovation districts with regard to urban economic development. In this 
study we have focused on distinguishing pertinent features of the selected 
districts and their environments, relating their design and implementation 
approaches to economic development goals, revealing looming challenges, 
and discerning emerging consequences for the encompassing communities 
and regions. We have not attempted to estimate the outcomes and impacts 
of innovation districts in a manner that is generalizable across locales. With 
their popularity continuing to spread across the United States and the rest 
of the world, we anticipate there will be much future value and interest in 
judging the effectiveness of innovation districts, along with abundant  
choices for empirical evaluation.
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE
OVERVIEW 
Focus   To solicit the informant’s views regarding the formation, goals, operation, and  
  achievements of the innovation district and its constituent operations. 
Targets  Innovation district planners and implementers, local economic development  
  officials and experts, residents and businesses within the innovation district 
Number  anticipate 20-25 per case 
Length  approximately 60 minutes 
Record  written notes
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Provide a clear statement of project subject and purpose and objectives of interview:
 • study explores design, justifications, features, operation of innovation districts
 • interview will gather respondent views on features of innovation districts and factors  
    that affect implementation and effectiveness of innovation district policies
Identify researchers:
 • study is conducted by a research team led by University of Illinois at Chicago
 • introduce interviewer(s)
Remind interviewee of confidentiality rights:
 • no information or views will be released in a way that identifies interviewee or his or her  
    organization with subsequent explicit permission.
 • interviewee may decline to respond to any question or portion of a question.
Thank interviewee for his or her time and willingness to help!
QUESTIONS
The questions below are guides; the interviewer(s) should modify appropriately as each interview  
develops while also attempting to cover all relevant principal topics.
Part I: For Economic Developers and Policymakers
A.  Scope: Innovation District, Innovation
 1.  What is the mission or predominant purpose of the innovation district?
 2.  Does the innovation district formally define what is considered innovation?
 3.  What kinds of economic activities are being sought for the innovation district?
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B.  Rationales
 1.  What is the purpose or justification for the innovation district?
 2.  What can the innovation district uniquely accomplish that could not be achieved  
       through other means?
 3.  What do you hope the innovation district achieves?
C.  Innovation District Development and Features
 1.  What are the key features of the innovation district that encourage innovation?
 2.  What policies and programs encourage and support innovation?
  a.  Are these policies specific to the innovation district  
       (as opposed to city- or region-wide)?
  b.  Which of these policies and programs are most important and why?
 3.  What current developments are occurring with the innovation district?
 4.  Which features and programs of the innovation district…
  a.  are fully in place
  b.  are partially in place
  c.  are planned but are not yet in place
 5.  What is the anticipated sequence or schedule for policies and features to be  
      put into effect?
  a.  What are the reasons behind this sequencing?
  b.  Are portions of this sequence dictated or constrained? If so:
   i.  which portions and why?
 6.  Are there other features that would desirable that are not yet planned?
 7.  Are you familiar with other innovation districts? If so:
  a.  How is this innovation district similar to those?
  b.  How is this innovation district distinct from those?
  c.  What are the reasons for the differences?
D.  Financing
 1.  What features and programs of the innovation district require financing?
  a.  initial capitalization
  b. cfunding on an ongoing basis
 2.  How was the innovation district financed initially?
 3.  How are the various programs of the innovation district anticipated to be  
      funded on an ongoing basis?
E.  Outreach and Involvement
 1.  For whom is the innovation district aimed?
 2.  How and by whom has the involvement of different organizations been determined?
  a.  Are specific individual organizations targeted?
 3.  Have any organizations rejected participation? If so:
  a.  Why did that rejection occur?
 4.  Have any organizations themselves requested participation?
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 5.  How is the innovation district promoted and marketed?
 6.  How are firms, innovation workers, and other entities targeted or selected?
 7.  How do organizations participate in the innovation district?
  a.  What are some of the different roles played by different types of firms  
        and organizations?
F.  Outcomes
 1.  What do you envision the innovation district being like in 5 years? In 10 years?
 2.  What outcomes or measures are being used to judge progress or success?
 3.  Are there other ways to measure the success of the innovation district that you think  
      would be suitable or preferable?
 4.  What is the time frame for ascertaining success?
 5.  What would an ideal surrounding environment for supporting the success of the 
      innovation district be like?
G.  Challenges
 1.  Are there any issues or circumstances that have been particularly challenging with  
      the innovation district?
 2.  Are there or have there been discrepancies in the vision for or implementation of  
      the innovation district? If so:
  a.  Have they been resolved? If they have been resolved:
   i.   how were they resolved?
   ii.  are they resolved satisfactorily?
H.  Follow Up
 1.  May we contact you again later [in 4-6 months] to ask how some of the responses you  
      gave us may have changed?
 2.  Can you suggest particular issues or developments we ought to consider to better  
      understand the innovation district?
 3.  Are there any additional individuals you suggest we speak with?
 4.  Is there anything else you wish to tell us?
Part II: For Organizations and Stakeholders
A.  Scope: Innovation District, Innovation
 1.  What do you consider to be innovation within the intentions of the innovation district?
 2.  Is your [firm / organization] innovative? Why or why not?
B.  Innovation District Development and Features
 1.  What are the key features of the innovation district that encourage innovation?
 2.  What policies and programs encourage and support innovation?
  a.  Are these policies specific to the innovation district (as opposed to city-  
       or region-wide)?
  b.  Which of these policies and programs are most important and why?
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 3.  What current developments are occurring with the innovation district?
 4.  Which features and programs of the innovation district…
  a.  are fully in place
  b.  are partially in place
  c.  are planned but are not yet in place
 5.  What is the anticipated sequence or schedule for policies and features to be put into effect?
  a.  What are the reasons behind this sequencing?
  b.  Are portions of this sequence dictated or constrained? If so:
   i.  which portions and why?
 6.  Are there other features that would desirable that are not yet planned?
 7.  Are you familiar with other innovation districts? If so:
  a.  How is this innovation district similar to those?
  b.  How is this innovation district distinct from those?
  c.  What are the reasons for the differences?
C.  Outcomes
 1.  What do you envision the innovation district being like in 5 years? In 10 years?
 2.  What outcomes or measures are being used to judge progress or success?
 3.  Are there other ways to measure the success of the innovation district that you think  
      would be suitable or preferable?
 4.  What is the time frame for ascertaining success?
 5.  What would an ideal surrounding environment for supporting the success of the  
       innovation district be like?
D.  Involvement and Benefits
 1.  What does the innovation district provide in general?
 2.  How did you find out about the innovation district?
 3.  In what ways have [you / your organization] been involved with the innovation district?
 4.  What do you expect to gain from your [involvement with / location within] the  
       innovation district?
 5.  Does the innovation district aid your interactions with other firms / organizations at the  
      regional, national, or international scales?
 6.  How responsive are innovation district policies and designs to the needs of your [business / 
      organization]?
 7.  How responsive have innovation district [administrators / policymakers / economic  
      developers] been to the needs of your [business / organization]?
E.  Challenges
 1.  Are there any circumstances that have been particularly challenging with regard to the  
      innovation district?
162
APPENDIX 1
 2.  Are there any issues currently preventing [you / your organization] from participating  
      fully or gaining the most possible benefits from your involvement with the innovation  
      district?
F.  Follow Up
 1.  May we contact you again later [in 4-6 months] to ask how some of the responses you  
      gave us may have changed?
 2.  Can you suggest particular issues or developments we ought to consider to better  
      understand the innovation district?
 3.  Are there any additional individuals you suggest we speak with?
 4.  Is there anything else you wish to tell us?
APPENDIX 2: RECRUITMENT SCRIPT
For initial telephone or email contact with potential interviewee.
Dear [name of potential respondent],
My name is [Joshua Drucker]. I am a [professor] of urban planning at the University of Illinois at Chicago. 
I am conducting a study of innovation districts as a new strategy for urban economic development. The 
study is being funded by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, which is the nation’s leading founda-
tion in support of entrepreneurship and innovation research.
I am hoping that you would be willing to be interviewed by me or my research team regarding your 
involvement, experiences, and perspectives on the [name of Innovation District]. We are interested in 
finding out how local participants and stakeholders view innovation district policies and how they feel 
innovation districts might best be able to support innovation and local entrepreneurs. Any information 
you give us will be treated so as to maintain your confidentiality.
I will be in [city] on [dates] and preferably we could schedule a time then. If those dates are not conve-
nient, perhaps we could find a different time to talk with you by telephone, Skype or other communication 
method.
I look forward to your response.
Thank you in advance.
[Joshua Drucker]
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APPENDIX 3: STUDY INFORMATION SHEET
Information about:
Assessing Innovation Districts as a Strategy for Urban Economic Development
What is this study about?
This study examines innovation districts in light of the urban economic development strategy becoming 
increasingly popular in the United States. The goal is to better understand the design, implementation, gov-
ernance, and features of innovation districts, in order to provide information and guidance to help existing 
and potential new innovation districts achieve economic development goals while minimizing damaging 
inter-regional competition.
Who is conducting the study?
The project is being led by researchers at the University of Illinois at Chicago, with additional team mem-
bers at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst and the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. The research 
is funded by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation of Kansas City, Missouri. The Principal Investigator is 
Dr. Joshua Drucker, Assistant Professor of Urban Planning and Policy at the University of Illinois at Chica-
go. If you have any questions about the project, please feel free to contact him at (312) 413-7597 or jdruck@
uic.edu.
Why are you being contacted?
The project involves case studies of selected innovation districts in the United States. We are  
soliciting the views of participants and informed observers of the innovation district—economic  
development officials, business leaders, entrepreneurs, other participants and stakeholders—who can help 
us understand the rationales, development, and operation of innovation district programs and policies. We 
identified you through background research or through a reference from another local individual.
Is your participation required?
No. Your participation is entirely voluntary. We hope that you will agree to be interviewed by  
members of the research team to share essential information for the study.
Why should you help in this study?
This kind of research is essential in producing sound understanding of urban economic development policy 
and providing guidance for policymakers and economic development actors. Without the knowledge and 
perspectives you can provide, the study could not be a success. We will be glad to share our findings with 
you when they become publicly available.
Is the confidentiality of your responses protected?
Yes. The study is focused on innovation district policies and the factors that enable them to be successful in 
supporting local businesses and organizations, not on the people or businesses involved in the innovation 
district. No information will be attributed to you or your organization and no information will be released 
that could be used to deduce your identity or the identity of your organization without your explicit  
permission. Once we organize the information you provide, all items that identify your identity or your  
specific organization will be removed.
